Søren Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen in 1813 to a wealthy wool merchant. At the age of 17, in 1830, in accordance with his father’s wishes, Kierkegaard began his studies at the theological faculty of the University of Copenhagen. Physically much weaker than his peers, Kierkegaard stood out against their background with his extraordinary intellectual abilities. In 1840, he passed the exam in theology, and in 1841 he successfully defended his master’s dissertation “On the Concept of Irony with a Constant Glance at Socrates.” Irony and humor, as two basic forms of the comic, play a far from accidental role in Kierkegaard’s teaching. Kierkegaard returns to these concepts in his subsequent works.
In 1841, he went on his first trip to Berlin, where he attended lectures by Friedrich Schelling. An open opponent of Hegel, Schelling criticized the latter for insufficient attention to the concrete, for reducing everything to an endless chain of concepts that flow into each other. Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel, whom he had previously treated with great respect, was received very vividly by him and undoubtedly influenced the evolution of his philosophical worldview, but he perceived Schelling’s own philosophy without enthusiasm and was generally skeptical.
Kierkegaard began his career as a writer as a publicist, but already in 1843 he published four independent works at once, two of which – the two-volume work “Either-Or” (under the pseudonym Victor Eremita) and the book “Fear and Trembling” (under the pseudonym Johannes de Silenzio) – laid the foundations of existential philosophy. No less fruitful was 1844, when “Philosophical Fragments” (under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus) and “The Concept of Fear” (under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensius) were published. The “Concluding Unscientific Afterword to the “Philosophical Fragments,” saturated with philosophical ideas, was published in 1846. Finally, it is necessary to mention the book “The Sickness Unto Death,” published in 1852 under the name Anti-Climacus.
A significant part of Kierkegaard’s works were thus published under pseudonyms, and since it was no secret to anyone who exactly was hiding behind them, the main reason for such “mystery” should be considered the methodological position of the philosopher, which Kierkegaard himself called “indirect exposition”. At the same time, Kierkegaard published a number of works, primarily on special religious topics, under his own name, for example, “Instructive Conversations of Various Kinds” (1847) or “Christian Conversations” (1848). However, for understanding the special style and method of Kierkegaard’s philosophizing, three articles signed with his real name are of particular interest. During Kierkegaard’s lifetime, only one was published, the smallest in volume – “On the Authorship of My Works” (1851). The other two, “The Only One: Two ‘Notes’ Regarding the Authorship of My Works” and “A Point of View on the Authorship of My Works,” were published posthumously in 1859. Unfortunately, none of the listed works has yet been translated into Russian.
Søren Kierkegaard died in 1855 at the age of 42. Kierkegaard’s works had a significant influence not only on philosophy, but also on European culture as a whole. His ideas inspired M. Heidegger and K. Jaspers, M. Unamuno and K. Barth. Among the representatives of Russian philosophy, N. A. Berdyaev and L. Shestov should be mentioned. His artistic talent and subtle instinct as a psychologist were highly valued by G. Ibsen and A. P. Chekhov.
Attitude to Hegelian philosophy and rationalism. In his youth, Kierkegaard was a passionate admirer of Hegel. Traces of his youthful admiration for the venerable German professor can still be seen in his master’s thesis “On the Concept of Irony”, although already here the polemical tone is gaining strength. Later, the differences become irreconcilable, and the polemics cease to be embellished with polite formulas paying tribute to the great German philosopher. Kierkegaard’s rejection of Hegelian philosophy can be reduced to two main points – the rejection of absolute idealism, including the dialectical method by which concepts are developed, and the rejection of the philosophical interpretation of religion. As for absolute idealism, Kierkegaard defends the primacy and fullness of existence, which is subject to inevitable distortion by abstract thinking in concepts. Kierkegaard contrasts the dialectical moment of annulment with a contradiction taken to the extreme, from which only faith, but not philosophy, can free man. Since man’s search for himself means his search for a lost connection with God, philosophy from the very beginning turns out to be inseparable from religion and subordinate to it. For Hegel, philosophy and religion are identical in content and differ only in form. God turns out to be knowable, which does not bother Hegel at all, and is completely unacceptable for Kierkegaard. For Hegel, intimately personal religiosity, the conflict between the general and the particular mean undeveloped forms of consciousness, while for Kierkegaard they become central questions, the subject of analysis of genuine philosophy. The “uncomplicated pure religiosity” condemned by Hegel, the bearer of which is human individuality, becomes the sought-after goal for Kierkegaard. In this sense, philosophy is only secondary for Kierkegaard: theoretical philosophy is insufficient and most often erroneous, and genuine philosophy—Kierkegaard’s attempt to combine conceptual exposition with literary text—is only capable of orienting a person, helping him to embark on the path of genuine self-knowledge, the path of faith.
The second most important European philosopher with whom Kierkegaard has an ongoing dispute is Socrates. In his diary for 1854, Kierkegaard wrote: “Outside Christianity, Socrates is unique.” This is exactly how Kierkegaard treated Socrates, as the greatest man in the entire pre-Christian world. And therefore, whether it was a question of irony or of Socrates’ understanding of sin as ignorance, Kierkegaard does not so much reproach as justify Socrates, who in his uncompromising service to truth was able to reach those boundaries beyond which the Christian faith begins. Finally, it is necessary to say a few words about Kierkegaard’s attitude to Descartes, and above all to his famous formula cogito ergo sum. From the 17th century, with the philosophy of Descartes, a new era in European philosophy begins – the era of subjectivity. In Kierkegaard’s time, this era comes to an end along with the crisis of rationality, and Kierkegaard becomes the first to openly reject the concept of the subject. Existence takes the place of the subject. From Kierkegaard’s point of view, the conclusion of cogito ergo sum postulates the identity of thinking and being, but this identity is not substantiated in any way and turns out to be an empty tautology: thinking is the only way of existence of a pure subject. If by the I in cogito we mean a single individual, then the value of the statement will be very questionable, since thinking is inseparable from existence, and therefore nothing new is communicated to us in the conclusion.
The main provisions and concepts of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The concept of “man”. Man, according to Kierkegaard, is first of all an existing man, an existence that unites the eternal and the temporal, infinity and finitude. In the “Concluding Unscientific Afterword to the “Philosophical Fragments” Kierkegaard explains that “man as he is in reality, uniting infinity and finitude in himself, possesses his reality precisely insofar as he retains both within himself with an infinite interest in existence.”
At the very beginning of the first chapter of The Sickness Unto Death, the given definition is supplemented by a new constructive solution, reminiscent of Fichtean analysis of consciousness. Man is still understood as “a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity,” but now the relationship between opposites comes to the fore. The human I exists when the said relationship relates to oneself. The ethical and religious orientation of such an understanding of the I becomes obvious when Kierkegaard puts forward the following postulate: the totality of relationships that make up the human self is not independent. The self-positing of a relationship—the act of self-awareness, when “the relationship relates to itself”—is preceded by the force that posits it. As a result, we have three relationships: (1) the relationship between opposites, (2) the relationship to this relationship, or the human I, and (3) the relationship to the other, or God.
The existential of “despair”. Definition of “faith” through the concept of “sin”. The main theme of the book “The Sickness Unto Death” is, of course, not self-knowledge as such, but ethical self-knowledge, leading a person to God. “Deadly illness” and at the same time the starting point for self-awareness is despair. As L. Shestov noted, the beginning of philosophy for Kierkegaard is not surprise, as the Greeks taught, but despair. Despair is an internal discrepancy in synthesis, when the attitude is related to oneself. Kierkegaard’s reasoning about the inevitability of despair could be compared with Schopenhauer’s teaching on suffering: just as our life, whether we like it or not, is permeated with suffering, so each of us carries within ourselves the seed of despair. From the structure of the human I, Kierkegaard derives two types of true despair: the desire to get rid of one’s I and the passionate desire to be oneself. Kierkegaard calls inauthentic or untrue despair such despair when a person is not aware of his Self. That is why Kierkegaard notes that “to despair of something is not yet true despair.” The real object of any despair is a person’s own Self. Thus, the universality of despair does not mean its homogeneity; on the contrary, despair can choose the most diverse paths, generalizing which we get three forms, or types, of despair: (1) despair when a person does not know his Self (untrue despair); (2) despair when one does not want to be oneself; (3) despair when one wants to be oneself.
Kierkegaard demands that the despairing one go to the end: being aware of one’s sin, one must continue to wish to remain oneself, and then we will find faith and in this faith we will overcome our despair. Kierkegaard describes the state when despair completely retreats as follows: “in relation to oneself, wishing to be oneself, the I immerses itself through its own clear transparency in the power that posits it” (1:350). In this formula we find Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith. Another definition of faith – through paradox and absurdity – is contained in the work “Fear and Trembling”, which will be discussed a little later. As for the concept of “sin”, Kierkegaard understands sin as “despair before God”. The idea of positivity, initially present in the concept of sin, sums up Kierkegaard’s conceptual reasoning: “Sin implies the I, raised to infinite power by the idea of God, and therefore also implies the maximum awareness of sin as an action. This is precisely what is expressed in the thesis that sin is something positive; its positivity consists precisely in being before God” (1:350).
As we have seen, not every despair leads to faith. Salvation, the acquisition of faith, simultaneously means the acquisition of oneself. However, Kierkegaard describes the thorny path to faith not only through the existential of despair. Another famous teaching of the Danish philosopher is the doctrine of the three stages of life, which he expounds most fully in Either/Or, his first major work – the book was published in 2 volumes with a total volume of about 800 pages – and his first work published under a pseudonym, which was published in 1843, that is, a decade earlier than The Sickness Unto Death, which tells of despair. To be precise, Either/Or covers in detail only two stages – the aesthetic and the ethical, and the description of the religious stage is contained in the books Fear and Trembling (1843) and Stages of Life’s Journey (1845).
Aesthetic stage. At the first aesthetic stage, a person is in search of pleasure and enjoyment, no matter physical or intellectual. Always unsatisfied desire constantly changes its object. The type of romantic individualist corresponds most to this stage, as well as Don Juan, who is in an eternal search for new sensations. Nero, oddly enough, is also cited as an example by Kierkegaard, since his main motive is the thirst for pleasure. In reality, aesthetic existence can take on a wide variety of forms, but three characteristics remain unchanged. The first is enjoyment. The second is spontaneity, when a person has not worked on his spiritual development, regardless of whether it reaches any heights or borders on feeblemindedness, but only uses what he already has as a gift. Finally, the third is ethical indifference, i.e. indifference to the ethical side of what is happening.
The ethical stage and the concept of “choice”. Kierkegaard connects the second ethical stage of human existence with choice. Its heroes are Ahasuerus and Socrates.
It is precisely the concept of choice that justifies the rigid formulation of the problem in the title of the book – “Either-Or”. Kierkegaard draws the reader’s attention to the fact that this is not about a simple choice, when the proposed options are actually equivalent, but about “absolute choice”. If a person finds its outlet for genuine freedom of will, then a person is capable of “choosing” only one thing – himself as freedom, his own Self, which is the center of ethical life.
Religious stage. “Teleological elimination of the ethical” and the definition of “faith” through the concept of “absurdity”. Thus, the work “Either-Or” reveals, first of all, the dilemma between the aesthetic and ethical principles in man. “Fear and Trembling” reveals the essence of the religious stage and replaces “either-or” with “neither-nor”: in order to enter the path of faith, a person must renounce not only aesthetic priorities, but also ethics with all its maxims and universal postulates. Faith is higher than ethics. Kierkegaard defines ethics as “universal”, i.e. he recognizes its pan-human and universal character. And yet Kierkegaard defends the possibility of “teleological elimination of the ethical”: the higher τέλος – faith – eliminates the ethical, does not destroy, but rather eliminates, preserving it in the highest.
The central concept for the third religious stage is faith. Faith in God is the highest thing a person can do. The greatest evil is atheism. But faith, according to Kierkegaard, begins where thinking ends, and if understanding, as a derivative of thinking, reflects a person’s attitude to another person, then faith expresses a person’s attitude to the divine. Thus, faith is irrational, but Kierkegaard finds concepts that help to get closer to its essence. This is about paradox and absurdity. Faith is “the greatest and most difficult of all possible things,” since achieving it requires “looking into the eyes of impossibility.” What exactly can be called impossible, paradoxical, absurd? Kierkegaard defines faith as a paradox, according to which “the individual as an individual stands above the universal” (1: 54).
Abraham’s Faith and the Theme of Silence in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy. One of the important themes for Kierkegaard is the theme of silence, which deserves attention because it is an integral part of the teaching, i.e. it is substantiated conceptually. Abraham is silent not because he is afraid to disturb the peace of his loved ones, Isaac and Sarah, with tragic news, and not because he wants, as usually happens with a tragic hero, to hide a secret known only to him, but because he cannot speak, or, in other words, because he has nothing to say. The “single individual” is silent because he has no connection with the universal, because no one will ever understand him. From this “incomprehensibility” for all others, several important conclusions follow at once. No one can give him advice, including another knight of faith, because “when another individual must go the same way, he must become singular in exactly the same way,” and therefore does not need any instructions.
The individual. The central concept of Kierkegaard’s philosophy is undoubtedly the “individual” (Enkelte), and the concept that opposes it is the “universal”. It is necessary to keep in mind that the “individual” is a completely special concept, since it has no definition, does not possess any properties except one – to be an individual, i.e., unique, singular. Kierkegaard’s “individual” is an individual who not only stands above the universal, but an individual who is in an absolute relationship to the Absolute, i.e., who has found God, who has entered the path of faith.
The formation of the “single individual,” and this is very important to note, since here the paths of the philosophy of life and even existential philosophy and Kierkegaard’s philosophy diverge forever, is formation through self-reflection, self-awareness. Thinking precedes action and is responsible for the analysis of its consequences, but man must somehow arrive at this “before” and “after.” Let us remember that despair, in order to become positive, i.e. to open the way for man to the awareness of his sinfulness, must necessarily be associated with reflection on himself: despair must be aware of itself, aware that it is an action, and its intensity increases along with the growth of awareness of the Self. Man is responsible for his sin precisely because it is in his power as a conscious being to sin or not to sin.
However, Kierkegaard’s philosophy is not only and so much a philosophy of individuality, as many try to present it. Its main goal is not the glorification of the individual, but, as Kierkegaard himself repeatedly emphasized, the answer to the question of what it means to become a Christian. The concepts of “single individual”, “repetition”, “despair”, “fear” and many others do not have an independent meaning, and Kierkegaard’s existentialism cannot be characterized otherwise than as Christian existentialism. At the same time, the way in which the Danish philosopher tries to convey his ideas to the reader is determined by his special, unconventional attitude to Christianity and its dogmas, and therefore it is extremely difficult to determine what prevails in his worldview – religiosity or existential orientation.
Method of Philosophizing: Kierkegaard’s Style and Method. Kierkegaard does not seek to create any system and deliberately does not adhere to the generally accepted norms of scientific presentation: he calls his own style “dialectical lyricism” (the subtitle of the work “Fear and Trembling”) or declares that he prefers to speak “like a human being”, or, finally, assures that he would like “to be considered an amateur who, of course, is engaged in philosophical speculation, but himself is outside this speculation.”
It is obvious that in the traditional sense Kierkegaard’s work is not philosophy, but rather belongs to the category of didactic literature, but it is equally obvious that it was precisely this method of philosophizing, devoid of systematics and directly bordering on art, that by the beginning of the 20th century had secured for itself the right to be called philosophy.
Leaving aside the religious component of his work, let us try to identify what compels Kierkegaard to apply the new method of philosophizing described above. Kierkegaard places passion above reason, above reflection. Kierkegaard’s aspiration is to influence his contemporaries, to change them, because neither their behavior nor their self-awareness suits him. He does not like the fact that “people believe too little in the spirit,” that they are “spiritless,” and he wants them to “gain the courage to believe in the power of the spirit.” Passion, accordingly, is understood not as some kind of lower unconscious force that controls our actions, but as something that constitutes an integral part of spirituality, i.e., passion is spiritualized. Thus, he recognizes as reliable not the conclusions of cold reason, but the conclusions of passion, since they are the only ones that convince. Moreover, it is not reason that determines what is truly human, but passion, the highest manifestation of which is faith.
The conclusions of reason, and with them all sorts of speculations and the philosophical systems that grow out of them, prove unconvincing and, most importantly, ineffective, since they are incapable of ensuring precisely what they are called upon to ensure, namely, the transition from thought to action. True self-awareness is not contemplation, but action, which can be brought about not by scientific or, what is the same, philosophical work, but rather by preaching, which is nothing other than the “art of persuasion.” Kierkegaard can be called his own biographer, and not only because he left us entire volumes of diary entries as a legacy, but also because his life itself (both creative and personal) problematizes the concept of authorship. This is evidenced by both the constant and well-thought-out play with pseudonyms and the desire to correspond to the “described I” in real life. Incidentally, the population of Copenhagen, although it was the royal capital, was approximately 200,000 at that time, meaning it was a small city in which the life of the intellectual elite was, so to speak, in full view of everyone. Kierkegaard took advantage of this more than once. Thus, while writing “Either-Or,” Kierkegaard was so immersed in his work that he had only a few free minutes a day, which he spent appearing at the theater in full view of the entire public. Rumours, naturally, claimed that all he did was attend performances, but this was exactly what Kierkegaard was after – the effect was produced. It is also known that his only joy was his daily walks around Copenhagen, and that he acquired the reputation of a “spy” who knew everything about everyone.
But let us return to the topic of authorship and to Kierkegaard’s desire to confuse the reader in every way, but not to give him the opportunity to attribute all his works to one author. Indeed, if he simply wanted to hide his name, he could have used one pseudonym, but he constantly changed them: the book “Fear and Trembling” was signed by Johannes de Silentio, “Repetition” by Constantine Constantius, “The Concept of Fear” by Vitalius Haufniensius, “Philosophical Fragments” by Johannes Climacus, and “The Sickness Unto Death,” Kierkegaard’s last major work, by Anti-Climacus. Is this a harmless game, or is there some meaning behind it?
In fact, Kierkegaard had a well-thought-out plan. This conclusion can be made on the basis of diary entries and three works devoted directly to the problem of authorship, which we mentioned when presenting Kierkegaard’s biography. The plan was as follows: Kierkegaard’s philosophical works were published under pseudonyms, but in parallel – that is, with a minimal gap in the date of publication – his religious works were published. The former, therefore, represented an “indirect form of presentation”, and the latter, on the contrary, carried a direct, immediate message. Kierkegaard strictly followed this plan for five years – from 1843 to 1848. It would seem that this is not such a long period, but the list of works published during this period is quite impressive. Kierkegaard saw the advantage of the “indirect form of presentation” in the “absence of authority”, which served as an effective way of influencing the reader, involving him, although not in an honest way, in the truth. Such a method, in addition, was excellent for combating various kinds of illusions. As the main “targets” for camouflaged, ironic and indirect criticism, Kierkegaard chose the belief in the infallibility of the absolute truth of the systematic philosophy of the Hegelian type, as well as the unfounded conviction of the average person that he is a Christian, and an orthodox one at that. We must not forget, however, that the plan developed by Kierkegaard was unified and, ultimately, both philosophical and religious works pursued one common goal – to communicate an understanding of what it means to be a Christian.
Kierkegaard not only followed his plan, but also did not hide it, fearing that otherwise he would be misunderstood. Meanwhile, he did not manage to avoid the latter. It is not at all surprising, but regrettable, that Kierkegaard’s literary and philosophical works gained a certain popularity, while his works on religious topics did not arouse much interest. Moreover, many were convinced that it was all a matter of age preferences: at first, Kierkegaard wrote aesthetic works, but with age he became more serious and switched to moralizing. Judging by his diary entries, Kierkegaard was deeply distressed by such obvious misunderstanding, which brought his efforts to naught.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, therefore, in no way mean that he wants to appear to be what he is not in reality; they only prevent one from making a final judgment about the author, i.e., from subsuming the “individual” under some concept (be it “entertaining writer” or “subtle psychologist”) and, already proceeding from this, from evaluating all his work. In other words, the “single individual” remains himself only in relation to himself, only he is capable of judging himself, and Kierkegaard’s manner of presenting himself to the reader is a clear example, an illustration of this important thesis.
We have already discussed the theme of silence in Kierkegaard’s work. Kierkegaard himself, of course, is not silent (he does not need to be, since, according to his own conviction, he is just one of us, and not a “knight of faith”), but his speech, even if completely sincere, lacks spontaneity and accessibility. Without revealing himself, Kierkegaard wants his convictions to become the convictions of the reader. Humor and irony also serve this purpose, since only someone who does not participate in what is happening can see the humorous side of what is happening, in other words, someone who has managed to distance himself, to look at everything from a different point of view. This is also served by the multiple variations of well-known plots, which draws the reader, against his will, into a world of endless possibilities, into Borges’s “garden of forking paths”, where the role of an observer is simply not provided – everyone who enters immediately becomes a co-creator or an active participant.
Universal philosophical propositions point only to the general and are powerless to express what distinguishes one person from another, i.e., the elusive subjectivity of our existence, and therefore speculative philosophy ends where differences begin. The exposure of speculative philosophy was not an end in itself for Kierkegaard: he continues to believe in the existence of an absolute and unique truth (i.e., something that exists beyond linguistic reality), the path to which his own philosophy must point. Since such a truth cannot be contained in the universal, it must be discovered in human subjectivity. The truth is contained in God, but it is revealed only through man as a “single individual,” through his personal (and therefore subjective) relationship to God, which is called “faith.”
Conclusion: Kierkegaard’s existentialism. In conclusion, let us say a few words about Kierkegaard’s existentialism. First of all, as already noted above, Kierkegaard radically rethinks the central concept of any philosophy, the concept of truth. If all previous philosophy believed that the source of truth is reason, then the Danish philosopher dares to raise the question of the “infallibility of human reason” and declare that “truth is subjectivity.” His philosophy begins not with surprise, and not because a passion for knowledge is inherent in man, but with despair (9: 429). However, this is not enough to classify Kierkegaard as an existential thinker; for this it is necessary that his philosophy be somehow connected with the concept of “existence.” Scholasticism, as is known, developed Aristotle’s idea of distinguishing essence and existence in various directions, recognizing essence as preceding existence. Kierkegaard turned the relationship between these two categories upside down, and existence began to precede essence. The subject of his philosophy becomes the “single individual,” or, as he also calls him, the “existing thinker,” the “existing individual,” i.e., an unobjectified individuality that avoids any definitions, in which thinking and realization, awareness and action are merged into one. But it is not only the relationship of essence to existence that characterizes existential philosophy. In this case, both Fichte and Schelling could also be called existential philosophers, since they considered “pure activity,” becoming, in relation to which essence can only be something secondary, to be the source of everything, the beginning of being. Paul Tillich defines existentialism as “thinking that is conscious of the finitude and tragedy of every human existence” (2: 454). This means that another important feature of existential thinking is its tragic nature. Suffering, according to Kierkegaard, is inevitable and necessary in human existence: only by comprehending its essence and depth, a person is able to find the path to salvation, to restore the lost harmony. Existential thinking, further, is such thinking, the definition of which should include going beyond one’s own limits. This is exactly how, in terms of the existential philosophy of the twentieth century, Kierkegaard’s understanding of existence can be interpreted. Not the power of reason or, more precisely, not intellectual efforts – after all, faith, according to Kierkegaard, is accessible regardless of a person’s intellectual merits – but deep experiences push a person to the level of genuine or real existence, beyond the limits of his present being. Repeating the previously expressed thesis, Kierkegaard does not reject thinking and reflection as such, but only denies the existence of “pure thought”, which, with its abstractness, replaces the natural connection between thinking and existence, united together in human existence.
Literature
1. Kierkegaard S. Fear and Trembling. M., 1993.
2. Kierkegaard S. Pleasure and Duty. Kiev, 1994.
3. Kierkegaard S. The Unhappy One. M., 2002.
4. Kierkegaard S. Repetition: The Experimental Psychology of Constantin Constantius / Translated from dated by P. Gansen, verified with the original, corrected, supplemented and commented by D. Lungina. Moscow, 1997.
5. Kierkegaard S. “The final unscientific afterword to the “Philosophical crumbs”” / Translated from dated by D. Lungina // Logos. 1997. No. 10
6. Rohde P. P. Soren Kierkegaard, testifying about himself and his life. Chelyabinsk, 1998.
7. Dobrokhotov A. L. Apology of Cogito, or the Curse of Balaam. Criticism of Descartes in Kierkegaard’s “Unscientific Afterword” // Logos. No. 10. 1997
8. Kierkegaard’s World: Russian and Danish Interpretations of the Works of Soren Kierkegaard. Moscow, 1994.
9. Shestov L. Kierkegaard and existential philosophy. Moscow, 1992.