Aristotle was born in 384/383 BC in the city of Stagira in Thrace, in the family of the court physician of the Macedonian king Amyntas I. The mentality of the future philosopher was undoubtedly influenced by the traditions of his family, a family of hereditary doctors. Having received his initial education, Aristotle came to Athens in 367 and became a member of Plato’s Academy. Aristotle remained in the Academy until Plato’s death in 347. Probably, already during Plato’s lifetime, disagreements between the great student and his teacher began to emerge; nevertheless, Aristotle’s Platonic training remained with him throughout his life, and in his later works, Aristotle would sometimes write “we, Platonists.”
After Plato’s death, apparently as a result of a conflict with the new scholarch of the Academy, Speusippus, Aristotle leaves Athens and goes to Assos, a city on the coast of Asia Minor, where he most likely devotes himself to biological studies, studying the rich fauna of the Asia Minor coast. It was here that the beginning of the collection of natural science materials was laid, which would later serve Aristotle in the development of biology. Three years later, Aristotle leaves for Mytilene, a city on the island of Lesbos, from where he sets off in 343 to Macedonia, where he becomes the tutor of the young Alexander, the son of Philip, who is destined to go down in history as Alexander the Great. The education of the young prince continued until 336, when Alexander replaced his murdered father on the royal throne. Aristotle undoubtedly exerted a great influence on the personality of his royal protégé; however, in many ways the political and cultural orientation of the great monarch diverged from the ideals that Aristotle tried to instill in him. Thus, the difference between Greeks and barbarians, from Aristotle’s point of view, existed by nature, whereas Alexander would later try to eliminate this difference. In 335, Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own school there, which would be called Peripatetic from the word “peripate”, “place for walks”. This school was located in a place called Lyceum, which is why its second name became “Lyceum”, hence our “Lyceum”. For 12 years, Aristotle led his school, conducted classes for members of the school and for the general public, and encouraged his students to conduct specific scientific research. The school collected a huge amount of material on the history of philosophy, biology, history, and politics. After Alexander’s death, anti-Macedonian sentiments grew in Athens, which could not help but affect Alexander’s former teacher. Aristotle, like Socrates and Anaxagoras before him, was accused of impiety, and he was forced to flee Athens to Chalcis, where he died in 322.
Aristotle’s legacy is very extensive, it is divided into works for a wide circle (“exoteric”), written by him mainly during the years of communication with Plato, and works for his school (“acroamatic”). Exoteric works are, for the most part, dialogues, in which Aristotle noticeably imitates Plato. These works are written in a lively and clear language, which gave reason, for example, to Cicero to speak of the golden source of Aristotle’s eloquence. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s dialogues have reached us in small fragments, while the ancients knew them much better than the main theoretical treatises of Aristotle. Acroamatic works are notes of Aristotle, which he used in his teaching activities. Hence the brevity of exposition, the many repetitions, the obscurity of many arguments, the very dense language, but devoid of figurative beauty, which allowed one old philologist (Wilamowitz von Moellendorff) to say that Aristotle was not kissed by the Muse. It is these works, which actually contain Aristotelian philosophy, that have come down to us. They are divided into the following groups. 1. Logical works (Organon); 2. Works on “first philosophy” (Metaphysics); 3. Works on the philosophy of nature, on the natural sciences, including psychology (Physics, On the Heavens, Meteorology, On Generation and Corruption, History of Animals, On the Soul, etc.); 4. Works on ethics, politics, rhetoric and economics (Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Politics, etc.); 5. Works on the history and theory of art (Poetics).
Division of sciences. According to Aristotle, any thinking can be directed either at activity or creativity, or it is theoretical. The sciences associated with activity, practical, study those areas in which there is a conscious choice. This includes ethics, politics and economics. Creative or constructive sciences talk about how a finished work is obtained from a certain material by means of a certain activity. Aristotle developed in these sciences only the knowledge of how a work of art is obtained (“poetics”). Finally, contemplative sciences do not produce anything, do not implement anything, but only contemplate, study the existing for its own sake. There are three types of theoretical sciences. First, physics, which studies things that are mobile and exist separately. Secondly, mathematics, some branches of which deal with motionless objects, but do not exist separately, but are given in matter. Finally, the highest theoretical science, the first philosophy, which considers objects isolated from matter and motionless. If there were no immobile and divine essence, then the first science, according to Aristotle, would be physics. But since such an essence exists, the first science is first philosophy or the science of the divine (“theology”).
Logic and the doctrine of knowledge. In the Aristotelian division of knowledge, logic is not mentioned, since, according to Aristotle, it is not included in any substantive part of knowledge, but is its tool or “organon”
[3] . This tool must be studied before any other part of knowledge, for it is impossible, says Aristotle, to cognize something and cognize knowledge itself at the same time. Aristotle himself called this preparation for knowledge analytics, meaning that this knowledge analyzes, i.e., decomposes thinking itself into its component parts. The main goal of such decomposition was the development of the doctrine of inference and proof. The system of Aristotelian logical doctrine embraces the doctrine of the most general terms in which being is expressed, then of the statement consisting of such terms, of the syllogism as a system of statements, and finally of proof as a system of syllogisms.
Aristotle calls the most general words of our speech categories. There are ten such categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, and suffering. All the diversity of our language and thinking is reduced to them; we do not express or think anything that could not be reduced to these categories. It is important to note that for Aristotle, these forms of speech and thinking are also forms of being itself. Analyzing thinking, Aristotle does not forget about being itself, about objective reality. Therefore, the categories that logic speaks of are identical with the categories of first philosophy, or the doctrine of being as such. A judgment arises from a combination of categories, and the categories themselves can be neither true nor false, but a judgment or statement is true or false. Aristotle calls judgment “revealing” (άπόφανσις), judgment has two types: affirmative (κατάφασις) and negative (απόφασις). In connection with judgment, Aristotle formulates the laws: 1). contradiction and 2). excluded middle. 1. Of two statements, when one asserts the same thing that the other denies, only one can be true. 2. Between the two members of the contradiction there is nothing in between. The logical law of contradiction is conditioned by the ontological: the same thing cannot belong and not belong to something in the same respect. This ontological law can no longer be substantiated in any way: it itself is the most obvious position, with the help of which all the others are proved
The doctrine of the connection of judgments, which was in its embryonic form in Plato, is developed by Aristotle in great detail. Aristotle’s definition of a syllogism reads: “A syllogism is a statement in which, given certain statements, something other than those statements follows by means of those statements.” According to the reliability of the premises, the conclusion is divided into apodictic and dialectical. An apodictic conclusion is a conclusion from true premises, a dialectical conclusion is a conclusion from plausible ones. Aristotle also speaks of an eristic syllogism, carried out from premises that only seem plausible. In addition to the syllogism, Aristotle developed the doctrine of induction. Its general definition is as follows: “induction is the path from the individual to the general.” According to Aristotle, only complete induction has scientific significance; incomplete induction, i.e., one that does not take into account all individual cases, does not pertain to science, but to oratory. Syllogism is superior to induction, it is closer to nature and more demonstrative than it, but induction is closer to us, to our sensory experience. The most reliable knowledge, according to Aristotle, must proceed from the general, moving towards the particular, i.e., following the deductive path, but many are more inclined to go from the particular to the general, i.e., the inductive path. The most general cannot be proven, since in proof the particular is proven by means of the general, and in the case of the most general, there can be no further principles. Therefore, according to Aristotle, the most general principles are cognized directly, i.e., they are cognized by the mind (νους). That which is deduced from these principles in a universal and necessary way is cognized by scientific knowledge (επιστήμη). That which can be both this and that is cognized by unreliable opinion (δόξα). It is obvious that Aristotle’s doctrine of knowledge is a further continuation and development of Plato’s concept of knowledge. Aristotle significantly enriches and concretizes it, modifies it in accordance with the needs of his own worldview, but remains faithful to the fundamental Platonic scheme.
Physics. Aristotle’s consideration of nature begins with the question of its principles and elements, for any scientific knowledge consists of breaking down the complex into the simple, of reducing a thing to its constituent principles. Aristotle calls this movement “the natural path from what is more obvious and understandable to us to what is more obvious and understandable by nature,” for what is initially more obvious to us is the thing that appears to our senses, and not its elements. How many principles can natural things have? In any case, there are more than one, for the recognition of only one principle leads to the concept of a single and unchanging being, which, according to Aristotle, is completely unsuitable for describing nature. Nature is, first of all, natural things that are mobile. Those who assumed the unity and immutability of being (the Eleatics) denied, from Aristotle’s point of view, the very possibility of knowledge about nature.
So, the number of principles must be more than one. But how many are there? The principles cannot be infinite in number, because in that case they would be incomprehensible, natural things could not be reduced to them, and therefore there could be no science of nature. Consequently, their number must be limited. To determine this number, Aristotle draws attention to the fact that in the previous Greek physiology, principles were understood as opposites. This is quite reasonable, for the property of principles is that they are not deducible from anything, and opposites have precisely this property. They cannot be deduced from something else, for by assumption they are principles, nor can they be deduced from each other, for such deducibility is not characteristic of opposites. So, according to Aristotle, principles must be opposites. However, in addition to opposites, we must also admit a third thing, which these opposites will act on. Thus, it is necessary to admit that there are three principles: one pair of opposites and that which they act on. With the help of these principles, Aristotle gives an explanation of the most important process in natural things – the process of origin and change. For example, if a person becomes educated, what principles are active in this process? Firstly, a pair of opposites “educated” and “uneducated”, secondly, the thing that accepts one of these opposites, in our case, this is man. That which accepts opposites is called by Aristotle the term “subject” (ΰποκείμενον), i.e. “lying under something”, under the opposites. One of the opposites is a positive definition of a thing, Aristotle calls it “form” (μορφή), the other opposite is the negation of this positive definition, Aristotle calls it “privation” (στέρεσις). The formation of an educated person is, therefore, the loss by the subject, man, of the opposite “uneducated” and the acceptance of the opposite “educated”. The nature of the subject may cause some difficulty, since it cannot be characterized in itself. According to Aristotle, it is possible to understand what it is only through analogy: “as copper is related to a statue, as wood is related to a bed, and as matter and the formless are related to anything that has a form before it takes on a form, so the underlying nature is related to the essence, to a certain something and being.”
Thus, the principles of natural things are established. But what is nature itself? According to Aristotle, nature is a certain principle of motion and rest, and natural things are those that have in themselves the principle of motion and rest, whether in relation to place, increase and decrease, or qualitative change. Man-made things are opposed to natural things, since the latter have the principle of their motion and rest not in themselves, but in something else. But what is this principle of motion and rest, i.e. nature? Aristotle says that according to some, “nature is what lies at the basis of every thing that has in itself the principle of motion and rest, the first matter.” For example, the nature of a bed in this case will be wood, the nature of a statue copper or marble. However, according to Aristotle, the understanding of nature is to a greater extent connected with the concepts of form and appearance (είδος), obtained in the definition. That is, if we want to define the nature of meat or bone, we must say what they are, and not indicate what meat and bone come from. According to Aristotle, bone comes from earth, but we do not know the nature of bone if we say that it is earth. Earth may or may not become bone, but nature is what does not exist in potentiality but in reality. However, one cannot study nature without taking into account its matter, i.e. what the thing is made of, since in natural things their definitions and forms exist only together with matter. We can theoretically abstract bone from its definition, but we cannot really tear it away. Thus, matter is present in the concept of nature, but one cannot study nature based only on matter. The student of nature is like a doctor who must know both what health is (form and appearance) and what bile is (matter), and like an architect who must know both the properties of stone (matter) and have the appearance of a house before his eyes (form).
The most important characteristic of Aristotelian natural philosophy is that it is imbued with a teleological view of the world. All natural things strive for a goal, or, as Aristotle says, for the best limit. That is, in addition to form and matter, nature in natural things also has a goal, or rather, the goal itself is the true form of the thing. For example, the form and goal of an egg is an adult bird, and the egg itself is the matter in which this form is contained. After all, in order to determine what an egg is, we need to have the concept of a bird, i.e. the definition of an adult bird.
What are the causes that act in natural things? According to Aristotle, there are four types. First, that from which the thing came into being, or the material cause. For example, such a cause for a bowl would be silver or copper, its material, and for a house – stones or wood. Second, it is the form and pattern, i.e. that which makes it possible to define the thing, or the formal cause. For example, for an octave, it would be the ratio of two to one, for a house – its appearance. Third, that from which the first beginning of change and rest came, or the active cause. For example, for a child, such a cause would be the father, for a house – the builder. Fourth, that for the sake of which, or the final cause. For example, for a house, the final cause would be “to serve as a shelter,” for a walk and a diet, such a cause would be health. Accordingly, a natural thing can have several causes at the same time. In this case, the formal, driving and target cause can often coincide, for example, when a person gives birth to a person, the driving cause is the person, the formal cause of the person being born will be the species definition of the person, and “that for which” will again be the person.
The most important point of Aristotle’s doctrine of causality in nature is his assessment of chance (τύχη) and that which happens by itself as possible causes for natural things. Firstly, these two factors are found in those phenomena which do not always and not mostly occur. Secondly, they can only be causes for such events which could arise for the sake of something. For example, if a person goes to the market to buy food, but there he meets his debtor and collects a debt from him, then the collection of the debt will be accidental. If a person always or in most cases went to the market to collect a debt from his debtors, the collection of the debt would not be accidental. Chance, according to Aristotle, is possible only in the practical activity of man. In the realm of nature there can only be “what happens by itself”, “when in things which generally arise for the sake of something, something happens not for the sake of what happened, but the cause of this lies outside.” For example, if a brick fell on a man’s head from the roof of a house and killed him, we have here “happening by itself”, since the same brick could have been thrown down by someone else with the purpose of killing. According to Aristotle, a brick has a natural downward tendency, this is its purpose and “for the sake of what”, but in our case it performed an action (murder), which was not its purpose, but could have been a purpose for something or someone else. Thus, even the concept of spontaneity turns out to be teleologically loaded in Aristotle. Aristotle, giving such a definition of chance and spontaneity, sharply criticizes the representatives of Greek atomism, according to which the emergence of our world is spontaneous. Aristotle believes that since in the living nature we observe the category of purpose is one of the most important, this should apply to an even greater extent to the nature of the entire cosmos. Chance and spontaneity, according to Aristotle, play a much smaller role in our world than nature and reason. They are a kind of side effects that arise at the intersection of many teleologically conditioned series of events. Nature always or mostly comes to the same results, and this, according to Aristotle, is possible only when it is determined by a goal. That nature is, first of all, a goal and “for the sake of what”, is also evidenced by the purposeful activity observed in the world of nature: a spider weaving its web, a swallow building a nest, etc. This activity is subordinated to a goal, although – and this prevents many from recognizing the purposefulness of nature – it occurs without prior reflection, which is characteristic of man and his arts. Cases of ugliness, according to Aristotle, should not lead to a denial of the purposeful character of nature: in this case, as in works of art, the goal is simply not achieved, although it takes place. Thus, according to Aristotle, the goal of a physicist is to know the final cause and only secondarily – the material cause, for the final cause determines the material, and not vice versa.
In accordance with this understanding of nature, Aristotle explains the most important phenomenon of the natural world – movement. To describe it, he uses the concepts of “being in reality”, “being in possibility” (δυνάμει) and “realization” (εντελέχεια). Movement is, first of all, a transition from possibility to reality, a realization of possibility. “The realization of what is in possibility as precisely what is in possibility is movement.” Let us take, for example, copper, which is potentially a statue. Copper as such does not contain the definitions of a statue, therefore the realization of simply copper is copper. But since we take it precisely as copper, containing the potential of a statue, we speak of its movement as the realization of a statue. Obviously, movement defined in this way is completely subordinated to the teleological view of the world, since movement is the realization of a goal, a transition from possibility to reality, which is the goal. In motion, there are usually two related things: the mover and the moved. According to Aristotle, the mover, being the beginning of motion, always brings form to the moved, and the beginning of motion will be precisely this form. Thus, analyzing motion, Aristotle speaks of three factors necessary for its understanding: 1) the moved, which is in a state of possibility, 2) the mover, which is always actual, and 3) the motion itself, which is the realization of what is possible under the influence of what is in reality.
In connection with the analysis of motion, Aristotle faces the problem of infinity or boundlessness, what it is and whether it exists. The conviction of the existence of the infinite arises, according to Aristotle, from the following considerations. First, from the infinity of time; second, from the divisibility of mathematical quantities; third, from the conviction that only the assumption of infinity can explain the continuity of the process of origin and destruction; fourth, from the position that there should be no limit, since one always borders on another; finally, fifth, from the fact that thinking never stops. All this forces us to understand the concept of the infinite. Aristotle emphasizes the complexity of the analysis of the infinite, since both its recognition and its denial lead to many contradictions. Aristotle verifies the infinite with his system of categories and finds out that in itself, i.e., as an essence, the infinite cannot exist. After all, if the infinite is an essence, quantitative categories are inapplicable to it, and it will be indivisible. Moreover, it is obvious that the infinite belongs to the same category as number and magnitude, and they, according to Aristotle, cannot exist as separate entities, but are “an incidental property of some entity” (το συμβεβηκός). Infinity is also an incidental property of another thing. Aristotle does not recognize the existence of an infinite body, since a body, by its very concept, assumes that it is limited to a plane, and the infinite cannot be limited by anything. Thus, according to Aristotle, there can be no actual infinity. Infinity can only be possible, potential. This means that, for example, with the continued division of a number, we have a different and different result each time. As Aristotle says, “the infinite exists in such a way that one always takes something different and different, and what is taken is always finite, but always different and different.” In Aristotelian terms, the infinite is the matter of some completed quantity, not the whole but a part, something auxiliary to the completed and perfect thing. However, although infinity is potential, this does not mean that it can ever be realized and become actual.
The next question to be considered in the study of nature is the question of place or space ( τόπο ς), whether it exists, what properties it has, and what it is. Place exists, and it also has a certain power. According to Aristotle, directions (up, down, right, left), which are types of place, exist not only relative to us, but also in themselves, by nature. Up, for example, is where fire rushes, and down is where heavy and earthy bodies rush. Aristotle defines place as the boundary of the enclosing body. Therefore, for something to be in a place, there must be another enclosing body outside it. Therefore, according to Aristotle, earth is in water, water is in air, air is in ether, ether is in Heaven, but Heaven itself is nowhere, for there is no enclosing body outside it. The most important point of the doctrine of place is that every moving body has its own natural place, where this body will move if there is no obstacle to this movement. Our world is a system of heterogeneous places, not reducible to any one spatial denominator. Bodies of different natures move to different places. Light bodies rush to the top of the Universe, heavy ones – to its bottom. In connection with the doctrine of place, Aristotle also examines the question of the nature of emptiness, which was assumed by some early Greek natural philosophers, primarily atomists. Aristotle refutes their thesis that without recognizing emptiness, movement is impossible, because with universal filling no body could find a gap for its movement. According to Aristotle, this is incorrect, because movement is possible in a continuous medium, for example, in the movement of liquids, when one successively takes the place of another. Moreover, the recognition of the void, on the contrary, leads to the denial of the possibility of movement, for why would movement arise in a void, since it is the same here and there? Movement, as we have already seen, presupposes for Aristotle the presence of heterogeneous natural places, their absence would lead to immobility. Finally, if we assume a void, then no body, having come into motion, could stop, for a body stops, according to Aristotle, in its natural place, and here there is no such place. Thus, the void itself does not exist.
Physicists cannot do without considering time, what it is, for time conceals many complexities that were revealed by Aristotle’s masterly analysis. We constantly talk about time, we live in time, but the essence of time is unclear to us. If time is a whole, composed of the past, future and present as its parts, then what would such a whole be in which some parts no longer exist and others do not yet exist? It cannot be composed of many “nows” either, since time is not only the present. And when we perceive only the moment of “now,” it seems to us that there is no time. Consequently, time is associated with movement and change, although it cannot be identical to it. Time appears when we distinguish between the previous and the subsequent in movement, “and then we say that time has elapsed when we receive a sensory perception of the previous and the subsequent in movement.” Thus, time is not movement, but “the number of movement in relation to the previous and the subsequent,” a number thanks to which we can speak of greater and lesser movement. Since, further, movement follows magnitude, and magnitude is continuous, time itself is continuous. The relationship between time and movement is reciprocal: just as time measures movement, so time itself is measured by movement. Finally, according to Aristotle, time is not only a measure of movement, but also a measure of rest. Time does not embrace all that exists; Aristotle speaks of the existence of eternal things that are not subject to time.
Cosmology. According to Aristotle, the source of all movement is the unmoving prime mover, a deity that is pure activity and thinks for itself. More details will be given about it in the section devoted to “first philosophy”. This prime mover sets in motion the sphere of fixed stars, which, moving in a regular circular motion, is the cause of the movement of the rest of the cosmos. Aristotle divides the world into two parts: the supralunar and the sublunar. The supralunar part is filled with ether, which moves in a regular circular motion. The remaining elements, which are in the sublunary world, are characterized by upward and downward movement. Upward movement is movement toward the boundaries of the sphere adjacent to the sphere of fixed stars, downward movement is movement toward the center of the world. In the center of the world is the earth, which is the heaviest element, at the boundaries of the world is fire, as the lightest element, it borders on the sphere of ether. Between fire and earth are the other elements. Fire is hot and dry, air is hot and moist, water is moist and cold, earth is dry and cold. Ether is the most perfect element, the substance of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle introduces this special essence to explain the regular motion that occurs in the sky. Since he added ether to the already known four elements, ether was called the “fifth essence” (quinta essentia) or “quintessence”.
Psychology. Aristotle developed psychology in connection with physics, since the soul is the principle of movement of animate beings. Psychology as a doctrine of the soul and the relationship between soul and body follows physics and precedes biology as a doctrine of specific forms of life. Aristotle conceives of the soul in its connection with the body. The basic definition of the soul says that “the soul is the first realization of the natural body, endowed with organs and having life in potential.” Since the soul is a realization, the body is a possibility of the soul. Also, the soul is the form and essence of the body, and the body is the matter of the soul. The body is something developing and changing, the soul is the beginning and purpose of this change. Each bodily organ exists for the sake of some activity, and the whole body – for the sake of the soul. Aristotle speaks of a certain hierarchy of souls. The lowest of all is the plant soul, which is characterized only by nutrition and reproduction. An animal also has sensation, desire and movement in space. Animals, unlike plants, also have a certain center of all their mental abilities. Aristotle considered the heart, the center of sensations, to be such a center. According to Aristotle, sensation is nothing more than the actualization of properties and qualities potentially present in objects. Sensation is followed by imagination, which is a kind of weak sensation that can be true or false. Then comes memory, defined as a kind of cessation of what is perceived by the senses, and recollection, which differs from memory in that it is a factor of conscious effort. The human soul has everything that is characteristic of the plant and animal soul. However, in addition, there is also a rational part, which is divided into the contemplative mind and the calculating reason. The first part is aimed exclusively at truth, the second at truth in relation to practical matters. All parts of the human soul, except the mind, are connected with the body, so they perish. But the mind, which exists both before and after the human soul, does not perish. In general, its connection with the soul is problematic, because it is something external to it. In any case, it appears in the soul “from outside” (θύραθεν) and is only divine. At the same time, Aristotle distinguishes between the active mind and the passive, perceiving mind. Immortality and independent existence are inherent only to the first. Thus, a rather paradoxical situation arises. The highest part of man is no longer man, but something divine, coming into him from outside, i.e. man is actually man due to the fact that he is no longer man. The relationship between the active and passive mind and their nature remains not very clear in Aristotle, which in the era of the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages became the subject of active discussion among philosophers.
First philosophy. Aristotle calls “first philosophy”, knowledge of being as such, the most important section of theoretical knowledge. Some theoretical sciences speak of being as mobile and changing (physics), others – of being immobile and abstracted from what is perceived by the senses (mathematics), i.e. they speak only of parts of being, without investigating being as such. Since they investigate particular types of being, they do not care about the most general definitions that are applicable not in this or that area of being, but for all being in general. The science that Aristotle calls “first philosophy” was later called metaphysics, since the Greek publishers of Aristotle’s texts considered that the work that deals with this science should follow Aristotle’s “Physics” (from the Greek meta – after, after). This is how the name “metaphysics” arose, and after some time it began to be considered that it denotes knowledge that speaks about objects that are higher than physical ones.
We have already said that all knowledge, according to Aristotle, is analytical knowledge, obtained as a result of the decomposition of a complex thing into its elements. These elements are “first by nature”, while the perception of a complex thing is “first for us”. Our knowledge begins with sensation, then some living beings have memory, a multitude of memories, united into one, give experience, and finally, only man has art and science. Experience differs from them in that thanks to experience we know that something is such, thanks to art and science we can say why it is such, and we can teach another. Experience concerns the particular and the individual, art and science – the general. Since science knows the general and has a concept, since, unlike experience, it goes beyond the senses, it, according to Aristotle, is higher and more divine than experience. Thus, in science the causes are known, and in the most general science the first causes are known. Aristotle calls such a science wisdom, since science, knowing the general, in a sense knows everything, and this is characteristic of wisdom. It knows everything, since it investigates the very first principles from which everything else is composed, and therefore it can know everything that has come from these principles. Then, this science deals with the most difficult questions, since it is farthest from sensory perception. It is the most accurate, since it proceeds from the smallest number of principles, and such knowledge is the most accurate. Finally, it is knowledge acquired not for the sake of something else, but only for its own sake. And this allows us to call it a science not enslaved and servile, but dominant and free, for a free man, in the understanding of Aristotle, exists for himself, while a slave lives for another. It does not satisfy any practical needs, on the contrary, they must be satisfied before we begin to study it. “All sciences are more necessary than it, but there is none better.” The beginning of this science from a psychological point of view is surprise, and the end is getting rid of this initial surprise, understanding that it cannot be otherwise.
As first causes, Aristotle distinguishes four main types, already known to us from Aristotle’s doctrine of nature. First, the essence and gist of being, that by virtue of which a thing is such and not otherwise. Second, matter and the underlying substratum. Third, that from which the beginning of movement comes. Fourth, “that for the sake of which” and the good. The last type of cause is the opposite of the third, since the third speaks of the beginning of movement, and the fourth – of its end and completion. The material cause is that from which a thing comes and into which it is destroyed. Aristotle’s concept of matter does not imply materiality, its main definition is that it is the basis in which certain changes occur, therefore he often speaks of matter as a substratum or underlying, i.e. underlying various changes of a thing. It was the material cause that the first Greek researchers of nature were most concerned with. However, according to Aristotle, the material cause, or the underlying substrate, could not explain why different things emerge from the same thing, why various changes occur in this substrate at all. Why does copper become a statue and a weapon, and wood a bed and a trireme? Matter itself cannot explain these facts. Therefore, according to Aristotle, some Greek thinkers (Anaxagoras, Empedocles) came to the moving cause, which says “where does the beginning of movement come from”. Aristotle connects the discovery of the cause of the essence of being with the Pythagoreans, and especially with Plato, for Plato’s ideas for things are not matter and not the cause of movement, but the essence of their being, their essence. This is the cause that is known by definition. Finally, the final cause is that for the sake of which any of the things exists and comes into being. According to Aristotle, none of the earlier philosophers spoke sufficiently about this cause.
In order to substantiate his theory of beginnings and causes, Aristotle seriously criticizes Plato’s theory of ideas, according to which beginnings and causes (ideas) exist in a special world, separate from the things of our experience. Although Aristotle remains Plato’s disciple in many ways, he refuses to accept the theory of ideas. He considers the argumentation with which Plato and his disciples proved the existence of ideas to be weak. For example, the Platonists believed that everything that is an object of scientific knowledge has its own idea. However, in this case it is necessary to recognize the ideas of artificially produced things, and this was not recognized by the Platonists. Another argument was: in the presence of a certain set of things with one common property, it is necessary to recognize a single idea of this property. But then, says Aristotle, it will be necessary to recognize the idea of negation, which, nevertheless, was denied by the Platonists. His main objection is that the recognition of ideas does not give anything either for the knowledge of things or for their existence. They are useless for knowledge, for, being outside of sensory things, they cannot act as their essence. For being, since if they are outside things, they cannot influence them in any way. Further, to suppose that ideas are models of things, and that things participate in ideas, is to talk empty words and to speak in poetic metaphors. It is not at all necessary, says Aristotle, that a similar thing should be a copy of what it resembles. Whether there is a Socrates or not, there will always be a man similar to Socrates. Moreover, if the species of a relatively sensible thing is a model, then relatively to the genus it will be a copy, which, according to Aristotle, is impossible. Further, how can, asks Aristotle, the essence of a thing and the thing exist separately? Finally, ideas cannot be causes for the coming into being of things, for even if there is an idea of a tree, by virtue of this the tree will not exist, for it is necessary that something exist that will bring this tree into existence. First philosophy, then, is concerned with the first causes and principles of being. But what, in fact, should be understood by being? After all, it was precisely about what being is that the philosophers who preceded Aristotle argued and disagreed. The word “being” or “existing” itself can be understood in different ways. Aristotle indicates the following possible meanings of this word: 1) being as accidentally given; 2) being as truth and as falsehood; 3) being as the subject of a categorical statement (essence, quality, quantity, place); 4) being in possibility and being in reality. Which of these serves as the subject of first philosophy? Being as accidentally given, i.e. existing not always and not in most cases, cannot be such, for an accidental being cannot be the subject of any science: neither theoretical, nor practical, nor creative. If we now analyze truth and falsehood, we will see that they depend on our thinking. If in our affirmation we connect things that are in reality connected, or in our denial we separate things that are in reality separated, we think truth. If the opposite is true,lie. Thus, according to Aristotle, we cannot speak, as Plato did, about the true being, for truth and falsehood can only appear in our thinking and cannot be found in the things themselves. So, leaving aside the accidental being and truth with falsehood, we must move on to that being which is expressed in categorical judgments.
The existent is expressed in categorical judgments as essence, quality, quantity, place, etc. However, although both quantity and quality exist, they do not exist independently and separately. They cannot exist without the essence of which they are expressed, and the essence is something that exists primarily, independently and separately. It is primary in concept, in knowledge and in time. Indeed, the concept of essence necessarily enters into any concept. The most complete knowledge of a thing is when we know what the essence of this thing is, and not what it is in quantity or quality. Thus, the question of what is existent is in fact the question of what is essence. Aristotle says that bodies and their elements are usually proposed for the role of essence, but the Pythagoreans say that numbers are more essences than bodies, and according to Plato, ideas are essences. Therefore, it is necessary to determine what essence is, and whether there are any essences other than sensory ones, i.e., eternal and unchanging essences. Since, according to Aristotle, essence is spoken of in four meanings – the essence of being, the general, the genus and the substratum (subject), it is necessary to analyze these meanings. The substratum is understood as that about which everything else is said, while it itself is no longer said about the other. The substrate is usually considered to be either matter, or form, or a composite whole of matter and form. Since a composite whole is something secondary, since it is the sum of two preceding components, it is necessary to examine matter and form, whether they can be essences. Matter, according to Aristotle, is what remains of a thing if we consistently subtract all its definitions: quantitative, qualitative, etc. Thus, matter lies at the basis of all definitions of a thing, it is a kind of its foundation, but matter is characterized by complete uncertainty, it is unknowable in itself and is not capable of separate existence. Therefore, form and a composite whole of matter and form can rather be called essences. The universal cannot be an essence either, for each thing has its own essence, it is not inherent in another, and the universal is inherent in many. If the universal were an essence, then one thing would be identical with all the others, and this is impossible. Consequently, for example, no animal exists in general apart from individual animals. For the same reasons, a genus cannot be an essence. It remains to examine the essence of being. From a logical point of view, the essence of being for each thing is that in which this thing is designated in itself. A person may be, for example, educated, but education is not what is specifically characteristic of this person, therefore such a property is not the essence of being. The essence of being can exist only in an essence, i.e. in a separately existing thing
[4], for everything else the essence of being exists in a secondary way. The essence of being is expressed by a logical definition, therefore, definitions in the full sense of the word can only be for entities. In addition, the essence of being will be found only in the species of the genus. Do a single thing and its essence of being coincide? In a sense they coincide, for without this it would not be possible to know a thing, since to know a thing is to know its essence of being. However, things still have a certain remainder that eludes our definition of their essence. For example, the essence of being of a white book is the essence of being a book, to define a white book we cannot directly use the definition of white, for being white and being a book are different things. Since a single thing is, according to Aristotle, a composite whole of form and matter, and matter as that by virtue of which a thing can be both this and that cannot be defined logically, the essence of being of a thing cannot completely coincide with a thing. Only in some things, which will be discussed further, can the essence of being and its actual being coincide. We see that for Aristotle the essence of being is form. Form does not arise and does not disappear, it is introduced into one or another substrate. For example, the form of a circle is introduced into copper and a copper ball is obtained. However, unlike Plato, this form does not exist separately from the thing, it exists only in the whole, which is a single thing. So, “… the essence is a form located in another, so that the composite essence is obtained from this form and matter.” Important conclusions for our knowledge follow from this. Individual things cannot be the object of knowledge, since they contain matter, knowledge, definition, proof relate only to necessary things. However, in reality, first of all, there are individual things, which we must explain and define. To do this, we need to see in these things their form separately from matter, our knowledge is always obliged to carry out this operation of mental separation of that which cannot exist separately in reality. Aristotle walks a fine line here: his realism, his conviction that there are primarily sensible individual things, clashes with his Platonic conviction that there is no knowledge of the individual. He tries to resolve this dilemma with the doctrine of form, which is essence in one sense, the composite whole, which is essence in another sense, and matter, through which form creates the composite whole. In the field of epistemology, the essence of being, which is expressed in logical definition, has unconditional priority, but in the field of our experience, the composite whole has first place. At the same time, Aristotle clearly sees that even for the definition of a sensible thing, sometimes we cannot do without its material side. Therefore, a physicist, for example, knows a thing primarily according to its essence, but he must also take into account the matter of the thing. Aristotle’s doctrine of essence is the center of his first philosophy,but it is precisely here that Aristotle hesitates, seeing the whole complexity of the problem of the relationship between being and knowledge, the general and the individual. His penetrating mind understands perfectly well the aporias that arise here, and he offers a certain direction of search rather than a ready and finished answer.
Since being is also spoken of as being in potentiality and actuality, the analysis of these concepts follows the analysis of essence. Without exaggeration, these concepts can be called central not only for first philosophy, but also for the other sciences. All being is conceived by Aristotle as a process of transition from potentiality to the realization of this potentiality, i.e. to actuality. In the philosophy preceding Aristotle, there were attempts to deny potentiality, to consider that potentiality exists only when there is actuality (the Megarian school). Aristotle, however, insists on distinguishing potentiality from actuality, since what can exist does not necessarily exist in fact, and what may not exist does not necessarily not exist. Potentiality for Aristotle is not the potentiality of realizing anything, “a thing that has potentiality has it for something, at a certain time and in a certain form.” Potentiality is thus a certain potentiality. When what can build, builds in fact, we call it actuality (ενέργεια). Here we must distinguish between movement and reality proper. For example, if I go to visit, this does not mean that I have come to visit and have been a guest. Aristotle calls such actions that have an end and completion, but not in the action itself, movement. If I see, then I have already seen, i.e. the action of seeing has an end in itself. Aristotle calls such actions activities. The most important point of Aristotle’s teaching is the thesis that reality precedes possibility. Reality precedes possibility both in logical definition and from the point of view of essence, only with respect to time in one sense reality is earlier than possibility, in another sense possibility is earlier than reality. Indeed, in order to understand how one can build, one must determine what it means in reality to build. In time, reality is earlier than possibility because the seed (man in possibility) is preceded by a man already existing in reality, since there can be no seed without man. Aristotle describes this situation as follows: “Always from a thing existing in potentiality, a thing existing in actuality arises through the action of another thing also existing in actuality.” From the point of view of essence, actuality also comes before capacity, since the actual being already has a form, while the potential being does not yet have one. Thus, an adult man, i.e. an actual being, already has an actualized form, while a child does not yet have one. This means that in the concepts of potentiality and actuality, form is actuality, and matter is potentiality. When we consider activity in terms of the realization of a goal, we speak of actualization or “entelechy.” The goal itself is the actuality for the sake of which something passes from potentiality. This transition from potentiality to actuality is characteristic only of temporary, emerging and changing things.If we are dealing with something eternal, i.e., imperishable, it is only reality, not possibility. In relation to the good, reality is better than possibility, since the possibility of something is simultaneously the possibility of its opposite, the possibility of being healthy is the same possibility as being sick. In reality this does not exist, therefore it is better. In general, in the sphere of the possible there are opposite definitions, the law of contradiction, which is subject to reality, does not operate in it. Using the concept of possibility, Aristotle solves the problem that faced early Greek thought, the problem of emergence. This problem can be formulated as follows: if there is an emergence of the existent, then it must come from the non-existent, being from non-existence. Therefore, some (the Eleatics), who denied the existence of non-existence, began to deny emergence and any change, others (the atomists) were forced to recognize the existence of non-existence (the void in Democritus) in order to explain the possibility of movement and change. According to Aristotle, they proceeded from the incorrect formulation of the question: there is no emergence from non-existence into being, but there is a transition from being in possibility to being in reality. This means that there is no longer any need to deny emergence, which is destructive for our knowledge of the changing world, or to recognize existing non-existence, which is impossible from a logical point of view.
The pinnacle of Aristotle’s first philosophy is his theory of the eternal, unmoving Prime Mover. How does Aristotle come to accept it? Everyone agrees, says Aristotle, that there are two kinds of entities perceived by the senses: eternal (planets and stars) and changing. They are in motion, motion cannot ever appear, it always exists, since it is impossible to say that motion once did not exist, for time itself is a property of motion. If motion always existed, it must have been circular. If there is motion, then, according to Aristotle, it is a transition from possibility to reality due to an already existing reality. Thus, if there is eternal circular motion – Aristotle speaks of the motion of the celestial spheres – there must necessarily be an eternal reality or activity that is the cause of this motion. If it is eternal, it will have no matter, and there will be no changes, since they occur only in material things. This eternal activity itself cannot be in motion, since if it itself is in motion, then there is a further cause of this motion, and it is necessary to go to infinity in search of causes. It cannot be both the mover and the moved, i.e. be the cause of motion for itself, since in that case it is necessary to distinguish in it the cause of motion and the caused, and speak of one of its parts. Consequently, this cause of circular motion, being eternal activity, is itself motionless. And to set in motion, remaining motionless, is characteristic of the object of thought and desire, which move without being in motion. The highest in the Aristotelian hierarchy of knowledge is the mind, it is by the mind that the simplest and most given essence in real activity is cognized. Since it is the first, it is also the most beautiful and the best. This motionless essence moves as an object of erotic desire, i.e. as a perfection to which the lower strives. Thus, the eternal activity of the motionless principle is the highest level of Aristotelian being. What is this activity? According to Aristotle, the best activity can only be thinking, for perfect thinking has no need of anything other than itself. And the highest activity, which sets the entire cosmos in motion, is the activity of thinking. Since the best thinking must also have the best object, this thinking can think only of itself. This thinking is the life of the origin, we sometimes manage to rise to such an activity, and it is inherent in it by nature, occurs necessarily and always. The doctrine of the mind thinking itself crowns the first philosophy, showing that it would be completely wrong to consider Aristotle a man completely freed from the influence of Plato. Of course, Aristotle criticizes Plato’s theory of ideas, but his teachings on form as the essence of a thing, on the final cause standing above the material, his teaching on matter, turning the latter into a pure possibility of change, finally,his teaching about the mind as the best essence, completely devoid of matter and eternally existing, testifies to the fact that, despite all his criticism of Plato, Aristotle remains a Platonist, that the teachings of the founders of the Academy and the Lyceum represent parts of a single whole, classical Greek idealism.
Ethics. Aristotle classifies ethics as a practical science; its goal is not abstract theoretical knowledge, but the performance of actions. Therefore, ethics does not pertain to exact knowledge; its objects are rather unclear and full of uncertainties, and, consequently, are understood rather approximately. Aristotle says that one cannot demand the same rigor in proofs from a geometer and a rhetorician. The subject of ethics is the good, that which every action and every choice (προαίρεσις) strives for. All arts are directed toward their goal and good, therefore there are many such goals, but at the same time some arts are subordinated to others, i.e., there is a certain hierarchy of arts and, accordingly, their goals or goods. Some good is desirable to us in itself, and we will choose all the others only for the possession of it. This good will be the highest. Since for Aristotle the highest art, to which the others are subordinated, is political art, then the good pursued by it, the good of the state or people, turns out to be the highest practical good, to the achievement of which all others are subordinated. Like Plato, Aristotle believes that the good of the polis surpasses the good of the individual, since the whole should not exist for the sake of the part, but the part for the sake of the whole. “The good of one person is certainly desirable, but the good of the people and states is more beautiful and divine.”
With regard to the goal, the good and happiness, there are three fundamental ways of life. The most rude and vulgar people strive for pleasure like cattle. Others, worthy and active, strive for honor (τιμή) as a good. This is a higher goal than pleasure, but it cannot be called completely perfect. Indeed, the ambitious person depends on the recognition of others, and the good is still something inherent and inalienable. Finally, the last way of life is the contemplative life. Aristotle also mentions the life of the acquisitive, but wealth cannot be a self-sufficient goal, for it always exists for the sake of something else. Speaking of the good and goods, Aristotle could not do without a critical analysis of Plato’s teaching on the idea of the good. A general idea of the good cannot exist, since the good is defined in various categories (essence, quality and relationship), and for them there is no general idea. Furthermore, if there were one general idea of the good, then there would be one science about this idea. But there are many sciences that speak about the good, according to Aristotle, since military art can determine what is timely and what is not (good according to the category of time) for a battle, and the art of a doctor for an illness. In addition, the eternity of Plato’s good does not add anything essential to it in relation to other goods, since, says Aristotle, an eternal white object is not whiter than a temporary one. Even if we admit the existence of such a good in general, it will still be impossible for anyone to realize it in their practical activities. Finally, even if such a good exists, it will not help in any way to realize specific goals and goods in various arts and crafts. What is the use of a doctor or a carpenter if he knows Plato’s idea of the good in general.
What is the good for man? It is contained in some activity inherent to man as such. Just as a carpenter is destined for a certain activity and the result of such activity, so is man. This activity cannot be the activity of nutrition and growth, sensations, for this is not what distinguishes man from other living beings. Such activity will be “the active life of a being possessing judgment”, and performed well. The basic definition of happiness given by Aristotle is as follows: it is the activity of the soul according to virtue, and if there are several virtues, then according to the most perfect of them, and for the entire human life. Consequently, neither an animal nor a child can be happy, since they do not possess judgment and cannot, guided by it, perform virtuous deeds. Such a definition agrees, according to Aristotle, with the traditional Greek division of goods into external, related to the body and related to the soul, since it is precisely spiritual goods that are goods in the proper sense. Aristotle’s understanding of happiness is dynamic; he emphasizes that happiness is a certain activity of the soul. It is impossible to be happy without performing the appropriate activity, being at rest or in sleep. Activity according to virtue is opposed only to gross and external pleasures, but not to pleasure as such. It carries pleasure in itself, and natural, not artificial or unnatural. Although happiness is an activity of the soul, it nevertheless requires external goods and favorable circumstances, for it is impossible to perform beautiful actions without having any means. “For he who is ugly in appearance, of bad origin, lonely and childless is hardly happy,” says Aristotle. Can such happiness be destroyed by any kind of vicissitudes of fate? Aristotle answers this question in accordance with common sense. Particularly severe misfortunes that happen to a person, of course, will not allow him to be called blessed. But since nothing can force him to commit disgusting deeds, he will not become completely unhappy. Nor can a person be deprived of happiness by misfortunes that happen to his loved ones.
Since the definition of happiness is connected with the concept of virtue, Aristotle moves on to consider the virtues. To understand the nature of virtues, it is necessary to know that the soul is divided into three parts. The lowest part is the vegetative part, which acts mainly during sleep, when a person cannot perform any virtuous deeds. Therefore, this part has nothing to do with virtue. In the remaining soul, two more parts are visible: the part that has judgment, and the appetitive part, which can act contrary to the rational part, but can also obey and agree with the rational part. It is the last two parts that are responsible for the virtuous life. Virtues are divided according to these parts into intellectual (διανοητικού) and virtues of character and disposition (ήθικαί). Intellectual virtues include wisdom, intelligence and prudence, and moral virtues include generosity and prudence. Mental virtues are acquired by training, moral virtues by habit. Virtues do not exist in us by nature, but they do not exist in spite of nature either; the habit of virtue itself, according to Aristotle, is natural. It is impossible to become virtuous without doing anything; we acquire the corresponding moral character only by performing or not performing moral acts. In the spirit of the Greek sense of proportion, Aristotle defines the nature of virtues of character. For such virtues, excess and deficiency are destructive, and possession of the mean is beneficial. Neither a coward who is afraid of everything, nor a reckless daredevil who takes any risk can be virtuous. Just as both overeating and undereating are destructive in nutrition, so in moral life extremes are destructive, and the mean is good. However, we are not talking about an abstract mean, or a mean in general. Aristotle points out that for virtue it is precisely the specific mean that is important, which is the mean in this particular case. To reach this middle is a very difficult thing, it is easy to miss the mark, but to hit the target, i.e. the middle, is not easy. “…And to be angry is accessible to everyone, as easy as to give away and squander money, but to spend on what is needed, as much as is needed, when, for that reason and as it should be, not everyone is capable of it, and this is not easy.” Therefore, in relation to excess and deficiency, virtue is the mean (μεσότης), and in relation to the good, virtue is the peak (άκρότης). However, not every action and not every passion can have a middle as a good between excess and deficiency. In fornication, theft and murder there can be no proper middle ground, these actions are bad as such. Thus, the coordinates of moral virtue can be called excess, deficiency and middle ground, and the extremes are opposite both to themselves and to the middle ground. By nature we are predisposed to one of the extremes, so in order to reach the middle we must draw ourselves to the opposite side. So, if someone is cowardly by nature, then in order to reach the middle,he must become somewhat reckless and daring. Then he will achieve courage, perfection and the true mean between these two extremes.
Moral virtues are mainly connected with pleasures and pains, therefore the basic definition of such virtue will be the following: virtue is the ability to act in the best way in everything that concerns pleasures and pains, and vice is its opposite. Moreover, not every act that seems moral at first glance will turn out to be so in reality. For such an act, its commission must meet the following conditions: it must be conscious, it must be chosen intentionally and for the sake of the act itself, it must be confident and stable. Aristotle defines virtue as the moral disposition (mode) of the soul, i.e. as that by virtue of which we have good or bad control over our passions. The most important ethical question is the question of the voluntary (κούσιον) and involuntary (άκούσιον), of choice ( προαίρεσις ) and will (βουλή), discussed in the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics. An act that is “forced” or “violent” (to puxiov), as well as “involuntary”, “happening not by someone’s free will” (άκούσιον) is one whose source is outside the person performing the action, and the person himself does not contribute to this act in any way. There are also mixed actions, when a person commits a certain act under the pressure of circumstances. Without these circumstances, he would never have committed it, therefore this act cannot be called voluntary, occurring by his will. But since there was still a certain choice, such an act cannot be called involuntary and violent. Another important definition of involuntary is that it is committed out of ignorance. Ignorance becomes decisive when it relates to the condition and purpose of a given act. Thus, in the case of ignorance of the purpose of an action, this action will be involuntary, because when doing something, a person did not know what result his act would lead to. Within the realm of voluntary, Aristotle distinguishes the sphere of conscious choice ( προαίρεσις ).Indeed, voluntary is broader than conscious choice, for according to Aristotle, children and animals act voluntarily, but not by conscious choice. Conscious choice is characterized by the following features. It is inherent only in those creatures that have reason. It is never connected with the impossible. Although one can desire the impossible, for example, immortality, it cannot be chosen. Therefore, only such things are subject to conscious choice that are considered to depend on the one who chooses. Conscious choice, unlike desire, deals not with the end, but with the means to this end. It is not possible to say that “I choose health or happiness,” but “I desire health or happiness, and I choose such and such means to achieve this end.” Conscious choice is also different from opinion, since an opinion can be about the eternal and the impossible, but a choice cannot, besides, a choice is defined in terms of virtuous and vicious, and not true and false, like an opinion. In this case, one can form a true opinion about what is good, but choose not this, but the exact opposite due to vice. Thus, the ethical choice, already in the scope of what is arbitrary, is a preliminary decision (that is, προβεβουλευμένον), since it is associated with reasoning and reflection. If the ethical choice is defined through the concept of a decision, it is necessary to clarify the latter. First of all, “a decision is made about what depends on us and is realized in actions.” One cannot make a decision about the cosmos, or about the commensurability of a diagonal, or about finding a treasure, etc. We make decisions about what depends on us and does not always happen in the same way. In addition, “decisions are about what happens, as a rule, in a certain way, but whose outcome is unclear and in what lies the uncertainty.” A decision, like a choice, does not concern goals, but the means to an end, but a decision precedes a conscious choice. “The object of the decision and the object of the choice are the same, only the object of the choice is already strictly determined in advance, for they consciously choose what is approved upon making the decision.” Thus, “the object of a conscious choice is the object of a decision directed toward what depends on us; indeed, having made a decision, we pass our judgment and then harmonize our aspirations with the decision.” If this is so, and the actions of virtues are connected with means, then both virtue and vice depend on us, and one cannot be good or bad against one’s will. If a person can only commit vicious acts and cannot act virtuously, this means that from the constant repetition of vicious acts a vicious disposition or frame of mind has already developed in him, which forces him to act accordingly. But the fact that such a disposition has developed in a person is his own fault, his arbitrary actions, which, accumulating, have led precisely to this disposition. In order to become virtuous from vicious, if this is possible at all, desire alone is not enough, it is necessary to perform virtuous acts, which can lead to the formation of a virtuous frame of mind.
In addition to the virtues of morality or character, which are characteristic of the irrational part of the soul, Aristotle also analyzes the intellectual virtues, which belong to that part of the soul that has reason. In this part, too, there is a division into two types: the scientific or cognitive (έπιστημονικόν) and the reasoning or calculating (λογιστικόν). The first is directed toward eternal, unchangeable and necessarily existing things, the second – toward what can change. Both parts strive for truth, but the scientific part aims at truth as such, the reasoning – at truth that presupposes actions and agrees with the right desire. The soul achieves truth thanks to five things: art, science, prudence, wisdom and intelligence. It is they that determine the intellectual virtues. Aristotle considers the distinctive feature of science to be its focus on the eternal and necessary, and its method to be proof. Art as a kind of creativity is aimed at what can be different, with the goal of understanding “how something comes into being from things that can be and not be and whose origin is in the creator.” Thus, art is involved in true judgment, aimed at creativity. Prudence is neither science nor art. It is not science, since its origins can be this way and that way, i.e., they do not allow proof; it is not art, since prudence is not aimed at creative creation, but at actions. It is a true disposition or property of the soul involved in judgment, aimed at the implementation of actions for the good or evil of man. Prudence, of course, is under the jurisdiction of that part of the soul that possesses judgment, which is aimed at what can be different, since human actions do not belong to the necessary. The mind is a faculty which proves nothing, but knows the very principles of what is eternal and necessary. Wisdom can both prove and know the principles, i.e. it is both mind and science. It is, according to Aristotle, the main science. The wisdom of which Aristotle speaks is not worldly wisdom, the latter is much closer to prudence. One can be wise, i.e. an expert in the most valuable and divine things, but lack practical ingenuity. Thus, art and prudence belong to the lower, and knowledge, wisdom and mind to the higher part of the soul, which has judgment.
Proceeding from the doctrine of virtues, Aristotle approaches the most important section of ethics, the doctrine of happiness. Happiness is not something given, not a frame of mind, but an activity worthy of selection in itself, i.e., one that is sought for its own sake. Happiness cannot be entertainment, for entertainment is rest and idleness, and happiness is activity, and activity in accordance with the highest virtue, i.e., the virtue of the highest part of the soul. Since the highest part of the soul is the mind, happiness is intelligent contemplation. Contemplative activity, unlike our actions, cannot be interrupted by anything, it gives the highest pleasure, it is self-sufficient, because a wise man, provided with everything necessary, does not need anyone for his contemplation. Only it is loved for its own sake, because even virtuous actions can bring some benefit besides themselves. Contemplation surpasses state and military virtues, because it does not deprive a person of leisure and is not chosen for the sake of something else. This activity of contemplation in us should rather be called not human, but divine. Man will live in contemplation not because he is a man, but because there is something divine in him. Moreover, it is precisely this part that is man himself, therefore it is impossible to limit oneself to mortal and human, political, military and economic affairs, it is necessary to strive for the divine and “rise to immortality” in order to achieve happiness. The second, lower kind of happy life is life according to prudence and moral virtues. It is also beautiful, but inferior to the first. The contemplator and the sage, since he is a man and lives together with others, must also perform actions according to moral virtue and have a need for necessary things, but still his life is much superior to the life of a man who exercises moral virtue without contemplation.
Literature
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