Epicurus was born in January or February 341 BC, and lived in his youth on Samos and Teos. His father was most likely a school teacher. Epicurus turned to philosophy at the age of 14, when, as a teacher of literature, he read the works of Democritus. His teacher in philosophy was the Democritus follower Nausiphanes. Epicurus became a teacher of philosophy at the age of 32, first in Mytilene and Lampsacus, then, beginning in 307, in Athens, where he founded his own school. The school was located in Epicurus’ garden, which is why it was called “the Garden”, and Epicurus’ followers “philosophers from the gardens”.
Epicurus wrote about 300 works, but only the “Letter to Herodotus”, which sets out the general principles of Epicurus’s epistemology and physics, the “Letter to Pythocles”, dedicated to celestial phenomena, the “Letter to Menoeceus”, which treats the ethical part of the teaching, and the “Main Thoughts” have reached us. The rest of Epicurus’s legacy is known to us from fragments and expositions by other writers. Like many school teachers of literature, Epicurus was not a master of style, and the Greek text of his works has been significantly distorted, so it is often difficult to judge Epicurus’s true thoughts.
Epicurus’ understanding of philosophy. Epicurus is extremely far from understanding philosophy as a study of theoretical truth, as a search for some hard-to-reach “pure” knowledge. His philosophy was supposed to serve the most pressing needs of man: the deliverance of the human soul from suffering. Just as a doctor strives to relieve the body of pain and illness, so a philosopher heals the soul, freeing it from suffering. Anyone who does not do this is not a philosopher. According to Sextus Empiricus, Epicurus defines philosophy as “an activity that creates a happy life through speeches and reasoning.” Philosophy leads to wisdom, to the ultimate goal of human perfection. Having achieved this goal, he can no longer fall into ignorance again. The sage is already completely alien to any opinions, which, according to Epicurus, are a “sacred disease.” However, not everyone can become a sage: for this, one must have a body with certain properties, and also be a Hellene, not a barbarian. Epicurus is alien to the cosmopolitanism preached by the Stoics, and as a true Athenian he remains faithful to the precepts of Aristotle. True wisdom does not require any complex and abstract sciences, such as mathematics. Here Epicurus opposes, first of all, Plato’s, and partly Aristotle’s understanding of philosophy. Many in Antiquity believed that Epicurus’ rejection of the mathematical sciences was caused by his ignorance of them. However, as Lucius Torquatus says in Cicero’s dialogue “On the Limits of Good and Evil”, “no, Epicurus was not ignorant, ignoramuses are those who believe that until old age one must study what it was shameful not to learn in childhood”. Only those sciences that help achieve happiness are worth the effort of studying: “art (and science. — D.B. )there is the ability to provide vital benefit.” There is no benefit in poetry either, which is why Epicurus spoke of the “noise of poets,” “Homeric nonsense,” “the destructive seduction of tales,” etc. Epicurus himself was not an elegant writer, and various subtleties and beauties, which are rich in the work of, for example, Plato, did not arouse his approval. The irony of Plato’s Socrates, the elegance of which Cicero spoke of, was completely alien to him. The enemies of Epicureanism – the same Cicero and Plutarch – also attribute to him ingratitude to his own teachers in philosophy: to the Platonist Pamphilus, to the Democritus Nausiphanes. Cicero writes that Epicurus spoke out against Pythagoras, Plato, Empedocles, Aristotle, and was even ungrateful towards Democritus. According to Diogenes Laërtius, Epicurus, playing with words, called Democritus (lit. in Greek “judgment of the people”) “Nonsense-judgment” (Ληρόκριτος). Enemies talk about the ambition of Epicurus, who did not want to admit that someone could teach him. Even if we admit Epicurus’ hostile attitude towards all these philosophers, it is not at all necessary to see in it a manifestation of a thirst for glory and ingratitude. Not to mention the idealist philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, whose worldview, according to Epicurus, leaves people in darkness and suffering, and Democritus’ concept of philosophy as an uninterested search for physical causes could not satisfy Epicurus. As is known, the young Marx in his doctoral dissertation spoke about the most fundamental differences in the understanding of wisdom in Epicurus and Democritus. One strives to understand nature with its immutable laws, another does not care about nature and its study if it does not help a person to get rid of the fear of death and the fear of torment in the afterlife. “If we were not disturbed in any way by suspicions about the heavenly bodies and death, forcing us to think that they have some relation to us, and also by our ignorance of the limits of suffering and desires, we would have no need to study nature.” This statement by Epicurus alone allows us to understand the reasons for his ingratitude to Democritus. Thus, both pure art and pure philosophy are of no value, true philosophy is nothing more than a cure for the soul, freeing it from the feeling of guilt and fear of death, leading to true pleasure.
Canon. Although it is traditionally believed that philosophy was divided, according to Epicurus, into three parts: canonics, physics and ethics, this is not entirely true. Epicurus did not recognize the independence of the part that studies the conditions of our knowledge. As Seneca testifies, it was for Epicurus only an appendage (accessio) of the doctrine of nature. Indeed, according to Epicurus, the study of nature itself should teach knowledge, reasoning and speech. “Thanks to physics,” says the Epicurean Lucius Torquatus in Cicero’s dialogue, “the meaning of words, the nature of speech, and the meaning of consequences or negations can be comprehended.” Or, as Diogenes Laërtius says, “it is enough for a physicist to keep up with the words about the things themselves.” It is physics that is the rule or canon for the knowledge of everything, all judgments about things go back to it, it is physics, and not formal logical rules, that allows us to distinguish the true from the false. Therefore, Epicurus rejected dialectics, did not develop the doctrine of syllogism and inference, and neglected the doctrine of definition and division into genus and species. One of the “holy fathers” (Jerome) summarized this orientation of Epicurus in the words “Do not worry about how you speak, but what you say.” Epicurus understood that, having recognized the independent existence of the science of knowledge, he must also recognize the presence of reason existing in man separately from the body, which, as we will see, contradicted the foundations of his philosophy. Therefore, the so-called canonics, the doctrine of the rules of knowledge, to which Epicurus dedicated his work “On the Criterion, or Canon,” must be understood as part of physics, as an inseparable prelude to it.
Epicurus recognized sensations (αισθήσεις), “anticipations” or general concepts (προλήψεις) and passions (πάθη) as criteria of truth, and later Epicureans added “fantastic throws of thought” (φανταστικαί έπιβολαι της διανοίας). Sensation is the criterion of truth, since nothing can either add or subtract from its testimony. Then, sensation is irrefutable, since homogeneous sensations cannot refute each other due to the fact that they are equivalent. And heterogeneous sensations relate to different things. Sensation cannot be refuted by reasoning. Plato is mistaken, according to Epicurus, in trying to prove the falsity of sensations, for the proof and reasoning themselves depend entirely on sensations. All thinking arises from sensations due to their accidental coincidence, similarity, resemblance and juxtaposition with some addition from the mind. Sensation does not simply show us an object, but shows us what it really is. The skepticism of Democritus, his doctrine of clear and obscure types of knowledge was alien to Epicurus, who was inclined toward Protagoras’ phenomenalism: what a thing seems to be, such it is in reality.
How does Epicurus understand sensation? From solid objects their imprints, or impressions (τύποι), are separated, similar to the objects in form, preserving the position and order corresponding to the thing, but much more subtle than the things. Epicurus calls these imprints images (είδωλα). They, continuously separating from the surface of the solid body, are carried with great speed in the environment and can penetrate into any opening. We do not notice this separation, since things, constantly losing their layers, acquire more and more new ones.
Impressions can preserve the order and position of the atoms in a solid body for a long time, but they can also mix with each other, and, moreover, they easily form new combinations in the air. When they enter us, we see and think. Moreover, the images that enter our eyes or ears always preserve the order and position of the atoms of a solid body, they are similar to things in form and color, due to the enormous speed of their movement they create in us the impression (φαντασία) of a single and continuous object. And those images that enter us through other pores act directly on the mind, which is the most subtle and mobile, material part of our material soul. These images, if we are to believe Lucretius, who expounds the Epicurean concept of images in the fourth book of “On the Nature of Things”, surpass visual images in subtlety, and are often a mixture of different parts of objective detachments. By virtue of images of this second kind we have such images as the image of a centaur, a half-horse, half-man, the three-headed dog of Cerberus, etc. If such images, which act upon our mind, are confirmed and not refuted, a lie will arise, if on the contrary, truth. Images in themselves are always true, for they themselves are an objective, material reality, correctly reflecting the position and order of atoms on the surface of solid bodies. But since sometimes in images there is a mixture of the correct order of the atoms of the original body, since many images are a mixture of different images of different things, then it will already be a mistake to consider such mixtures and combinations of images as corresponding to things. Therefore, although all images are real and true, we must always distinguish between images reflecting the things themselves and the combinations of many images into one image. For example, the devil of Ivan Karamazov as a sensation that arose under the influence of many images that united into one is a true sensation, but when we begin to believe that the sensation of the devil corresponds to a single bodily reality, we will express a false opinion. The idea of the devil arose in the soul of Ivan Karamazov when, from the images that had separated from a certain set of objects and were randomly floating in the air, and then penetrated into it, a complex image of a certain creature arose in his soul
[5] . Thus, sensations, according to Epicurus, are always true, but opinions about sensations, judgments about sensations can be both true and false. We must always verify the implicit and non-obvious with what is always the same and clear. From sensations we must conclude what is unclear and non-obvious to us. Such a conclusion is called a judgment ( λόγο ς) by Epicurus.In this we must ensure that the obscure and non-obvious are in agreement with the clear and obvious, i.e. that our thinking (έπίνοια), which comes from sensations, is not separated from them and does not contradict them. Philosophy must not reject general judgments, but constantly verify them with sensation as the most obvious in our knowledge.
Another criterion of truth Epicurus called “anticipations” ( προλήψεις ). When we say “This is an educated man”, we think of an image or imprint (τύπος) of a person who was already in us before this statement thanks to sensations. “Anticipation” is “the memory of what has often appeared from the outside”, i.e. the memory of many similar sensations of one and the same object. Anticipation in this sense is also the first, most clear and understandable meaning of the word for us, from which we must always proceed. As T. V. Vasilyeva writes, “anticipation … is a certain imprint associated with the word of the object designated by this word, the anticipation of which imprint were sensations” (6: 240). According to Epicurus, it is impossible to explain this first meaning logically; it is based only on the consolidation of repeated sensations and the formation of a clear image of a thing on their basis. Without anticipation, we would not be able to investigate, doubt, have an opinion, or refute anything. Indeed, if I see the silhouette of an animal in the distance and cannot understand whether it is a cow or a horse, and I want to investigate this, I should have already known in advance the shape of a bull and a horse. Epicurus called this knowledge that preceded my investigation anticipation. Anticipations cannot be understood as an epistemological unit independent of the senses. They are rooted in our sensations and summarize them. Epicurus contrasts “anticipation” ( πρόληψις ) with “false understanding” (ψευδής ύπόληψις ). For example, we have anticipations of the gods through their images that are everywhere, but the ideas of punishing and supervising gods are false ideas, not based on any clear feeling or “anticipation.” And even the first and clear meaning of the word “god” (θεός) does not contain any traces of the concept of divine retribution and justice.
Physics. We have already said that the study of nature was not an end in itself in the eyes of Epicurus; it was supposed to free the human soul from false fears and hopes, from suffering in general. And although Epicurus’s physics is based on Democritus’s concept of nature, these teachings are not identical. Epicurus’s physical theory is based on a number of propositions which, although not given directly in sensation, nevertheless do not contradict sensations and are consistent with them. According to Epicurus, the denial of these propositions leads to impossible conclusions. The first proposition states that nothing can arise from nothing. According to Epicurus, the admission of the possibility of arising from non-existence destroys every regularity in our world. If something arose from non-existence, any thing could arise from anything. People would emerge from the water, fish and birds from the earth, livestock would fly from the sky, etc. There would be no need for specific seeds from which, according to Epicurus, specific things arise. Even before the advent of Christianity with its thesis of creation from nothing, Epicurus shows how such a teaching destroys at the root any possibility of scientific knowledge. Then, if everything that is destroyed passes into non-existence, then gradually all things perish and are destroyed, which is impossible. Therefore, the destruction of things is only their disintegration into constituent elements, the rearrangement (μετάθεσις) of the elements, their inflow and outflow, and this is emergence and destruction. Further, the Universe (to πάν
) has always been such as it is now, and will forever remain such. No changes for the Universe as a whole can be allowed, for this would presuppose the admission of non-existence, which influences existence.
The universe is a collection of bodies ( σώματα ) and space (τόπος). The existence of bodies is evidenced by sensation itself, and space, i.e. emptiness and intangible nature, must be assumed to explain the possibility of the movement of bodies. “If there is movement, then there is emptiness. There is movement. Therefore, there is emptiness.” Although we do not see or touch emptiness, its recognition does not contradict our sensations, but agrees with them. Therefore, this conclusion is based on sensation. Emptiness can neither act nor be acted upon. It only gives bodies space for movement. They move in it and through it. Emptiness is boundless. Emptiness exists both in our world and in the entire universe. Everything else that can be seen in the Universe are only properties (συμπτώματα, συμβεβηκότα) of bodies and void. Bodies are divided into two types: complex bodies and those of which complex bodies are composed. Bodies of the second type are indivisible and unchangeable, i.e. atoms that do not have any void in themselves, and therefore are indestructible. Void arises only in complex bodies, separating some atoms from others. Nothing can act on atoms, they are characterized by freedom from suffering (απάθεια). In themselves, as Plutarch testifies, there is no generative force, they produce everything thanks to their hardness and resistance to each other. Atoms cannot be seen by us, they are, as the doxographer Aetius says, “contemplated only by the mind”, but their recognition also does not contradict the senses. We see, for example, that the invisible force of the wind blows off the roofs of houses, raises sea waves, sinks ships, and since only the body can act on the body, then we can admit the existence of invisible bodies, and the recognition of atoms does not contradict our sensory experience.
The Universe is infinite, if it were finite, it would have a boundary with something else, and such something else can only be non-existence, which does not exist. In the Universe, the number of bodies is infinite, and the void is infinite. If there were an infinite number of bodies, and space was limited, then the infinite number of bodies would not fit into the limited space. And if space were infinite, and the number of bodies was limited, then the bodies would simply disperse into the infinite void. In addition to infinity, the Universe also does not arise or disappear, does not increase or decrease.
There are a great number of types of atoms, but these types are not infinite, as Democritus taught, the number of types of atoms is only inconceivable (άπερίληπτος). As Plutarch says, according to Epicurus, “atoms cannot be hook-shaped, trident-shaped, or ring-shaped, for these forms are easily broken, and atoms should not be subject to external influence.” The number of atoms themselves in one form or another is infinite. Atoms are characterized by eternal motion, which has no beginning. In this motion, they collide with each other and intertwine, forming atomic compounds.
An infinite number of atoms makes possible the existence of an infinite number of worlds (κόσμοι), for such a number of atoms would not be exhausted by the creation of a finite number of worlds. Some of the worlds are like ours, others are not.
Atoms do not have any qualities present in the world we perceive, except for shape, weight and size. This is necessary, since any quality can change, and atoms, by definition, are changeless. An infinite number of atoms, together with their shapes and weights, should, according to Epicurus, explain all the qualitative diversity of the phenomenal world. In addition, it is impossible to assume that atoms can have any size, as Democritus probably believed. To explain the diversity of qualities we encounter, it is enough to assume that atoms have some differences in size. Epicurus objects to Democritus on this point, based on the thesis of his canonics, which states that everything must be brought into conformity with sensations. If atoms of any size existed, we would see them, which does not happen. Democritus could, indeed, adhere to the thesis of the possibility of the existence of an atom of any size, since the epistemological position of the great Abderites did not presuppose such a belief in the correctness of our sensation. Rather the opposite. In addition, as Plutarch testifies, Epicurus, unlike Democritus, considered the essential property of an atom to be its weight, since it is thanks to weight that the movement of atoms occurs. Democritus, however, recognized only size and shape
[6] .
A limited and definite body cannot consist of an infinite number of atoms, even if they are maximally small. For from an infinite number of constituent elements a limited body cannot be obtained, it must then be infinite and limitless.
All atoms, regardless of their size and weight, move in a vacuum with the same and very high speed until they encounter some obstacle, i.e. until they collide with each other. Therefore, what we call speed or slowness is only the absence of resistance or the presence of such.
The most important change introduced by Epicurus into the Democritus’s scheme of atomism is the deviation of the atoms, which Lucretius, Cicero and Plutarch speak of. The atoms, which initially move in a straight line due to their weight, could never collide with each other and form compounds if each atom at some minimal moment in time did not begin, without any reason, to deviate little by little from this line of its movement. It was precisely due to this deviation that the formation of the world and all its parts became possible. As Cicero notes, this doctrine was introduced by Epicurus to overcome the necessity of fate (necessitas fati). Cicero explains this idea as follows: “Epicurus introduced this doctrine because, indeed, if the atom always moved under the influence of natural and necessary gravity, we would have no freedom, since our spirit would have a movement that would be completely conditioned by the movement of the atoms.” Thus, in order to lay the foundation of human freedom already in physics, Epicurus goes against the determinism of Democritus’s atomism, introducing the spontaneous deviation of atoms, which has no physical cause. The contradiction of this teaching with the basic framework of atomism was noted by the Stoics, who said that, having recognized the causelessness of deviation, Epicurus also recognized nothing. Indeed, Epicurus, building his teaching for the liberation of man, erects it on the foundation of Democritus’s physics, which did not set such goals for itself. Hence the contradiction between the two systems of atomism and Epicurus’s desire to correct Democritus’s natural philosophy based on necessity, introducing the teaching of the arbitrary deviation of atoms.
The soul, according to Epicurus, is not an independently existing entity, something incorporeal. The incorporeal can neither act nor be acted upon, which is not true of the soul. It is a body consisting of subtle particles, scattered throughout the entire organism, and similar to air with an admixture of heat. There is an even more subtle part in the soul, to which sensations belong. This part perceives what happens to the rest of the soul and to the physical body. Moreover, this perception is due to the fact that this part of the soul is “covered” by the rest of the organism. Thanks to it, the rest of the organism also takes part in the activity of sensation. When any of the organs of the body is lost, the soul does not lose the ability to sense, whereas when the entire body disintegrates, the soul also disintegrates and disperses.
The shapes, colors, and sizes of bodies are not something that exists independently. Although Epicurus understands perfectly well that they all determine the nature of a particular body, he does not recognize them as constituent parts of the body. And although all these properties have their own knowledge, they can only be known in the context of the whole body. According to Epicurus, shape, color, and size are essential properties of the body (συμβεβηκότα). He contrasts them with accidental properties (συμπτώματα). Such properties do not always accompany the body and do not determine its nature. Without accidental properties, we can think of the body, but without essential properties, we cannot.
All worlds and all bodies were formed from special clusters of atoms, and they are destroyed in them. There is no necessity for such a cosmos to have arisen, and not another. Epicurus denies that some immortal and blessed force can take care of the cosmos and order it. If it did, it would not be blessed and self-sufficient; it would be characterized by care, anger, mercy.
Thus, the study of nature in its main causes frees one from fears and gives bliss. However, according to Epicurus, it is not at all necessary to strive for accuracy in the details of physical knowledge. It is not at all necessary to know for what reason the sun rises and sets, etc. Many experts in these details were not, according to Epicurus, free from fears, for they did not know the main causes of everything that happens. Like Democritus, Epicurus, being an atomist, does not deny the existence of gods. As evidence of their existence, he cites the following. Firstly, the knowledge of the gods is clear and obvious, it is written in the souls of all people and is present in all nations, regardless of their institutions, teachings and customs. The universality of this knowledge testifies to the existence of those objects (gods) that produce this knowledge in us. Knowledge of the gods appears to us thanks to their images that visit us in dreams. Gods are nothing more than images produced by atoms in the spaces between worlds. The gods are not solid bodies, they are a kind of outlines or forms (liniamenta, as Cicero says), constantly filled with new, finest atoms. An interesting point in Epicurean theology is the doctrine of the anthropomorphism of the gods. Since the most perfect body is the human body, for only in it can reason arise, the gods are endowed with the likeness of the human body, the likeness of human blood and organs. The gods spend their lives in conversations and reflections. The second argument proving the existence of the gods is the following: if only the mortal existed, there would be an imbalance in nature. Therefore, by virtue of the principle of equilibrium (ισονομία, aequilibritas), acting in the Universe, there must also be the immortal, and such are the gods.
In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says that the recognition of certain propositions about the gods is the most important beginning of a blessed life. However, it cannot be assumed that the gods rule the world, interfere in human affairs, punish the wicked and reward the virtuous. Such a teaching is false, since it contradicts the main properties of the divine nature, imperturbability and bliss. In the teaching about reward and punishment for certain deeds and virtues, Epicurus rightly sees anthropomorphism: “For, accustomed throughout their lives to their own virtues, people accept and approve of their own kind, and consider everything that is not so to be alien.” The impious person is not the one who rejects the crowd’s idea of the gods, but the one who attributes these ideas to the gods. “The divine being, being blessed and indestructible, neither troubles himself about anything, nor does he cause trouble to others, and therefore neither gets angry nor shows mercy, for all this is characteristic only of a powerless being.” Such an understanding of God should make people stop fearing the gods, and drive out fear from the human soul, the basis of all our misfortunes. The Epicurean concept of deity sharply opposes Plato’s teaching about a deity creating the world by its goodness, the Aristotelian interpretation of deity as the beginning of world movement, and the Stoic concept of omnipresent divine providence. But why then recognize the gods, what good are they? Many ancient enemies of Epicureanism (Posidonius in Cicero’s sympathetic retelling) said that Epicurus was a secret atheist. However, the Epicureans had an answer to such statements. “Those who have believed in our prophecies about the gods will yearn to imitate their happy existence,” says the Epicurean Philodemus. In this sense, according to Atticus, Epicurus acknowledged that the gods do good to people. The same Philodemus speaks of a kind of mystical experience of Epicurus: “And he (Epicurus. – D.B. ) admires their nature and state, tries to get closer to this nature and, as it were, clings to it, trying to reach it and abide with it. He calls the wise men friends of the gods, and the gods – friends of the wise men.” Thus, the concept of the deity of Epicurus is not a cover for secret atheism, as his enemies slandered, his deity, blessed and free, existing outside the world, spending all his time in conversations and reflections, is the ideal to which man must strive in order to achieve happiness. The original knowledge of the gods that everyone has guarantees everyone the possibility of achieving this blissful state.
Ethics. When studying the ethics of Epicurus, one should remember that Epicurus’ ethical concept has little in common with what is usually called “Epicureanism,” i.e., with love for all and sundry pleasures. The goal of ethics is to define a blessed, or happy, life. The foundations of happiness, according to Epicurus, are a proper understanding of the divine nature, which we have already discussed, and the absence of fear of death. The fear of death is the most terrible evil that prevents us from achieving a happy life. By getting rid of it, we will have the opportunity to get rid of all other troubles. Death has nothing to do with us, since every good and evil for us is contained in sensation, and death is the complete cessation of sensation. “While we exist, there is no death; when there is death, we do not exist,” says Epicurus.
The highest goal of a happy life is bodily health and equanimity of soul. “For we do everything,” Epicurus says, “so as not to suffer or worry.” Therefore, the beginning and goal of a happy life will be pleasure or enjoyment, because we can enjoy only when we do not suffer or worry. Thus, Epicurus’ definition of happiness is purely negative. We have a need for pleasure only when we suffer, and when there is no suffering, we do not feel the need for pleasure. “The limit of the magnitude of pleasures is the removal of all pain. And where there is pleasure, and as long as it is, there is neither pain nor sorrow, nor both together.” Because of this, pleasure is the standard by which we measure every good. It is itself the first and innate good for us. When speaking of pleasures, Epicurus does not mean the pleasures of libertines, gourmets, lovers of idleness. Such pleasures lead neither to the health of the body, nor to equanimity of the soul. Therefore, although every pleasure is good, we must nevertheless make a choice between pleasures, preferring some to others. We must choose those pleasures that lead to a happy life, i.e., to more pleasures, and avoid those that lead to pain and illness. Although every pleasure is good in itself, some causes of pleasure may lead to pain that exceeds the pleasure. Sometimes it is even necessary to choose pain – although any pain in itself is evil – if this pain will ultimately lead to pleasures.
Epicurus divides pleasures into pleasures of rest and pleasures of movement. The first refers to imperturbability (αταραξία) and the absence of bodily suffering (άπονία), the second – joy and merriment. The first type of pleasure is better, for in it the final goal of a happy life has already been achieved. The second can be accompanied by suffering. The main pleasures, according to Epicurus, are bodily pleasures. “I cannot think of any good if the pleasures of taste, the pleasures of carnal love, the pleasures of hearing and those pleasant movements that affect the sight with images are excluded.” Epicurus even says that the beginning and root of every good is the pleasure of the stomach, to which wisdom and refined culture can be traced. Spiritual pleasures are completely reducible to bodily pleasures, since our spirit and soul have a bodily nature. However, spiritual pleasures can be more intense than physical ones, because the suffering of the soul, according to Epicurus, is stronger than the suffering of the body. The body suffers only in the present, but the soul can be tormented by memories, suffer from the awareness of pain now, and worry about the uncertainty of the future.
Not every desire should be satisfied. Epicurus divides desires into natural and empty, natural, in turn, are divided into necessary and simply natural, necessary are divided into necessary for a happy life, further, into necessary for physical peace and necessary for life itself. Necessary desires are desires for food and clothing. The desire for carnal love, according to Epicurus, is natural, but not necessary. And the desire for luxurious clothing and exquisite food is not natural, not necessary, but is an empty desire.
This means that a happy life requires choice, and it is impossible without reasoning and understanding. Epicurus calls understanding the greatest good, because only with its help can one come to a happy life. “One cannot live in pleasures unless one lives wisely, well, and justly, and one cannot live wisely, well, and justly without living in pleasures.” He even says that it is better to endure misfortunes while living wisely than to prosper in unreason.
Epicurus’ ethics are individualistic. Man is not a social animal by nature, as Aristotle believed. He becomes one only under the influence of need. Therefore, a sage will never strive for social life, for it excites and disturbs the soul. A sage will engage in social activity only in order to ensure his own self-preservation. Epicurus puts forward the slogan “Live unnoticed” (λάθε βιώσας) as a social imperative. At the same time, Epicurus highly valued friendship, and the Epicureans were famous in Antiquity for their devotion to friends.
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