Nicolas Malebranche was the most significant of all of Descartes’ followers; he was the systematizer and the greatest theorist of occasionalism. The starting point in the development of occasionalism (from the Latin occasio – case, occasion) was the problem of the relationship between the soul and the body. The solution to this problem proposed by Descartes did not satisfy even many of his followers, and seemed insufficiently convincing to them. The supporters of occasionalism held the opinion that natural interaction between bodily and spiritual substances was impossible. At the same time, they explained the relationship between the soul and the body by divine intervention.
Malebranche was born in Paris in 1638 to a large noble family. He grew up an extremely sickly child, which influenced his parents’ decision to educate him at home. A secluded home life, almost complete isolation from his peers, and a religious upbringing all contributed to the emergence of a tendency toward solitary reflection, which left its mark on Malebranche’s entire subsequent life. By the age of sixteen, Nicolas’s health had improved somewhat – just enough that his parents considered it possible to send him to continue his education at one of the newly opened large colleges in Paris. In 1656, he began studying theology at the Sorbonne (his studies lasted three years). In 1659, he entered the religious congregation of the Oratory of Jesus, and in 1664 he was ordained a priest. Malebranche’s main works are: “On the Search for Truth” (1674-1675), “Christian Meditations” (1683), “Conversations on Metaphysics” (1688). Malebranche died in Paris in 1715.
Theory of Being. Following Descartes, Malebranche advocates a dualistic ontology. All varieties of created beings are modes of matter or spirit. In addition, there is a Supreme Being – an incorporeal, thinking, uncreated substance, i.e. God. Examining the “order of metaphysical questions” in his work “On the Search for Truth,” Malebranche asserts: “The first thing we know is the existence of our soul” (1:2, 369); moreover, the “irrefutable proofs” of the existence of the soul are all acts of human thought (since everything that thinks exists – at least at the moment of thinking). The French philosopher defends the ontological proof of the existence of God: “If one thinks about God, he must exist. Another being, although cognized, may not exist. One can comprehend its essence without its existence, its idea without itself. But one cannot comprehend the essence of the infinite without its existence” (3: 12, 53-54). The idea of the infinite is realized with the help of direct contemplation, accessible to everyone. At the same time, it is impossible to contemplate non-existence, therefore, the idea of the infinite must necessarily be connected with a certain infinite being as its prototype. This prototype is God. Having found a satisfactory, in his opinion, solution to the problem of the existence of God, Malebranche declares that the proposition “God exists” is as reliable a metaphysical principle as the proposition “I think, therefore I exist”. The proof of the existence of the external material world, according to Malebranche, presupposes the already achieved knowledge of the real existence of God. In this sense, he says that the existence of God is more obvious than the existence of the world. But still, the presence of the corporeal world is indisputable. Its existence can be proven if we rely on Divine Revelation. True faith teaches people that God created heaven and earth. Moreover, the scriptures testify quite clearly that there are thousands of different created beings. Thus, it is the testimony of the scriptures that is the indisputable proof of the existence of material objects.
According to Malebranche, created substances cannot interact naturally, without the intervention of the Deity (he differs from Descartes on this issue). His justification of this position consists of an attempt to prove two interrelated theses: a) the body cannot act on the spirit, b) the spirit cannot act on the body.
a) Matter cannot act on the spirit, since it is extended, and all properties of extension are reduced to spatial relations; spatial relations can in no way influence the immaterial, non-spatial mind.
b) The spirit cannot act on the body, since there is no necessary connection between its will and the movements of bodies. For example, a person’s desire to wave his hand and the movement of his hand are two phenomena, the necessary connection between which reason cannot prove. We can only conclude that experience speaks of the joint existence of these two events (and nothing more). In addition, Malebranche relies on Augustine’s teaching on continuous creation. If God continuously renews the world, then he must remain the main cause of the movements of created bodies: “there is a contradiction in the fact that all the angels and demons gathered together could shake a straw. For no force, no matter how great it may be imagined, can surpass or even equal the Divine power” (3: 12, 160).
Thus, due to the qualitative difference of substances, the connection between them can exist and be maintained only through the intervention of the Supreme Being. According to Malebranche, natural interaction is impossible not only between two created substances, but also between the modes of the same substance. This statement is concretized in the form of two theses: a) a body cannot act on a body, b) a spirit cannot act on a spirit. The argumentation of the French thinker can be briefly summarized as follows. A) A body cannot act on a body, since this is clear from the very idea of a body. This idea does not contain anything that would allow us to conclude about the ability of bodies to communicate motion. Mainly because the idea of extension and the idea of a moving force are not connected by a necessary connection. In addition, from the doctrine of continuous creation also follows the conclusion about the impossibility of natural interaction between bodies. If creation is continuous, then it is reasonable to agree that bodies are deprived of internal active force (since their existence is completely determined by the will of the Creator). B) A created spirit cannot act on other spirits for the same reason (continued creation excludes such an influence of spirits on each other, which would not have the divine will as its support). Thus, the impossibility of natural interaction between the modes of one and the same substance, according to Malebranche, requires the acceptance of the doctrine of the Divine will as the highest principle of all movements. But although God is the highest principle of any changes, it does not at all follow that His will is the only cause of everything that happens in the world. In addition to the general true (or supreme efficient) cause, there is an infinite number of natural or occasional causes. An occasional cause is only a reason for the manifestation of the Divine will. Nevertheless, without this reason, the Divine will would possibly never have performed this or that specific action in the form in which we observe it. In essence, all modes of created substances (depending on the circumstances) can act as particular or occasional causes. For example, the Sun is the occasional cause of many earthly goods: the fertility of the soil, the existence of animal species, and many other objects that benefit man. But the Sun itself does not possess any special inner power. It is only a part of the material substance, animated by the action of the Divine will. Developing the occasionalist theory of causality, Malebranche explains that the body and spirit can act as particular or natural causes of changes occurring in man. Moreover, the movement of the hand, for example, occurs because God desires the raising of the hand at the very moment when man himself desires the same thing. In this situation, man’s will is the occasional cause of the movement of the hand, while the true and general cause of this is the corresponding Divine command. In the same way, bodily movements can be the occasional cause of changes,observed in the human soul.
Theory of knowledge. Malebranche identifies four ways of knowing: 1) direct, 2) through inner feeling, 3) by analogy, 4) mediated – through ideas. These ways of knowing correspond to four types of objects present in the universe: God; created spirits (which for every knowing subject are divided into two categories – the souls of other beings and their own soul); material bodies.
1) According to Malebranche, only God can be known directly. According to the French thinker, direct knowledge can relate to “intelligible things,” but not to material things that lack activity and the ability to move. But among intelligible entities, only God can directly and immediately influence souls. Therefore, God is the only object of direct knowledge. “We contemplate only God directly and immediately; He alone can enlighten the spirit with His own essence” (1: 2, 29). Moreover, this knowledge of God by the soul is very imperfect – due to the fact that the soul, as a type of created being, is disproportionate to its cause, it cannot comprehend the entire set of Divine perfections.
2) According to Malebranche, man understands his own soul with the help of his inner sense. This kind of knowledge is very incomplete and imperfect. Man would have complete knowledge of the soul only if he had a special idea of the soul, from which all its properties would necessarily follow. However, man does not have such an idea; he understands the soul and its various modifications through special sensations, which are always insufficient.
3) The souls of other people (as well as “pure spirits”) are known by analogy. Other people’s souls are inaccessible to our inner sense, they are not known to us through their ideas, and there is no direct knowledge of them due to the absence of their direct effect on our consciousness. The only possible way of understanding them is based on the transfer to other spirits of those properties that we find in ourselves. Of course, this method of knowledge is based on the assumption that the essence of created spirits is the same. But this assumption, according to Malebranche, is difficult to dispute, since it, in turn, is a consequence of another thesis: God governs the world by means of immutable laws.
4) Material objects are comprehended through the “vision in God” of their ideas. In substantiating this position, Malebranche refers to the fact that, due to the heterogeneity of substances, there can be no natural relationship, no natural connection between material bodies and unextended spirits, and therefore no natural cognition of bodies by souls. At the same time, he considers it indisputable that the ideas of all the beings created by Him are necessarily present in God. This means that the soul’s cognition of ideas is possible only through contemplation of them in God—of course, solely for the reason that God himself wishes to reveal them to people. Secondly, the ideas of things, clearly and distinctly perceived by reason, are necessary and unchangeable. But the unchangeable can only abide in an unchangeable substance, i.e., in God. Consequently, we see unchangeable ideas in God. Thirdly, the theory of “seeing things in God” has the greatest religious value compared to other epistemological concepts and is best consistent with Christian doctrine, since it “places created spirits in complete and greatest dependence on God” (1: 2, 21).
Malebranche repeatedly repeats in his works that “vision in God” does not mean contemplation of the essence of the Deity. The divine essence is devoid of imperfections, it is simple and indivisible. In God there is no sequence and diversity of thoughts (this is characteristic of the human mind), it contemplates everything in a single act. The divine substance does not consist of parts, it is essentially one. The human soul, cognizing things in God, always encounters a multiplicity that cannot be attributed to the properties of the Supreme Cause. Of course, one can assume that since ideas are in God, they must somehow reflect (or even constitute) his essence. But Malebranche adds an explanation: “The divine substance … you do not see it in itself, or according to what it is. You see it only according to the relationship it has to material creations” (3: 12, 51). It turns out that vision in God, although it gives a person the opportunity to come into contact with the highest substance, does not at all allow one to achieve adequate knowledge of it, since in this case the soul encounters only one of the manifestations of the Supreme Cause.
Man can see the eternal ideas only because God himself wishes to reveal them; but the will of God is distinguished by its unshakable constancy. In general, “God himself enlightens philosophers with those knowledges which ungrateful men call natural, although they are sent down to them from above” (1: 2, 21).
Ethics. Malebranche divides his ethical teaching into two parts: the first is devoted to virtue, the second to moral duties. Since man is a rational being, the more virtuous and perfect he is, the more he is connected to the Divine Reason that governs the whole world. The only virtue, according to the French philosopher, consists in obedience to the Divine law or, what is the same, in love for the highest order, which contains relations of perfection. “Love for Order is not simply the main moral virtue, it is the only virtue: it is the basic, fundamental, universal virtue” (3: 11, 28). Malebranche connects the acquisition of virtue with the fulfillment of a number of conditions. A person must have certain qualities (or “habits”) of the mind, without which virtue is inaccessible. These special qualities are called by the French thinker: 1) strength of mind, 2) freedom of mind and 3) obedience. The strength or power of the mind consists in the ability to maintain attention, to stop it on clear and distinct ideas. Knowledge of the relationships of perfection that constitute the highest order is impossible without careful consideration of clear ideas. “Without the work of attention… the soul will live in blindness and disorder, since naturally there is no other way to reach the light that should guide us” (3: 11, 61). Freedom of mind, according to Malebranche, is a quality that allows one to delay agreement or disagreement with a certain position that requires additional research. Freedom of mind is necessary in order not to make premature decisions in confusing issues. Obedience to the Divine law is a necessary complement to the power and freedom of mind. After all, knowledge of the nature of good is not enough to become virtuous; readiness and desire to follow it are also required. The French philosopher divides moral duties into three types: 1) duties towards God, 2) towards other people, 3) towards oneself. Duties towards God are quite numerous. These include: considering only God as the cause of our happiness; fearing only God; thanking God for the knowledge he has revealed to man, etc. Moral duties towards other people are reduced to three main ones: a) respect, b) goodwill, c) reverence for authorities and submission to them. Moral duties towards oneself consist of striving for self-improvement and happiness.
An essential feature of Malebranche’s work is his desire to use Cartesian philosophy to defend Christian doctrine. In his opinion, true philosophy contributes to the spread of religion because it “overthrows all the arguments of freethinkers by establishing its highest principle, which is in complete agreement with the first principle of the Christian religion, namely, that one must love and fear only God” (1:2, 326).
Malebranche is rightly considered the greatest Cartesian. He accepts Descartes’ ontological dualism (spirit – matter), his doctrine of method, ideas about the role and purpose of feelings, about the nature and functions of reason, about the subjectivity of “sensory qualities”, etc. At the same time, one should not underestimate the originality of Malebranche’s philosophy: his unique originality is given to it primarily by his theory of occasional causes and his doctrine of “seeing things in God”.
Literature
1. Malebranche N. Search for truth. Vol. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1903-1906.
2. Malebranche N. Oeuvres. T. 1-4. P., 1871-1884.
3. Malebranche N. Complete works. T. 1-20. P., 1958—1967.
4. Ershov MN The problem of knowledge of God in the philosophy of Malebranche. Kazan, 1914.
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