The Stoic school was founded at the end of the 4th century BC by Zeno, a native of the Cypriot city of Kition, which had a Phoenician settlement. Some scholars believe that Zeno was of Phoenician origin. At the end of the 4th century, he came to Athens and turned to philosophy. Inspired by the image of Socrates in Xenophon’s “Memoirs”, he became a student of the Cynic Crates, and thanks to this, the influence of the Cynics colors the ethical teaching of the Stoics quite strongly. He also attended lectures by Polemon and Diodorus Cronus. After this, he founded his own school, which was located in the famous “Motley Portico” (tod ποικίλη ), painted with frescoes by Polygnotus. This is where the school got its name. Zeno was highly respected in Athens for his preaching of virtue, after his death he was awarded high awards by the Athenian citizens. Zeno’s most important students were Ariston of Chios and Cheryl. Ariston was a strong example of the Cynic streak. He completely rejected logic and physics, calling for an exclusive focus on virtue and vice. Another famous student of Zeno was Cleanthes of Assos, a former boxer who became a loyal follower of Zeno. Cleanthes’s student Chrysippus of Soli (?281 – 208 BC) played a special role in the development of the Stoic school; his all-encompassing talent allowed him to become, so to speak, the second founder of the Stoics. He was a prolific writer, producing 500 lines a day. He developed a complex system of Stoic logic and made many changes to ethics and physics. Chrysippus’s students included Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.
The next period in the development of Stoic teaching (2nd – 1st centuries BC) is called the Middle Stoa in contrast to the preceding period of Ancient Stoa. It is represented by two main figures, Panaetius (? 185 – 108 BC) and Posidonius (? 135 – 51 BC). This period was characterized by a departure from some provisions of ancient Stoic dogma, eclecticism, i.e. a combination of Stoic doctrines with individual elements of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, and an orientation toward Rome as a new center of civilization.
Finally, the last important stage was the so-called “Roman Stoicism” (1st – 2nd centuries AD), represented by the names of Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The logical and physical aspects of Stoic teaching were practically not developed during this period. The ethics of Stoicism came to the fore, understood primarily as a practical art aimed at achieving a happy life. There were practically no conceptual changes during this period, but the rich in thought and well-written works of the Roman Stoics became the most important part of the European cultural heritage from that time. While we can judge the Ancient and Middle Stoa exclusively by fragments and quotations from other authors, the works of the Roman Stoics, almost completely preserved, are included in the golden fund of European and world literature. They influence the writers of late Antiquity, the moralists of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and continue to be the benchmarks of morality and good style for many thinkers and writers of the New Age. It is thanks to them that the word “stoic” with its unique meaning entered all new languages.
Division of philosophy.
Wisdom (σοφία) is defined by the Stoics as the science (επιστήμη) of divine and human things. Philosophy is an exercise in a necessary art, and necessary, according to the Stoics, is virtue, which is divided into three parts: physical, ethical and logical. Accordingly, philosophy is divided into three parts. This tripartite division was first proposed by Plato’s student Xenocrates, who was followed in this by the Stoics. They illustrated this division with comparisons. If we compare philosophy to a living being, then logic will be the bones and sinews, ethics will be the flesh, and the soul will be physics. If we compare philosophy to an egg, then logic will be the shell, ethics will be the white, and physics will be the yolk. If we compare it to a fertile field, then logic will be the fence, the fruit will be ethics, and the earth and trees will be physics. However, sometimes the correspondences changed. For example, the Stoic Posidonius called ethics the soul of a living being and the yolk of an egg, and physics – flesh and white. These parts are not separated from each other, but are interconnected. A more detailed division of philosophy was proposed by Cleanthes. He divided philosophy into six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics and theology.
Logic. Since the Greek word λόγος meant both “word” and “reason”, the Stoics, when creating their logic, paid great attention to both thinking and language. Logic was divided into two parts, rhetoric and dialectic, which were not opposed to each other, as was the case, for example, with Plato. Rhetoricians say more fully what dialecticians express more concisely. Zeno therefore compared dialectic to a fist, and rhetoric to a palm. Some Stoics, in addition to dialectic and rhetoric, included in logic the doctrine of definition and the doctrine of canons and criteria. Rhetoric was divided into three parts: deliberative, judicial, and eulogistic. Dialectic was divided into the doctrine of sound (grammar) and what sound denotes. In grammar, the Stoics summarize and generalize the results achieved by previous philosophers, primarily Aristotle. The Stoics developed a general doctrine of language, a theory of cases
[7] , a theory of parts of speech
[8] , a theory of verb tenses, and the foundations of a theory of stylistics. Their understanding of language was based on the doctrine of its natural character, since the first words arose, according to the Stoics, from the imitation of things. In connection with this, the Stoics also engaged in etymological studies.
The criterion of truth, according to the Stoics, was the so-called “cataleptic fantasy” (φαντασία καταληπτική) or simply “perception” (κατάληψις). What is it? According to Zeno, the process of cognition begins when we receive a certain impulse, a push, from outside. This push acts on our soul, imprinting itself on it. The Stoics called this imprinting fantasy. It should be noted that before this external influence, our soul is empty, like a white sheet of paper before writing or like wax before a seal is stamped on it. After the imprinting has taken place, agreement (συγκατάθεσις) or disagreement with it follows, which relates to the guidance of our spirit. We can agree or disagree, we are free to accept or reject the image received from outside. If this image has in itself the testimony of the thing from which it originated, i.e. if it is clear and distinct, does not give rise to any doubts, then in the case of agreement to it, in the case of its acceptance, perception or “katalepsis” (κατάληψις) arises. This perception is similar to what we experience when we grasp something with our hand, i.e. it provides us with direct and immediate contact with the thing. Finally, having received such a perception, we verify it with reason. If it is not refuted by reason, knowledge arises. If it is refuted, ignorance arises. Zeno demonstrated the relationship of these stages of our knowledge by means of the hand. Thus, an open palm symbolizes the original image imprinted on us. When we bend our fingers slightly, this means our agreement with this image. When we clench our hand into a fist, this means perception. Finally, when we grasp this fist with the palm of our left hand, we receive the image of scientific knowledge, knowledge that only a sage can possess. Thus, the beginning of our knowledge is an action from outside, in which we are not free. But we can accept or reject the image that has appeared in us. This is where our freedom is manifested. If we consider that this image clearly testifies to the thing from which it originated and give our consent to it, we receive a perception, which must then pass the test of reason. The criterion of truth in this scheme is perception, i.e., the image that clearly communicates the thing that gave birth to it and which has received approval.
Chrysippus presents this scheme of cognition somewhat differently. According to Chrysippus, the criterion of truth is not perception, consisting of cataleptic fantasy plus approval, but cataleptic fantasy itself. The fact is that the latter, according to Chrysippus, necessarily forces us to consent. If we have perceived something cataleptically, then consent follows automatically. Therefore, there is no point in talking about the criterion of truth as a combination of cataleptic fantasy and approval. However, he still recognized the possibility of cases when some additional circumstances force us to reject cataleptic fantasy. Thus, when in Euripides’ tragedy “Alcestis” Hercules returns Alcestis from Hades and brings her to Admetus, her husband, he, despite the clarity and certainty of the image of Alcestis, does not agree that it is his wife in front of him, since he knew that she is in Hades, from where there is no return. This means that in certain circumstances, cataleptic fantasy still cannot receive approval.
Thus, although our knowledge begins with sensations, it does not end with sensations. It would be wrong to consider the Stoic epistemology to be sensualistic. Sensations can be of varying degrees of clarity, while truth must be clear and obvious. In addition to involuntary sensations, we have the right to agree or disagree with them. This means that in cognitive activity, man is not completely bound by the phenomena that act on his senses. Man is free in cognition, since the final word remains with him and his consent.
When an object is already perceived, a memory of it remains in us. From a multitude of memories, experience is formed, i.e. a multitude of homogeneous ideas. From our perceptions, concepts (εννοιοα) are gradually formed, some of which are formed by themselves, while others are the result of the conscious activity of our thinking. In the first case, we form general ideas, in the second – artificially formed concepts. Reason ( λόγο ς) is gradually formed in the human soul from perceptions and general ideas. Its formation ends at the age of fourteen. It is reason that opens up to us the possibility of knowing not only individual things, but also the world as a whole.
The highest concepts, according to the Stoics, were the following: 1) subject, 2) quality or subject endowed with quality, 3) being in a certain state (το πώς έχον) or being in a certain state endowed with quality subject, 4) relating to something or relating to something being in a certain state endowed with quality subject.
Physics. Physical doctrine plays a major role in Stoicism. We have seen that it played a major role in the comparisons made by the Stoics. This was due to the fact that in the eyes of the Stoics it was a doctrine of the deity. At the same time, much of the physical doctrine of Stoicism is taken from the previous tradition, mainly from Heraclitus and partly from Aristotle.
The principles of all that exists, according to the Stoics, are the agent and the sufferer, or God and matter. Matter is that which is devoid of all qualities, entirely passive, ready to take any form, and set in motion only by the action of another. Matter can become neither greater nor less, it is devoid of any change. Only its parts can change, but not the matter itself. The agent is called reason ( λόγο ς), which is in matter, and God, who permeates matter and, shaping it, creates all things from it. Both God and matter are eternal and indestructible. Although the Stoics distinguish them, they do not separate them. Both reason and matter are two aspects of the same reality.
The most important principle of Stoic physics is the assertion that any active principle can only be a body. “Everything that acts is a body” (Diogenes Laërtius, VII, 56). Thus, the Stoics, like the Epicureans, oppose Plato and Aristotle, who recognized immaterial active causes. Consequently, God, who acts as an active principle, is a body. He is nothing other than fire and breath. This is not a destructive, consuming fire, but a creative fire that generates the entire world, containing within itself “seed logoi” (σπερματικοί λόγοι), i.e., the rational foundations of every phenomenon, which necessarily determine everything that exists. These seed logoi, since they are eternal and unchangeable, resemble Aristotelian forms and Platonic ideas. But, being material and immanent, they differ from both forms and ideas. Thus, everything in the world and the world itself as a whole are created by a rational cause, the creative fire. The Stoics oppose the Epicurean thesis about the random origin of the world. Just as an artist skillfully creates his work, imprinting his skill and his mind in it, so the creative fire intelligently and skillfully creates everything and permeates everything. At the same time, the creative fire does not stand outside the world, like Plato’s demiurge. No, it itself is in it, is its guiding, directing and creative part, the nature and soul of the cosmos. The Stoics call it Zeus.
When he creates the world, he first makes matter fit for creation, then creates the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. The cosmos arises when from the initial fire, everything passes into moisture through an intermediate air stage, some parts of the water condense to earth, some again return to the air state. From these four elements arise all plants and animals.
After a certain time, the cosmos returns to the fiery state, what the Stoics called the “world conflagration” occurs. Everything again becomes fire, in which the seeds of everything that exists are, in order to then repeat everything all over again. Everything again moves through the airy state to the moist, which is why Seneca calls fire the end of the world, and moisture its beginning. Thus, the birth and death of the cosmos are periodically repeated, without anything new arising. Since the same seed logoi are contained in God, all events in the world unfold in exactly the same way each time, there occurs, as Nietzsche would later say, “the eternal return of the same.”
The cosmos, created and guided by God and reason, is itself a living being, rational and animate. The Stoics proved this position as follows. The rational, animate and living is better than the irrational, inanimate and dead. The cosmos is the best. Therefore, the cosmos is rational, animate and alive. Another argument was as follows. That which gives birth to rational beings is itself rational. The cosmos gives birth to living beings. Therefore, the cosmos is rational. Divine reason permeates the entire cosmos, however, not equally. In some things, its presence is noticeable only in the rational design inherent in them, while in others, it manifests itself directly as the leading principle. The Stoics called the ether, the sky or even the sun the leading principle of the entire world.
The cosmos, according to the Stoics, is one and only, limited and spherical. Beyond its boundaries is an infinite void, devoid of corporeality. In the cosmos itself there is no void, the cosmos exists in complete unity, conditioned by the agreement and conjugation of the heavenly and the earthly.
The Stoics identified divine reason with fate (ι): “fate is the reason according to which the past was, the present is, and the future will be,” said Chrysippus (SVF II 913). The classical definition of fate, also by Chrysippus, was as follows: “Fate is a certain natural articulation (σύνταξις) of everything, when one thing eternally follows another, and the connection of this succession is insurmountable” (Aulus Helius, NA VII 2). Seneca writes: “It is a great consolation to be a prisoner together with the whole world. For that which ordered us to live and die thus, by the same necessity bound the gods. The course of everything human and divine moves inexorably. And the creator and ruler of everything himself, having outlined the laws of fate, follows them. “Once having commanded, he always obeys” (De prov. 5, 8). In another place Seneca says: “If you call him (God. – D. B.) fate (fatum), you will not be mistaken. For fate is nothing other than a connected series of causes, and God is the first cause of everything, on whom everything else depends” (De benef. IV 7).
The most important point of Stoic doctrine is the doctrine of providence (πρόνοια). According to Zeno, fate and providence are identical
[9] . This means that everything that happens in the world is, by the law of necessity, simultaneously the best, that the deity, who necessarily arranges the world, directs it to the best and most perfect. Thus, any event simultaneously and necessarily follows from a preceding series of causes, starting with the first, and is the best. In this case, there is not and cannot be any evil in the world. Not all Stoics agreed with Zeno; his closest disciple Cleanthes limited the principle of providence. As Chalcidius testifies: “What happens by the power of providence also happens necessarily, but not everything that happens by necessity happens by the will of providence,” Cleanthes asserted (In Tim. p. 144 (SVF I 551)).
Thus, everything in the world is arranged for a purpose. The lower exists for the higher, the worse for the better. The inanimate exists for the animate, the animate for the rational. Thus, according to Chrysippus, we were created by the gods for them and for themselves, animals were created for us: horses for our wars and battles, dogs for hunting, and leopards, bears and lions for the exercise of courage. Even harmful animals were created for our benefit. According to Plutarch (Stoic. repugn. 21, p. 1044 d.), Chrysippus said that bedbugs are useful in preventing us from sleeping for a long time, and mice make us not throw everything around in disarray. However, some living creatures did not arise for utilitarian purposes, but for beauty. Thus, according to Chrysippus, the peacock arose for the beauty of its tail.
If everything in the world is arranged expediently, where do troubles and misfortunes come from, where does evil come from? Firstly, the Stoics said, all sorts of troubles can be sent by God to bad people in order to teach others by their example. However, such a solution does not answer the question of why troubles and misfortunes happen to virtuous and righteous people. The second solution proposed by the Stoics was that in a large world economy, well arranged, all sorts of minor troubles can nevertheless happen. Divine nature gives birth to everything beautifully and for the good, but at the same time, while achieving the main good, it also gives birth to some defects along the way (κατά παρακολούθησιν). Chrysippus gave the following example. In creating the human head, nature wisely and carefully created it from the finest and smallest bones, but despite this great art, the head turned out to be fragile and brittle. So in the world, evil arises in an incidental way, when nature, creating her beautiful creations, also creates all sorts of deformities and causes undeserved suffering to good people. In this, as Seneca says, the fact that matter has its own causes plays a role. In any case, according to the Stoics, one must pay attention not to the particular failures of the divine mind, but to its, so to speak, strategic success. The Stoics realized the problematic nature of this solution, but they had no other way out. Either the world, despite all its defects, is still purposefully arranged, or there remain atoms and emptiness, chance and the mechanical necessity of the Epicureans. Finally, evil, according to Chrysippus, must exist, for without it we could not understand and appreciate the good.
In the system of Stoic fatalism, man is left only with the freedom to submit to the laws of the world as a whole and its movement. The Stoics illustrated their understanding of freedom with the example of a dog tied to a chariot. If the dog runs after the chariot, it does so of its own free will, as if understanding that it has nowhere to go, and at the same time submits to the pulling necessity. If it refuses and does not want to run, the chariot drags it along anyway. Thus, human freedom is a conscious and reasonable following of necessity. As it is said in the prayerful verses of the Stoic Cleanthes:
Lead me, Zeus, and you who weave fate, Where you have predetermined from the ages, Let me go without complaining. And if I do not want to, Having become worthless, then I will go there anyway.
(Epictetus, Encheiridion, 53).
Based on the fact that everything that exists is a necessary connection of causes and effects, the Stoics asserted the possibility of mantics and predictions of the future. They tried to create a scientific basis for the practice of predictions, which was widespread in both Greece and Rome. In general, their attitude to religion differed sharply from the consistent rejection of the Epicureans. The Stoics tried to assimilate ancient religion into their worldview, recognizing God, gods, and demons. They tried to respond to criticism of religion by allegorically interpreting the main figures of the pantheon and the main myths. Homeric texts are subjected to allegorical interpretation. This assimilation of religion is carried out under the sign of pantheism. The numerous gods and heroes of Greece were well suited to a worldview that proclaimed that everything is a deity.
The Stoics defined the human soul as “our inherent air” (SVF II 774), “our inherent and continuous air that permeates our entire body” (SVF II 885). The air of our soul itself was defined as “thinking heat” (SVF II 779) or as fire. The Stoics divided the soul into eight parts: the leading and guiding principle, the five sensations, the faculty of speech (φωνητικόν), and the faculty of reproduction (σπερματικόν). The leading principle is not in the head, but in the chest, since the voice comes from the chest. The soul, according to the Stoics, cannot have incorporeality, since it is air or fire, and cannot have eternal existence. During the world fire, all individual souls return to the single fiery nature from which they once separated
[10] . As for the time before the world fire, according to Cleanthes, all souls exist before it, and according to Chrysippus, only the souls of the wise.
The ladder of beings, according to the Stoics, looks like this. The lowest rung, the inanimate, has only a property or structure; in plants, nature (φύσις) is added to this as the ability to move. The soul first appears in animals, it is distinguished by the ability to imagine and desire. In humans, reason ( λόγο ς) is added to all this.
Ethics. Unlike Epicurus, the first aspiration of every living being is not for pleasure, but for self-preservation. The closest thing to any living being is its own structure and consciousness of it. No living being can treat itself as a stranger; from birth it rejects everything destructive and harmful, and assimilates everything related and close. And this could not be if we did not immediately possess a feeling and consciousness (sensus) (Cicero, De finibus III 5) of ourselves and our structure. Pleasure is only a side effect (έπιγέννημα) of this original aspiration for self-preservation. According to Chrysippus, this innate feeling of closeness to ourselves extends to our parts and to our creations (Cf. SVF III 179). Love for one’s creations forms the foundation of human sociality.
Man is a rational being, therefore he is close to himself not simply as a living being, but as a rational being, i.e. man in himself, first of all, cherishes his rational part. The main definition of a happy life was the formula “life according to nature”, which was understood as “life according to reason” and “life according to virtue”. The founder of Stoicism Zeno spoke simply about a harmonious life, meaning the absence of disagreements in the soul of a virtuous person, his agreement with himself, i.e. with his reason. Zeno’s student Cleanthes added to “harmonious life” the words “with nature” (tr φύσει), meaning a life in accordance with the general law governing the Universe. Chrysippus reconciled these two approaches, understanding “nature” both as a general law and as the essence of each person. Since the nature of each of us is part of world nature, there is no contradiction between these meanings. In accordance with this teaching on the purpose of life, the Stoics defined virtue as “a state of the soul in agreement with itself” (Diogenes Laërtius, VII 89), as “a state of the soul, in agreement with reason concerning the whole of life” (Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus I 13), or as “a state of the soul in agreement with itself concerning the whole of life” (Stobaeus, II p. 60, 7-8 W). Thus, the perfect life consists in agreement with oneself and the general law that permeates everything, in the agreement of our rational part and the universal reason. This will be the virtue of the happy man and the good course of his life.
The Stoics considered virtue to be the only good. Zeno speaks of it this way: “Everything that exists is either good, bad, or indifferent. The following are good: wisdom, chastity, justice, courage, and everything that is virtue or partakes of virtue. The following are bad: unreason, unbridledness, injustice, cowardice, and everything that is vice or partakes of vice. The following are indifferent: life and death, glory and dishonor, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty, sickness and health, and everything like that” (Stobaeus, Ecl. II p. 57, 18 W). Seneca writes: “The highest good is the morally beautiful (honestum). And I will add, so that you will be even more surprised: the morally beautiful is the only good” (Epistulae 71, 4). Thus, everything that is necessary for a happy life is contained only in virtue, virtue is quite sufficient for happiness and is sufficient in itself. The basis of any virtue is reason. Between various goods, i.e. between virtues, there is no difference, none of them is better or worse than another. In the same way, all vices are the same, among them there is no better or worse. Unlike other arts, wisdom, i.e. virtuous life, has its goal in itself.
The Stoics divided the area of the indifferent into two types: the preferable (προηγμένα) and the non-preferred (άπροηγμένα). Although the indifferent could not bring any benefit for a happy life, for ordinary life the choice of the indifferent seemed important to the Stoics and required justification. Thus, life, health, strength, wealth, fame, good origin were considered preferable, and their opposites were non-preferred. For the virtuous life, all this was indifferent for the Stoics. Some Stoics (Ariston of Chios) went even further and completely eliminated any distinction between the preferable and the non-preferred, bringing the Stoic point of view on the good to its logical conclusion.
Virtue was defined by the Stoics as “a certain perfection of every being” (Diogenes Laërtius, VII 90) and as “a certain disposition and power of the leading principle of the soul that has arisen through reason” (Plutarch, De virt. mor. 3). Every person has a natural predisposition to virtue or, as Cicero says, “innate seeds of virtue” (Cicero, Tusc. disp. III 1,2). Thus, virtue is innate in us and exists by nature, while vice and evil can only come from outside and represent a perversion (διαστροφή, perversio) of nature.
As already mentioned, the Stoics considered understanding, justice, prudence and courage to be the main virtues. In a certain sense, justice, prudence and courage were varieties of understanding. Thus, Zeno defined justice as understanding in matters of distribution, prudence as understanding regarding objects of choice, courage as understanding in what must be endured. But he still did not believe that understanding is the only virtue, and that the others should not be discussed, as Ariston of Chios would think. Virtues are inseparable from each other, and he who has at least one virtue will have them all. Virtue cannot be lost in a normal state of mind, but in severe mental disorders, virtue is lost along with reason.
The Stoics judged moral action not by its result, but by the inner disposition of the one who performs it. An act that might seem terrible and impossible from the outside, from the point of view of intention, can be virtuous and reasonable.
One of the important achievements of the ethical doctrine of Stoicism is the development by the Stoics of the doctrine of passions (πάθη). Passion was defined by Zeno as “an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, or an inclination that goes beyond measure” (Diogenes Laërtius, VII 110). However, another prominent Stoic, Chrysippus, defined passions as false judgments of our rational part. According to the Stoics, there are four main types of passions: sadness, fear, desire, pleasure. “Sadness is an irrational contraction, or a recent opinion about the presence of evil, because of which contraction seems to occur. Fear is an irrational avoidance, or flight from what seems terrible. Desire is an irrational desire, or pursuit of an apparent good. “Pleasure is an irrational exaltation (επαρσις), or a recent opinion about the presence of a good, due to which the exaltation seems to occur” (Andronicus, Περί παθών Ι (SVF III 391)). From these definitions it is clear that passion, firstly, is irrational, contrary to reason, and secondly, passions are connected with the apparent, and not with the real. Passions cannot be moderated, according to the Stoics, they must be completely eliminated. This is where the Stoics differ from Aristotle. The destruction of passions is the work of philosophy. Cicero says this about it: “This is what philosophy does. It heals souls, removes empty worries, frees from desires, drives away fears” (Cicero, Tusc. disp. II 4, 11). The Stoics contrasted passions with “good suffering” (εύπάθειαι), joy, caution and “good will” (βούλησις), which differ from passions in that they do not contradict reason, but agree with it (εΰλογαν). Compassion and repentance were not included, according to the Stoics, among the “good suffering” and had to be rejected. Since there is nothing intermediate between reason and unreason, between virtue and vice, all people are strictly divided into two types: the wise and the foolish. Even those who strive for moral perfection, but have not achieved it (οί προκύπτοντες), must be classified as unreasonable and bad. The sage possesses all the virtues, does only right deeds, and never makes mistakes. He is alien to opinion, since his knowledge is thorough and firm, and to ignorance. The sage is not insensitive, but dispassionate. He can feel pain and fear, but he will not accept it into his soul. The sage can do anything, for he will do everything perfectly and in accordance with nature. He can live in society, marry, bring children into the world, for all this can in no way interfere with his freedom. He is so free that he can even eat human flesh, if this is justified by reason. Only the sage is a true king, since the king must know what is good and what is bad. Only the sage is a true judge or orator. The Stoic sage does not pity anyone and forgives no one, for this contradicts his understanding of duty. Only the sage is rich, handsome and happy. The sage has the right to his own life, which he can leave either for his fatherland or friends,or because of a serious and incurable disease. A sage is an extremely rare, but not impossible phenomenon on earth. According to Seneca, he is born once every five hundred years.
The basis of the Stoic teaching on society was the assertion that every person by nature strives for self-preservation, cares for himself and for what is close to him. From this love for oneself grows love for one’s loved ones and, ultimately, for the human race as a whole. Since our true “I” is the mind that every person also possesses, then our love for ourselves is, in fact, love for man as such. From here grows the overcoming within the framework of Stoicism of the division into ours and others, into Greeks and barbarians.
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