Positivism is one of the most influential trends in Western philosophy over the past two centuries. Positivism has gone through three main stages in its development. The first stage is associated with the teachings of Comte, Mill, and Spencer. The second stage is the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avenarius. The third is the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (or the neopositivism of Schlick, Carnap, and others). Supporters of positivism are united by the conviction that it is impossible to construct a “true” metaphysics. From the point of view of positivism, statements about the substantial essence of things cannot be scientific. Rejecting ontology as an untenable pseudoscience, the positivists did not propose the abolition of philosophy as such. They believed that genuine (“positive”) philosophy should contribute to the progress of concrete scientific disciplines.
The method of implementing this task at different stages of the development of positivism was interpreted differently. Philosophy is a synthesis of scientific knowledge, including the basic provisions and methods of particular sciences; it broadens the horizons of a scientist, contributes to the achievement of the main goal of any scientific research – the prediction of future events and the practical application of this knowledge (A. Comte). The task of philosophy is to cleanse the content of science from imaginary problems, to provide a “regulator for natural scientific thinking” (E. Mach). Philosophy is not a system of knowledge, but a system of actions to clarify the meaning of propositions; “with the help of philosophy, propositions are explained, with the help of science they are verified” (M. Schlick).
The founder of positivism, Auguste Comte(1798-1857) was born in Montpellier into a civil servant’s family. He studied at the Lyceum, then at the Paris Polytechnic School. From 1817 to 1824 he worked as a secretary for Saint-Simon, and from 1832 he was a tutor in mathematics at the Polytechnic School. Comte’s main work is the Course in Positive Philosophy (vols. 1-6, 1830-1842). Comte’s philosophy is based on the “law of three stages” describing the intellectual evolution of humanity. According to the French thinker, both an individual and humanity as a whole consistently go through three stages in their development: 1) theological, 2) metaphysical, 3) scientific (positive). The theological (or fictitious) stage corresponds to the infantile state of the human mind, which is incapable of solving the simplest scientific problems. Man, being at the first stage of his development, strives to acquire (in reality, inaccessible to him) knowledge about the essence of the world, to explain all phenomena, to find the origins of all things. Such a “primitive need” is satisfied in a rather simple way: people consider the phenomena of the external world, explaining them by analogy with their own actions, connecting the events that occur with the activity of anthropomorphic supernatural beings. Comte divides the theological stage into three steps: fetishism, polytheism, monotheism. Fetishism consists in attributing life to all external bodies. Polytheism transfers life to special imaginary beings, which are supposed to actively influence the destinies of people. Monotheism is characterized by the reduction of a large number of revered supernatural beings to one and only. The metaphysical (or abstract) stage, as well as the theological, is characterized by the desire of the human mind to achieve “absolute knowledge” of the root causes. The difference between the first two stages is that the very principles of explaining the universe change: the place of supernatural entities is now occupied by abstract forces. These abstract forces are studied by a special discipline – ontology, which aims to explain the inner nature of all things. A typical feature of the metaphysical stage is insufficient attention to observations and an increased interest in speculative argumentation, weakly supported by facts. The metaphysical stage, according to Comte, is transitional: its purpose is the gradual destruction of theological thinking and the preparation of the ground for the future triumph of the scientific method. The positive (or scientific) stage, according to Comte, is the “final state of the human mind.” The main feature of the positive stage is “the law of constant subordination of the imagination to observation.” This means that from now on, instead of investigating unsolvable questions about the essence of being, man directs his efforts to studying facts and establishing laws, i.e., those relationships that exist between observed phenomena. “The true positive spirit consists primarily … in replacing the word ‘why’ by the word ‘how’” (2: 4, 81). The impossibility of attaining knowledge about the essence of the universe, according to Comte,is proved by the theoretical arbitrariness and practical uselessness of previous attempts undertaken by theologians and metaphysicians. The truth of the “law of three stages” as such is proved, in his view, by the general history of sciences. “There is not a single science that has reached a positive state in our time that could not have been imagined in the past as consisting mainly of metaphysical abstractions, and in more distant times even as being under the complete domination of theological concepts” (1:5).
Positive philosophy, according to Comte, is one of the scientific disciplines. It makes its content the most important results of each of the basic sciences and considers their most general methods. Positive philosophy carries out a general synthesis of scientific knowledge (at the same time, it is not at all identical to a simple set of sciences, since it does not include the countless particulars that make up their composition). The structure of philosophy is revealed by the “encyclopedic law”, which establishes the classification of sciences. In the “Course of Positive Philosophy” the hierarchy of sciences, in which the “encyclopedic law” finds its expression, looks as follows: 1) mathematics, 2) astronomy, 3) physics, 4) chemistry, 5) physiology (biology), 6) social physics (sociology). The given classification, in the opinion of its creator, reflects both the historical and logical (or “dogmatic”) interrelationship of sciences. From a historical point of view, according to Comte, the hierarchy he proposed reflects the order of the sequential emergence of sciences. Thus, the classification is built on the principle of the movement of sciences from the more ancient to the more recent. On the other hand, the dogmatic principle of constructing the classification provides for the consideration of the mutual connections between the subjects of individual sciences. The French philosopher claims that his classification records the interrelation of phenomena cognized by various sciences. Although sciences are not reducible to each other, their arrangement in the hierarchy presupposes a certain and, moreover, unchangeable dependence: the disciplines included in the classification must rely on the preceding ones and prepare the subsequent ones. From a logical point of view, sciences are arranged in the hierarchy in accordance with the principles of movement: 1) from the general to the particular and 2) from the simple to the complex (these principles are dictated by the relationship of the phenomena studied). In addition, the “encyclopedic law”, as Comte insists, reflects the degree of perfection of the main branches of human knowledge. This perfection is determined by the level of consistency with each other and the degree of accuracy of the knowledge that a particular science has (the knowledge will be the more accurate, the more general and simple the phenomena that serve as the subject of research are). It should be noted that a significant drawback of Comte’s classification of sciences is its one-sided focus on natural science.
Socio-political doctrine. Comte considered the creation of social physics (or sociology – it was he who introduced this term into scientific circulation) to be his major achievement. He divides social physics into social statics and social dynamics. Statics includes three main elements. It studies the general conditions of social existence of the individual, family and society. Considering the individual, Comte identifies two initial, in his opinion, properties of human nature: the predominance of affective abilities over intellectual ones and the predominance of egoistic aspirations over more noble inclinations. Analyzing “society as such”, the French thinker speaks of two inextricably linked principles necessary for its existence: the division of labor and cooperation. In his social dynamics, he defends the idea of progress. In his opinion, progress consists both in the constant improvement of people’s material life and (mainly) in the improvement of their intellectual and moral qualities. He considered the “development of reason” to be the “prevailing principle” that ultimately determines the progress of the human race (intellectual evolution directs the entire course of human history). Comte declares the “great law of three stages” to be the “fundamental concept” of social dynamics. Analyzing this law, he seeks to substantiate the interrelationship between the intellectual and political development of humanity. The theological stage corresponds to a military regime that, as a rule, receives the full approval of the priests; at the same time, religion enjoys significant support from the authorities, who strengthen its authority in every possible way. The metaphysical stage corresponds to a significantly modified military system: in contrast to the original, it loses its offensive character and acquires a defensive one. Finally, the spread of scientific thinking is accompanied by the creation of an industrial system and the special political relations associated with it.
Comte believed that contemporary society was in a state of profound political crisis, the cause of which he saw in the pluralism of opinions: “our most dangerous disease consists in the profound disagreement of minds regarding all the fundamental questions of life” (1: 21). In his opinion, the crisis of society can be overcome only with the help of a true philosophical doctrine: the gradual spread of scientific thinking will lead to the complete triumph of positivism, which, in turn, will predetermine a change in social institutions. In the society of the future, according to Comte, the dominance of the central government is inevitable. At the same time, he categorically declared the inadmissibility of the supreme power of the people. At the same time, he did not think that class differences would ever disappear: on the contrary, in his opinion, the division of people into entrepreneurs and producers is inevitable and completely justified from a scientific point of view. Representatives of the proletariat must renounce absurd claims to power and wealth. Entrepreneurs are obliged to free the proletariat from poverty by wisely using their capital. According to the French philosopher, morality will determine politics in the society of the future. The basis of positivist morality is the principle of altruism (the term was introduced by Comte). Altruism assumes the elevation of public interests over personal ones and acts as a “principle of universal love”. Positivist morality sees the value of people not in the fact that they are unique individual beings, but in the fact that they are different parts of a single social organism. The motto of positivist morality is “to live for others”. Morality forms public opinion, thanks to which citizens will have no doubts about their behavior in “each individual case”. The founder of positivism believed that “reasonable order” in the social sphere would be established on Earth gradually, initially establishing itself in Europe (he predicted the formation of the Western Republic with its capital in Paris). It should be noted that in Comte’s “society of the future,” all aspects of human existence are strictly regulated by the central government, a single ideology dominates unconditionally, completely excluding pluralism of opinions, and the uniqueness of the human personality is practically not taken into account.
In the last years of his life, Comte came up with a justification for the religion of Humanity. He proclaimed that “Humanity is the true Great Being”, “which has forever replaced the concept of God” (2: 5, 149). The priests of Humanity are the positivist philosophers, and “science acquires a truly sacred character, as a systematic basis for universal worship” (2: 5, 156). The cult of Humanity, according to Comte, requires the introduction of new public celebrations and rituals, the glorification of great people, and the introduction of a new, “positivist” calendar. Positive philosophy must turn into a “definitive religion”.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) is one of the most prominent representatives of British positivism. He was educated at home, and served in the East India Company from 1823 to 1858 (from 1856 he headed it). For a number of years, Mill was a member of parliament. From 1841, he was in correspondence with Comte (although he never met the latter). Mill’s main philosophical work is A System of Logic (1843). Like Comte, Mill believed that it was impossible to obtain “absolute knowledge” about the essence of things. All that people can know about the world comes down to the sensations they experience. But these sensations do not at all reveal the inner nature of things. Justifying this position, Mill refers to the qualitative difference between cause and effect: “an east wind is not like a sensation of cold, a burn is not like the vapour of boiling water. Why should matter be like our sensations?” (5, 53). Mill defines matter as “the constant possibility of sensations.” He reduces causal connection to a sequence of phenomena. He identifies three types of explanation of natural laws: 1) decomposition of a complex law (describing a “complex effect”) into simple ones (laws of the causes of this effect), 2) establishment of an “intermediate link” in the sequence of phenomena, 3) reduction of particular laws to a more general one.
The main method of scientific research, according to Mill, is induction (in this matter he continues the line of F. Bacon). In his opinion, “the foundation of all sciences, even deductive ones, is induction”; “by adding … syllogism to syllogism, we in reality add one induction to another” (5: 201, 189). Within the framework of the inductivist model of knowledge, he developed four “methods of experimental research”: 1) similarities (“if two or more cases of the phenomenon to be studied have only one circumstance in common, then this circumstance … is the cause (or effect) of this phenomenon”, 2) differences (“if the case in which the phenomenon under study occurs and the case in which it does not occur are similar in all circumstances except one, which is found only in the first case, then this circumstance … is the effect, or cause, or necessary part of the cause of the phenomenon”), 3) residues (“if we subtract from a phenomenon that part of it which, as is known from previous inductions, is a consequence of some specific previous ones, then the remainder of the given phenomenon must be a consequence of the remaining previous ones”), 4) accompanying changes (“every phenomenon that changes in a certain way whenever another phenomenon changes in some special way is either the cause or the effect of this phenomenon, or is connected with it by some causal connection”) (5: 354 – 365). It is important to note that the use of induction, according to Mill, presupposes the principle of uniformity of the order of nature.
In his essay “On Liberty” (1859), the English thinker came out in favor of political liberalism. He declares the following position to be the general principle limiting the power of society in relation to the individual: a person should be allowed everything that does not harm other people. Mill distinguishes three aspects of political freedom: 1) freedom of opinion (with respect to “all possible objects”), 2) freedom to choose life goals (it assumes the ability to live in accordance with one’s views), 3) freedom of association (i.e. joining an association with other people within the framework of some organization). Justifying the need for freedom of opinion, he says that: a) a prohibited opinion may well turn out to be true, b) even if the prohibited opinion is false, knowledge of it will serve to better understand the truth, c) a prohibited opinion may be partially true and only partially false (and therefore an attempt to completely discard it will delay the progress of scientific knowledge). In affirming the right of an individual to arrange his life at his own discretion, Mill refers to the diversity of human characters. This diversity, in his opinion, requires the presence of different ways of life. Different people cannot feel equally comfortable in the same conditions for everyone. Only the person who arranges his life in accordance with his own, independently developed convictions will be able to truly develop all his abilities. Mill was one of the first to declare the danger of the emergence of a “mass society”. He saw an extremely negative tendency in the spread of a special type of “average man” who does not have any inclinations and ideas other than the “generally accepted” ones. He believed that the triumph of the “mass” man could stop the progressive development of European society. Therefore, the English philosopher spoke of the need to defend the rights of the individual in every possible way. Freedom of association, according to Mill, directly follows from the right of people to choose their life goals. He was against excessive centralization of power and believed that a significant number of public issues should be resolved at the level of local government. According to Mill, a sharp increase in government power is always harmful to the life of society; He considered the press as an important means against the abuses of government officials. The English thinker criticized Comte’s political philosophy, since, in his opinion, it leads to the establishment of “despotism”, to the destruction of individual freedom.
Herbert Spencer(1820-1903) – a very influential representative of British positivism. He received a technical education, worked as an engineer on the construction of a railway. Subsequently, Spencer becomes a contributor to the magazine “The Economist”, and then leads the life of an armchair scientist, busy implementing the plan to build a “synthetic philosophy”. His main philosophical work is “First Principles” (1862). This work contains the doctrine of the Unknowable (part 1) and the Knowable (part 2). The Knowable is the realm of phenomena, the Unknowable is the Absolute Reality underlying these phenomena. In the section on the Unknowable, Spencer talks about the possibility of reconciling the findings of religion and science. Analyzing the “ultimate religious ideas”, he states that no satisfactory answer can be found to the question of the origin of the Universe. The Universe either exists by itself, or it created itself, or was created by an external force. All three hypotheses are understandable only in words; they are impossible to think consistently; Moreover, there is no way of ascertaining that they correspond to reality. Hence the recognition of the fact that the force underlying everything is completely unknowable. This conclusion is the common true element of all religions, which at the same time contain many erroneous and absurd ideas. In considering the “ultimate scientific ideas,” Spencer says that it is impossible to conceive of space and time either as objective entities or as subjective qualities. Likewise, it is impossible to conceive of matter either as infinitely divisible or as indivisible. (If we assume infinite divisibility, we must follow these infinite divisions in thought, which is impossible; if we assume indivisibility, we must conceive of particles which no conceivable force can divide, which is also impossible.) It remains to admit that matter, space, and time correspond to a reality which cannot be conceived. Thus science and religion come to the same result: the acceptance of the thesis of the existence of an infinite and incomprehensible force, of which everything that exists is a manifestation. At the beginning of the section on the Knowable, Spencer examines the nature of philosophy. While science is “partly unified knowledge,” philosophy is “completely unified knowledge.” The task of philosophy is the synthesis of scientific knowledge. Philosophy formulates conclusions of the highest degree of generality. It seeks to encompass all specific phenomena with a single general law. This general law describes the cycle of changes undergone by any object and includes the integral process of evolution and disintegration. Evolution, according to Spencer, is: a) the integration of matter and the dispersion of motion, b) the transition from the indefinite to the definite, c) the transition from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. The evolution of any aggregate ends in equilibrium (between the forces acting from outside and from within). Since the equilibrium is unstable (it can be disturbed by a change in the balance of external forces), the aggregate must inevitably move toward decomposition. Decomposition is a processconsisting in the disintegration of matter and the absorption of motion. The alternation of evolution and disintegration characterizes the development of not only individual objects, but also the Universe as a whole. The periodic change of eras of evolution and disintegration has occurred more than once in the Universe in the past and inevitably awaits it in the future (moreover, the processes of evolution are always identical in their principle, but different in their results, therefore, absolute repetition of cycles does not occur).
In the context of his socio-political concept, Spencer viewed society as an organism. In his opinion, the relationships between parts of society are similar to the relationships between parts of a living body. Like an organism, society is capable of growth, of increasing complexity of structure, and the division of labor in it is similar to the “physiological division of labor.” Any social, like a bodily, organ has systems of nutrition, distribution, and regulation. Spencer identifies two types of societies that emerged in the course of human evolution. The military type of society is characterized by the dominance of an external regulatory system that establishes compulsory cooperation of citizens. This system makes it difficult to change occupation, place of residence, or social status. Attempts to create non-governmental organizations are successfully suppressed. Power is centralized; the structure of society is adapted to the struggle with external states. The industrial type of society (which arose much later than the military type) is based on a system of voluntary cooperation, when there is a mutual exchange of services. In such a society, there is no despotic power; a mass of private organizations appears. Unlike the military type, the industrial type of society is subject to negative regulation, but not positive (there is a system of prohibitions, but no direct prescriptions regarding how each citizen is obliged to live). Reflecting on the political future of humanity, Spencer argued that wars will cease altogether, and the main goal of the state will be to care about preventing harm that members of society could cause to each other (the state must exist for the individual, and not vice versa; at the same time, a significant part of the functions of the government will be taken over by public organizations in the future).
Literature
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