Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born in Rammenau in 1762 and studied at the universities of Jena and Leipzig. Without receiving a degree, he worked for some time as a tutor in Zurich. The turning point in Fichte’s fate was his acquaintance with the works of Kant in 1790. He immediately felt like a Kantian and began to seek a meeting with the author of his favorite philosophical system. The meeting took place in July 1791, but Kant showed no enthusiasm and Fichte was disappointed. Nevertheless, he still managed to gain the approval of the famous philosopher. In 1792, he anonymously (though not intentionally) published the work “An Essay on the Critique of Every Revelation”, written in the spirit of criticism and accepted by many as the work of Kant himself.
After Kant publicly supported the Essay, while naming the real author, Fichte immediately became famous. Soon, despite his radical political views and admiration for the French Revolution, he received an invitation to occupy the chair of philosophy at the University of Jena (largely thanks to Goethe’s recommendation), where he worked from 1794 to 1799. As a textbook for students, Fichte published in 1794 an essay “On the Concept of Science of Knowledge or So-Called Philosophy”, as well as “The Foundation of General Science of Knowledge” – a treatise that became one of the central works of the entire cycle of works on “science of knowledge”. In 1795, “An Essay on the Peculiarities of Science of Knowledge in Relation to Theoretical Capacity” was published, supplementing the theoretical part of “The Foundation of General Science of Knowledge”, and in 1796 – “The Foundations of Natural Law”, continuing the practical part of the aforementioned work. Later, Fichte made great efforts to explain and popularize the basic tenets of his system. Fichte’s emotional lectures were very popular with students. However, his administrative activities did not evoke such unanimous approval. Over time, Fichte became inconvenient for the university, and the first opportunity (an atheistic article in a journal edited by Fichte) was used by the authorities to oust him from the University of Jena. In 1800, Fichte moved to Berlin, where he gave private courses in philosophy and published his works “The Purpose of Man” and “The Closed Commercial State”. During the occupation of Prussia by Napoleon’s troops, he addressed “Speeches to the German Nation”, calling on his compatriots to a liberation movement. In 1810 he published The Facts of Consciousness and became a professor at the new University of Berlin, where he taught until his death in 1814.
Fichte was a bright personality, an unusually active and energetic person. Many were even afraid of his activity. At one time he was interested in Freemasonry, but gradually became disillusioned with it, convinced that his ideas did not find a response in this environment. As already noted, I. Kant had a decisive influence on Fichte’s philosophy. Fichte believed that he was developing his system (however, Kant distanced himself from his student in 1799). His youthful fascination with the metaphysics of B. Spinoza also left a serious mark on his philosophy, although he later contrasted his “dogmatism” with true “criticism”. Even more significant was the influence of the Kantian K. L. Reinhold on Fichte. One can even say that his system arose as a result of an attempt to save Reinhold’s constructions from the skeptical attacks of G. E. Schulze. Fichte agreed with Schulze that the basis of a system of knowledge cannot be Reinhold’s “law of consciousness”, which states the distinction of the subject from itself and objects, and that the initial principle must be related to the law of identity. But he filled this law with subjectivistic content, thereby remaining faithful to the tradition of Kant and Reinhold.
Science of knowledge. Fichte, avoiding foreign terms, called the philosophical system he created “science of knowledge” (Wissenschaftslehre). Sciences are reliable knowledge, and it is quite natural for a philosopher to ask about the nature of knowledge. A detailed answer to this question is given by science of knowledge. This answer itself must also be scientific. Thus, science of knowledge turns out to be a kind of “science of sciences”, substantiating the axioms of particular disciplines. In fact, any knowledge implies reliability, which can be derivative or original. Derived reliability can only be the result of a conclusion from some original principles. But if there were many such principles, then human knowledge would be deprived of unity and some reliable truths could contradict others. Since this is not observed, our knowledge forms a system and must be based on some absolutely reliable foundation, on the one hand, which underlies all particular axioms, and on the other, which is the starting point of scientific teaching.
The closest candidate for the role of this basic principle is the law of identity, “A is A”. But the identification of A with itself occurs in thinking, in the I, which must also be identical. Thus, the foundation of all human knowledge is the principle “I am I” (see 1: 1, 77-81). In other words, the science of science can fulfill its role in substantiating the axioms of particular sciences only by studying the nature and laws of the spirit, or I. The completeness of the science of science is ensured by the fact that its end coincides with its starting point. This innovative feature of Fichte’s methodology allows us to see in his philosophy a kind of hermeneutic circle, the main subject of interpretation of which is the I, both human and divine. Over the course of hundreds of pages of “The Foundations of General Science of Science” Fichte seems to be trying to admit the possibility of combining the existence of the absolute I with human self-consciousness. In the end, however, it turns out that the absolute Self is present in the human soul only in the form of an ideal.
Thus, the unconditional beginning of the science of science is the fundamental principle “I am I”, or “I posit I”. In this self-evident formula, which Fichte was prompted to by Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, he sees the revelation of the essence of self-consciousness as the unity of conscious activity and its result, the I, which is simultaneously the condition of self-consciousness. The act of self-consciousness is not conditioned by anything, it is spontaneous. It reveals the original freedom of man, as well as the unity of the theoretical and the practical. But Fichte does not limit himself to one fundamental principle. The fact is that real human self-consciousness is not pure self-consciousness. Self-consciousness of the I always occurs against the background of the consciousness of this very I of some objects.
This fact cannot be ignored, and Fichte seeks an explanation for it. It is clear that the givenness of objects cannot be directly derived from the I. On the other hand, it is something opposite to the I, i.e., it is not-I. This can be interpreted as meaning that the I opposes the not-I to itself. This is the second fundamental principle of the science of science. In content, it depends on the first, but is unconditional in form, i.e., in relation to its negativity. The specificity of this fundamental principle allows Fichte to speak of the “empiricism” of the science of science.
The dual nature of consciousness, containing the I and the not-I, is fixed in the third (unconditional in content, but conditioned in form) fundamental principle: “The I opposes in the I the divisible I to the divisible not-I” (1:1, 95).
From this proposition, which shows a similarity with Reinhold’s “law of consciousness” (but in Fichte it is not a pure fact, but at least partly the result of a deduction from higher principles), both Fichte’s theoretical and practical philosophy originate. In essence, Fichte’s entire metaphysics is an attempt to answer the question of the possibility of the experience of consciousness, which turns out to be problematic due to the presence in it of the opposites of the I and the not-I. Fichte offers a way out already in the third fundamental principle, and it consists in deducing the concept of “divisibility” or limitation, which allows the I and the not-I to be united, but does not allow them to come into contact. However, this solution, according to Fichte, is not final. New contradictions arise (for example, from the third fundamental principle it follows that the not-I limits the I, but only that which has reality can limit, and reality, Fichte is sure, is only in the I), and it becomes necessary to introduce new concepts in order to push it aside. In a similar way, in addition to the categories of reality (already derived from the first fundamental principle), negation (the second fundamental principle) and limitation, Fichte also deduces the categories of interaction, cause, substance. At the same time, he criticizes Kant’s method of systematizing pure concepts of reason, which, in his opinion, lacks the signs of a real deduction.
By separating the I and the not-I, Fichte ultimately deduces the “independent” unconscious activity of the soul, the “productive imagination,” whose function is to generate the opposites of the I and the not-I and at the same time prevent them from absorbing each other. The discovery of the unconscious functions of the subject leads Fichte to the conclusion about the need to distinguish between several levels of spiritual life. He calls the subject of everyday experience the “empirical,” or final I. To the empirical I, the objects of its perception seem to be something external and alien, i.e., they appear as not-I. At a deeper level of the human spirit, which only a reflective philosopher can know about, namely, at the level of the I as the “intelligentsia,” the situation changes radically. The intelligent I, which has a supra-individual character, produces individual empirical I’s by means of unconscious imagination, as well as the empirical non-I, i.e. the world of phenomena given in contemplation, opposing them to each other in the united consciousness of individuals (it is precisely the intelligent I that is discussed at the beginning of Fichte’s third fundamental principle). Self-awareness of the empirical I is possible only in the form of reflection, which implies the reflection of the activity of the I from a certain object. However, when encountering an obstacle, this activity inevitably strives to overcome it.
The “practical” I is characterized by this very desire to expand the sphere of the empirical I by acquiring ever greater power over the non-I, or nature. Fichte believes that overcoming obstacles and conquering difficulties contributes to the fact that moral will is gradually forged from the initial vague aspiration of the soul. The ideal (in reality, however, unrealizable) of this expansion of the sphere of the I is the final displacement of the non-I, as if dissolving it in the I. As a result, such an I should be obtained that would not need the non-I for self-awareness, would be infinite and not split into conscious and unconscious activity – Fichte calls it the “absolute I”. The absolute I, or God, is nothing more than an idea of the human mind. In his early works, Fichte subscribes to the Kantian position, asserting that the existence of God is unprovable. But since he nevertheless admitted the possibility of not only reflective but also non-reflective (divine) self-consciousness, he had to indicate the reason why human self-consciousness is structured precisely reflectively.
According to Fichte, such a cause is the thing in itself. The thing in itself (which cannot be confused with the non-I generated by the intelligent I as a world of phenomena) acts as the “Prime Mover” of the I (see 1: 1, 281-283).
However, the concept of the thing-in-itself is almost elusive. When we think of it, we are no longer thinking of the thing-in-itself. It is only clear that it produces some kind of “impetus” (Anstoss) on the activity of our I, which plays the role of a trigger for the entire internal mechanics of the intelligent I. Having stated this position in the “Basis of General Theory of Science,” Fichte later significantly adjusted it. He came to the conclusion that the concept of the thing-in-itself should nevertheless be eliminated, since it presupposes a transcendental application of the concept of cause, which, as Kant had already shown, is impossible. But the elimination of this concept made it difficult for Fichte to explain the reflexivity of the human I. In the “Second Introduction to Theory of Science,” Fichte was inclined to simply state this reflexivity as an original fact. But such an explanation did not satisfy Fichte himself, and in his later works he replaced it with new conceptual schemes.
The essence of Fichte’s new position consisted in an attempt to combine the functions of the thing-in-itself from the “Fundamentals of General Science of Doctrine” and the idea of the absolute Self, which he had previously deprived of objective reality. In his later works, he speaks of the existence of the Absolute and its image – Knowledge, which he had previously called “I as the intelligentsia”. Fichte identifies the Absolute with Being or Life, and Knowledge turns out to be a “scheme” of Being, its existence (Dasein). Sometimes Fichte switched to theological terminology and, for example, noted the agreement of science of Doctrine with the prologue of the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” The Word is a synonym for Knowledge, which reflects God and at the same time is in a certain sense identical to him. At the same time, the agreement of science of Doctrine with traditional theistic views has always been quite conditional. The classical “theistic” God is conceived according to the model of an individual creative conscious being, whereas in Fichte neither the Absolute (of which it is only known that it is absolute), nor the intelligent I that generates the finite I and nature, or, to use Fichte’s later terminology, impersonal Knowledge, meet these criteria.
The doctrine of morality. The unconsciousness of the supra-individual spiritual principle in Fichte’s system explains why he often characterized it in terms of Will rather than Thinking, anticipating the ideas of A. Schopenhauer. The emphasis on the volitional aspect of the world essence also reflects Fichte’s deep interest in ethical topics. Fichte’s doctrine of morality developed under the influence of Kant’s corresponding theories. At the same time, he tried to overcome Kant’s dualism of sensuality and rational will. The moral law is the same sensual aspiration, but on a qualitatively new level. In accordance with this principle, Fichte offers a solution to one of the problems of Kantian ethics, which, as it may seem, imposes a ban on receiving pleasure from good deeds (Kant calls actions that are moral in form, but provide sensual pleasure “legal” and not “moral”). Fichte considers it possible for a person to joyfully fulfill his duty. Another difference between Fichte’s ethics and Kant’s constructions is that he tried to get away from the abstract universality of Kant’s moral law. Without rejecting the combination of moral motivation with the universal imperatives of practical reason, Fichte also claimed that each person makes his own unique contribution to the movement of the world towards a more perfect state. This contribution is expressed by the concept of the “purpose” of a specific person. The uniqueness of each individual will, according to Fichte, guarantees that it will not be destroyed after the disintegration of the body. Its improvement will continue in the future life, although in a different form.
Social philosophy. However, Fichte does not limit himself to reasoning about the transcendental significance of moral actions. He also analyzes their worldly conditions. Thus, he is sure that a free personality cannot reveal itself if there are no other personalities. The moral law also presupposes a plurality of subjects of morality. Therefore, like Kant, Fichte’s ethics is closely connected with the problems of social philosophy and the philosophy of history. He distinguished five stages of human history – 1) “innocence”, when reason acts as an instinct, 2) “beginning sinfulness”, 3) “completed sinfulness”, when people renounce reason altogether, 4) “beginning justification” and 5) “completed justification and sanctification”, “when humanity with a confident and firm hand creates from itself the exact imprint of reason” (1:2, 370). The introduction of the ideals of reason into public life is impossible without the active participation of the state, although its role is largely auxiliary.
Fichte’s socio-political views changed significantly over time. In his early days, he expressed views close to Locke’s theory of the state as the guarantor of property, rights and freedoms of citizens. By 1800, he came to the conclusion that a more active role of the state was needed in resolving property issues. The state must first “give everyone what is his, put him in possession of his property, and only then begin to protect it” (1:2, 237). Fichte believes that in matters of property, the state must proceed from the principle of equality of all people. On this basis, he constructs a theory of an ideal state, close to socialist teachings and at the same time reminiscent of the guild system of the Middle Ages. The state, Fichte believes, must have extensive control functions, plan production and distribution. Only international trade, developing according to its own laws, can interfere with a planned economy. Therefore, Fichte proposes to create a “closed trading state” that will have a monopoly on commercial relations with other countries. In his later period, Fichte began to talk more and more about the religious function of the state.
Fichte had a great influence on his contemporaries. His thesis on the self-closure, i.e., essentially, the hermeneutic nature, of philosophical systems was taken up by Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach and even Schopenhauer, who in words did not want to have anything in common with Fichte. They extended his methodological scheme to being itself, to which the desire for self-understanding and self-knowledge was attributed. No less influential was his idea of using contradictions for the progressive movement of thought in philosophical deductions. It was fully developed by Hegel in his doctrine of the speculative method. Fichte’s reflections on the creative nature of the I were popular among the Romantics. A certain influence of Fichte’s philosophy with its emphasis on the activity of the subject was recognized by Marxists. But Fichte had, of course, the greatest influence on Friedrich Schelling.
Literature
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