George Berkeley was born in Ireland in 1685. He came from a family of English immigrants. In 1700, he entered Trinity College in Dublin, where he was influenced by the ideas of John Locke and hated scholasticism. In 1707, he began teaching at the same college. 1707 can also be considered the beginning of his philosophical activity. Berkeley makes numerous (about 900 fragments) rough sketches, later published under the title “Philosophical Notes”. In these sketches, Berkeley, in particular, develops the theory of existence, set out in “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge” – Berkeley’s most famous work (1710). A year before the “Treatise”, he published another influential work – “An Essay on a New Theory of Vision”. In this work, Berkeley puts forward a thesis that is paradoxical at first glance – a creature deprived of touch could not judge the real properties of space. According to Berkeley, touch is the teacher of vision.
The Essay gave the impression that it was precisely the sense of touch that took man beyond the sphere of his subjective sensations. In the Treatise, however, Berkeley subjectivized the sense of touch. On the basis of this work, many judged Berkeley as a solipsistic philosopher. In fact, however, he admitted not only his own existence, but also the existence of other spirits, including God. He clarified his position in Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus (1713). A short Latin competition treatise, On Motion (1721), also had a clarifying character. Berkeley intended to continue the publication of the Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, and had already written the second part (on ethical topics), but lost it during one of his trips around Europe.
Philosophical activity was only part of Berkeley’s activities. As early as 1709, he became an Anglican priest, later making a successful career in this field. In addition, Berkeley often traveled. In 1713, he visited London, where he met J. Swift. In 1713-1714 and 1716-1720, he lived in France and Italy, and in 1728, after returning to teaching in Dublin, he went on a missionary journey to America, where he was going to open a college in Bermuda. Berkeley settled in Newport (Rhode Island), but due to difficulties with financing in 1732, he returned to his homeland, where he soon received the rank of bishop in Cloyne. During his stay in America, he wrote the work Alciphron, or the Petty Philosopher, directed against the “freethinkers” and published in 1732. Berkeley also entered into polemics on other issues, in particular, defending his natural philosophical and mathematical views. In 1744, in Cloyne, Berkeley wrote and published the treatise Seiris, the main purpose of which was to advertise the miraculous medicinal properties of the “tar tincture”, which Berkeley learned about in America. In addition to the discussion of the tincture (continued by Berkeley in 1752 in “Further Thoughts on Tar Tincture”), this work contains many philosophical ideas that reveal significant changes in the general atmosphere of Berkeley’s philosophizing. If in his early works Berkeley is analytical and demonstrates amazing logical ingenuity, then in Seiris he reveals a broad erudition and a respectable commitment to tradition. Berkeley spent the last six months of his life with his family in Oxford, where he had moved to oversee his son’s education. Berkeley died in 1753.
The Doctrine of Abstraction. The theoretical basis for many of Berkeley’s key ideas is his doctrine of abstraction, set out in the introduction to A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Berkeley considers Locke’s theory of abstraction to be erroneous, according to which general ideas arising through abstraction from the accidental properties of things have an independent existence in the human mind. He believes that it is impossible to imagine a person in general, a triangle in general, etc. Concrete, individual things are always imagined. This does not mean that Berkeley rejects the possibility of abstraction as such. The human mind is quite capable of separating certain qualities, for example, abstracting from the smell of a thing while preserving its visual image. He does not deny general ideas either. Berkeley denies the existence of only general abstract ideas. In fact, every general idea, for example the idea of ”fruit in general”, is nothing more than a representation of some particular fruit, which, however, interests the mind not in itself, but in its representative function, as a representative of a whole class of objects. There are no other differences, except for the change of point of view, between a single and a general idea. Berkeley uses the representative theory of abstraction to criticize a number of the most important concepts of traditional metaphysics. He is convinced that an incorrect understanding of the nature of general ideas can lead to the creation of fictitious concepts, such as the concept of matter, as well as to attempts to divide the inseparable, for example, to separate perception and existence. Such attempts can be successful only on the verbal level. Berkeley argues that language itself sometimes pushes philosophers to erroneous conclusions.
Esse is percipi. One of the most important applications of Berkeley’s representative theory of abstraction is his doctrine of the inseparability of existence and perception, expressed in the short formula “esse is percipi”, i.e. “to be is to be perceived” (see 1: 172). The truth of this formula, according to Berkeley, is almost self-evident. Indeed, when we imagine any sensory object, we simultaneously imagine ourselves, representing this object. The subject cannot be thought out of the object. This means that objects have only a relative existence, and depend on the perceiving spirit. However, Berkeley still does not dare to declare this position an unconditional axiom, apparently because it seems to contradict common sense, according to which objects of the senses exist independently of perception. And although Berkeley denies that his philosophy is incompatible with common sense, he nevertheless puts forward additional proofs of his fundamental thesis.
One of Berkeley’s lines of argument is to reinforce the traditional position of modern philosophy, according to which a number of sensory qualities, such as color, smell, taste, etc., as we know them, are subjective. This was usually proven by referring to the fact that the same object can seem different to different people. For example, wine can seem sweet to one person and sour to another. Since it cannot be both sour and sweet at the same time, we have to admit that sweetness, acidity, and indeed any taste, exist not in the thing, but in the perception of the subject. Berkeley extends this in itself imperfect argument (which, incidentally, he felt) to the so-called “primary qualities,” extension and density, which were usually believed to form the world of material, mind-independent objects. The same object, Berkeley notes, may seem to have different shapes, and, following the logic of the proof of the subjectivity of the above-mentioned “secondary qualities,” color, smell, etc., in order to avoid contradictions, it must be recognized that shape and extension are generally subjective. The same can be demonstrated with respect to density.
If so, then all the qualities that make up what in ordinary usage is called matter depend on the subject and, therefore, exist only in his perception, which was to be proved. Another line of proof of the same thesis was that Berkeley suggested that the reader try to imagine the properties of the supposed material substance. It is difficult to deny that the objects of immediate consciousness are not the things themselves, but their mental imprints, “ideas” (although in the history of philosophy this thesis has been periodically disputed by “common sense philosophers”, from T. Reid in the 18th century to J. Searle in the 21st). Such ideas exist in the spirit, which is their bearer, substance. But we assume that these ideas more or less adequately reflect material things. However, Berkeley rightly notes that ideas can only resemble ideas. This means that the supposed material substance must turn out to be a bearer of ideas. But the bearer of ideas is spirit, not matter. Therefore, Berkeley considers the concept of matter to be contradictory and declares the refutation of materialism. Only spirits and their perceptions can exist in the world. Perceptions cannot be separated from spirit. In order to exist, they must be actually, not potentially, perceived. The clear explanation of this point in the Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonous removed the ambiguity that remained in the Treatise, where it might seem that the formula “to be is to be perceived” has the meaning that everything that exists can only in principle be an object of perception. With such an interpretation, Berkeley would not have been able to use his main principle for the large-scale philosophical and theological generalizations that he makes in the Three Conversations.
Spirits. The principle “to be is to be perceived” is valid in the narrow sense only for sensible objects, which, however, do not exhaust all that exists. These objects themselves exist in spirits, to which the other proposition applies: to be is to perceive. Spirits are simple substances and can know their unity and substantiality by means of “reflection,” a special internal intuition, which, it is true, does not supply us with “ideas,” but allows us to form “concepts” of their objects. Berkeley refuses to call these concepts “ideas,” since the latter, in his opinion, do not contain any signs of activity, whereas spirits are not only perceiving, but also active beings. For in addition to perceptions or ideas, spirits are also endowed with will. Will is responsible for the modification of ideas. The possibilities of human souls, which constitute one of the varieties of finite spirits, in modifying ideas are, however, very limited. The will of man has power over the ideas of the imagination, but the ideas of sensation seem to be imposed on it. This means that such ideas are generated by some external cause. To determine the properties of this cause, Berkeley draws attention to the unity and expediency of the world of sensations. Such qualities indicate that behind the totality of ideas of sensation there is a single rational first cause, namely God.
The existence of God is also proved by Berkeley in another way. He combines the thesis that “to be is to be perceived” with the common-sense position that things (or, in his terminology, “ideas of sensation”) exist independently of our perception. The combination of these premises leads to the conclusion that there is some supreme spirit or spirits in whose perception or perceptions sensible things exist. The thesis of the unity and purposefulness of the world again allows us to limit the number of these perceiving beings to a single infinite spirit—God. Berkeley is proud of this proof, which, among other things, clearly demonstrates that his philosophy can really be reconciled with common sense. He does not at all believe, as one might at first think, that the cessation of human perception of a thing means its destruction. After all, the existence of a thing, as Berkeley proclaims in the Three Conversations, depends not on human but on divine perception. Of course, it would be wrong to say that God perceives things in the same way as finite spirits sense them (we come to the conclusion that there are other finite spirits besides our own by experience and the principle of analogy). God is devoid of sensation in the human sense of the word. Therefore, in his perception there are rather archetypes of what we call sensory things. And in accordance with these archetypes, God generates series of sensations in finite spirits, and does this in such a way that some sensations act as natural signs or harbingers of others. This makes it possible to discern patterns in them and to increase knowledge, including scientific knowledge.
Berkeley’s ontology thus establishes direct contact between human souls and the ideas of God. Deviating from traditional schemes, Berkeley eliminates from the process of this interaction an unnecessary, as he believed, element: matter (matter retains ontological status in the system of N. Malebranche, who, as they said, had a strong influence on Berkeley, proving that “we see all things in God”; although Berkeley himself denied the similarity of his views with the ideas of the French Cartesian). Such an interpretation, however, creates difficulties in understanding the possibility of God’s creation of the world, which Berkeley, at least due to the specifics of his profession, could not ignore. Therefore, he was forced to clarify his position. By creation, he proposed to understand the revelation of God to finite spirits, while the world before creation, in his opinion, is God closed in on himself. In other words, Berkeley restored the trinity of being. Things as ideas exist in three ways: hidden in God, revealed in God, and as ideas of sensation in the minds of finite spirits. The existence of the second order corresponds to the place occupied in traditional ontologies by the material embodiment of divine ideas.
All these clarifications reduced the originality of Berkeley’s judgments to a minimum. Berkeley wrote that he struggled with the idea of the absolutely independent existence of material objects, but none of the major metaphysicians of the New Age, in fact, put forward such an idea. Most philosophers of the 17th-18th centuries, relying on the pan-European intuition of being as the fullness of essence, which imperfect material things lack, believed that God, having created the material world, constantly maintains its existence, and such tireless activity can be fully interpreted as God’s continuous perception of this world. Gradually, Berkeley began to increasingly realize the traditional nature of his theoretical constructions and to integrate his ideas into the context of the then relevant Platonic philosophy, although he insisted on continuity with his early works.
The doctrine of nature. Platonic philosophy with its ideas of the hierarchy of being and the primacy of spirit over matter turned out to be a convenient tool for Berkeley to present his own natural philosophical doctrine, although his interest in natural science itself arose in his youth. Berkeley criticized a number of popular scientific concepts, primarily some aspects of the theory of differential calculus and Newton’s idea of the motion of bodies in absolute space. He was sure of the absurdity of the concept of an infinitely small quantity and considered it impossible to speak meaningfully about the infinite divisibility of finite segments, although he did not argue that these techniques can be an effective means of solving mathematical and physical problems. However, since they lead to contradictions (the finite is identified with the infinite), then, in his opinion, they should be discarded.
These contradictions themselves are a consequence of the fact that the concept of an infinitely small quantity and infinite divisibility, as well as the concept of absolute space, are formed by means of an incorrectly understood abstraction. True mathematics, according to Berkeley, must be based on a representative theory of abstraction. Berkeley also spoke out against the doctrine of the internal activity of matter, which was gaining popularity.
Supporting Descartes, he maintained that matter (understood as the totality of data of external sense) is in itself devoid of any activity and is entirely passive. In substantiating this position, he referred to the generally accepted law since the time of Galileo and Descartes, according to which bodies retain their present state in the absence of external influences. This law means that material objects cannot independently change their state, and therefore are passive even when they seem to be active, for example, colliding with other bodies, moving from place to place, etc. Accordingly, by observing bodies, one cannot obtain any idea of the driving force, unless one declares it to be an incomprehensible hidden quality. The correct concept of the driving force can be extracted exclusively from observations of the actions of the spirit. Only the spirit is truly active, and therefore all bodily movements in the world must be attributed to the action of spirits, or, more precisely, the world soul, connected with the highest rational origin of the world. And such a relationship between the spirit and the world is quite logical, Berkeley believes. After all, it is not the spirit that is in the world, but the world that is in the spirit and comes from it.
At the same time, Berkeley, however, noted that metaphysical reflections on the spirit as the “true productive cause of motion” should not be mixed with physical research into “secondary corporeal causes”, knowledge of which can bring concrete benefits. Sciences should know their limits and not cross them. Berkeley had an ambiguous influence on European thinkers. Sometimes he was perceived as a lover of paradoxes and philosophical shock value – an example of such an interpretation of Berkeley was given by G. V. Leibniz. Supporters of materialistic philosophy saw Berkeley as a dangerous opponent and tried to get rid of his arguments by opposing them to common sense. On this path, they themselves sometimes came into conflict with common sense. Thus, the famous reasoning of D. Diderot that Berkeley’s system is absurd, but most difficult to refute, is itself on the verge of absurdity. It should be noted that Berkeley’s ideas were often presented in a truncated form, especially in a number of Marxist works. Many perceived him as a “subjective idealist” who denied everything except the reality of his own Self. However, even those who interpreted his system more correctly saw it as a threat to traditional ontology. For example, the 18th century in German philosophy was largely marked by the “refutation of idealism”, which was understood to mean Berkeley’s system. Such famous thinkers as Chr. Wolff, I.N. Tetens, I. Kant and others took part in this campaign against idealism. Kant, for example, called Berkeley a “dogmatic idealist” and believed that he refuted his theory in the teachings on a priori forms of sensuality and antinomies of pure reason, which made it possible to rid the concept of matter of contradictions, although Kant himself was often reproached by his contemporaries for his Berkeleianism. D. Hume was seriously influenced by Berkeley’s ideas, having taken from him the theory of abstraction, the argument on the subjectivity of “primary qualities” and some other ideas. Hume considered Berkeley, who aggressively attacked skepticism, to be a potential skeptic himself. There is great interest in Berkeley in modern philosophy as well.
Literature
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