This term is commonly used to designate the works of several philosophers of the mid-20th century, thematically united around questions of scientific methodology and subjecting the concepts of classical rationality to rethinking. Among the most famous representatives of postpositivism are K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, M. Polanyi, K. Hübner. In fact, M. Foucault is not far from this movement of thought. Late postpositivism gave rise to the sociology of science.
In general, postpositivism is characterized by the problematization of the possibility of knowledge (not only scientific, but any) – from reserved doubts that scientific theories reflect the actual state of affairs (Popper) to uncompromising assertions that science is a servant of power (Feyerabend).
The general scheme of this movement looks like this. Its origins lie in a field that at first glance seems far removed from philosophy – in mathematics and physics of the early 20th century. The central topic for understanding at that time was the development of the theory of relativity (hereinafter – TR). This theory was developed for very specific conditions, primarily for speeds close to the speed of light. However, within its framework, results were obtained, the general philosophical interpretation of which shook the minds: the relativity of simultaneity, the absence of absolute time, the absence of absolute and motionless space. The spatial characteristics of bodies, their mass, and so on were also relativized (at one time it even seemed that the law of conservation of energy was called into question).
It is characteristic that all this in the physical sense does not affect our world at all, but metaphysical formulas containing the concept of relativism, after 100 years, became widespread not only for describing our world, but also for formulating the proper philosophical state. Relativism from a mathematical result became an ethical and methodological prescription. TO descended into the minds of the masses and turned into a state of postmodernism, having lost the quality of descriptiveness and acquired the quality of ideology.
This whole process was closely connected with the philosophical reflection of science. The methodology of science and philosophical reflection moved hand in hand in one direction.
There have been several philosophical answers to the question of how to treat the discoveries of RT. N. Hartmann, for example, believed that in the case of RT, mathematics was inadequately applied to a field in which it cannot work. Another answer was given by Henri Poincaré (1854-1912): the concepts we use are essentially agreements, conventions. The development of this idea, which became widely known, was called conventionalism.
Conventionalism can also be the name given to the idea that scientific theories are the result of agreement. In this case, conventionalism essentially coincides with instrumentalism. Poincaré, on the other hand, adhered to the conventionalism of concepts, i.e. he questioned not the theory, but the concepts in which it is formulated. In his relativization of concepts, one can discern a desire to save the theory, which is connected with his intuitionism – see below.
Another response to the challenge of RT was instrumentalism, which, however, has a long history. This name was given to the idea that theories in themselves say nothing about reality, they are only tools that allow us to connect observed facts, formalize their observed regularities, and make predictions. An instrumental understanding of theory was proposed long ago in astronomy, both for those theories that were later rejected (the theory of pericycles) and for those that were later accepted (the theory of Copernicus). It is quite natural that an instrumentalist interpretation was proposed for RT as well.
Poincaré, reflecting on his own mathematical creativity, very vividly emphasized the idea of intuition, which underlies any theory. According to his thought, theory is only a subsequent formalization of the original intuitive idea. He illustrated this not only with the material of the RT, but also with the material of many of his other brilliant discoveries in mathematics. In doing so, he referred to the then fashionable idea of the unconscious.
Later, in mathematics and logic, the intuitionism movement emerged, for which Poincaré’s works played the role of a starting impetus. Intuitionism was a reflection of the idea of intuitive logical creativity. Logical and mathematical intuitionists demanded that in order for an object/statement to be called true, its construction, origin, be known. This approach differs from classical logic, which works with already given statements.
A contrasting background to the above-mentioned movement of thought is logical positivism (Vienna Circle. See the previous chapter). As is typical of positivism in general, logical positivism considered empirical data to be the primary material of knowledge. Science, according to logical positivists, should be a correct generalization of facts. They declared metaphysics to be meaningless. They considered the criterion of the correctness of a theory to be its correspondence to facts – confirmability, verifiability (the so-called empiricist justificationism). Surprisingly, they hardly reflected on the fact that their own logical positivism is in no way a generalization of any facts, but a purely a priori prescription, therefore it does not represent science and, consequently, is meaningless!
Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) was born in Vienna. He studied natural sciences and psychology, and was preparing to work as a teacher. At the same time, he was passionate about music and even wanted to become a professional musician, but abandoned this idea, suspecting that he was not talented enough. He was interested in philosophy non-professionally, but with his inherent thoroughness, he mastered it to perfection. In his youth, he took part in social work together with Freud’s follower Adler. Through him, he became acquainted with psychoanalysis, which later played an important role in his idea of falsifiability as a criterion of scientificity. Popper’s views on the essence of scientific knowledge were formed under the influence of Poincaré’s ideas and in polemics with logical positivism. From Poincaré, he borrowed the idea that insight lies at the basis of scientific creativity, in other words, the primary cognitive act is the formulation of a hypothesis. The theories that the logical positivists wrote about are, from the point of view of logic, inductive theories – deducing general statements from individual ones. Popper formulates objections to the logical positivists in the form of a critique of induction, indicating that from the point of view of logic this operation is illegal. Popper points out a fundamental asymmetry: to refute any theory (as well as any general statement of the type “All A is B”), a single fact is enough, but no amount of facts can prove a theory. It is equally illegal, he points out, to accept a theory only on the basis of its verification (confirmation).
Thus, according to Popper, a theory cannot be convincingly confirmed, but it can be refuted. In order for a theory to be refuted, a single refutation is enough. Popper calls the refutation of a theory by a single fact falsification.
Popper is optimistic about the progress of knowledge. Popper sees the development of scientific knowledge as follows: hypotheses are put forward – their refutation – new hypotheses are put forward, and so on. If Poincaré, in explaining where hypotheses come from, referred to the work of the unconscious, Popper left this problem unanswered.
According to Popper, it is extremely unlikely that any hypothesis will be 100% correct. He does not believe in this even in principle; according to Popper, human knowledge is doomed to remain imperfect (he calls this postulate fallibilism). Popper called his model of knowledge growth evolutionary epistemology, because the development of hypotheses and the subsequent selection of the most “adapted” ones – those that are the longest to be falsified – reminded him of Darwinian evolution.
Just as evolution, in his opinion, leads to progress in the organization and development of organisms, so in the process of evolution of scientific theories the best of them survive, which in general allows us to speak of the growth of knowledge and understanding.
Popper has a negative attitude towards conventionalism and instrumentalism. He declared instrumentalism to be incompatible with the spirit of scientific inquiry. It is impossible to apply the criterion of scientificity – falsifiability – to a theory that declares itself to be an instrument. A theory-instrument cannot contradict the facts, and may simply not be applicable in some area. (A good example is given by the Russian commentator A. L. Nikiforov: if I tried to shave with an axe and failed, I do not declare the axe to be “generally falsified”; it continues to be adequate in its own area: chopping wood (see 9: 63). This can be reasoned with because an axe is not a theory. According to Popper, a theory that fails to be applied to some facts is falsified “generally”). For Popper, and this is very important, theories are not conventions, not instruments, but sincere attempts to explain the world. Only under this condition can they be steps along the path of infinite growth of human knowledge. In this approach, it is better to have a completely false theory, but put forward with seriousness, than one that turns out to be correct by chance, although it is put forward as conventionalist, for reasons of convenience. A very important role in his reasoning is played by the so-called problem of demarcation. This problem was posed by logical positivists, who tried to find a criterion for distinguishing “real” science from metaphysics. According to Popper, they solved it incorrectly. They saw this criterion (essentially, the criterion of empiricism) in the fact that the theory must be based on facts. However, someone who does not accept the legitimacy of inductive constructions at all cannot adhere to this criterion. Popper puts forward falsifiability as a criterion for the empiricism/scientific nature of a theory. A theory must be constructed in such a way as to prohibit certain types of events – then the discovery of such events clearly falsifies the theory.
Popper calls unfalsifiable theories “metaphysical”, borrowing terminology from the Vienna Circle. Unlike the logical positivists, he did not consider any unfalsifiable statements to be meaningless. Moreover, according to his criterion, even ordinary factual statements of the type “A exists” turned out to be “metaphysical”, since they cannot be empirically refuted. He also treated metaphysics in the proper sense of the word, i.e., speculative philosophical constructions, without condemnation. He himself created several metaphysical theories (see below).
What Popper disapproved of were theories that claim to be scientific but cannot be falsified in practice. He cites psychoanalysis as an example. He writes that no matter what the experimental data, psychoanalysis is capable of explaining them all, i.e., it is impossible in principle to come up with a situation that would refute them. Freud’s theory, so to speak, knows how to get out of any situation perfectly.
He writes: “I can illustrate this with two essentially different examples of human behavior: the behavior of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it, and the behavior of a man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save this child. According to Adler, the first man suffers from a feeling of inferiority (which causes him to have to prove to himself that he is capable of daring to commit a crime), and the same thing happens to the second (who has the need to prove to himself that he is capable of saving the child).”
He interprets Marxism in a similar way.
He also declares conventionalism to be incompatible with his model. He charges that conventionalist theories, in order to avoid refutation, defend themselves against any falsification by ad hoc hypotheses. It is not entirely clear whether this follows from the inner essence of conventionalism, or whether Popper concluded it from observations of the actual practice of those who hold conventionalist views.
In general, Popper’s position on science can be characterized as a call to strive to understand the world, to be bold in putting forward hypotheses, ruthless in refuting them (as Lakatos formulates it), and not to succumb to the temptations of conventionalism and instrumentalism.
In addition to the philosophy of science, Popper is known as a social philosopher, the author of the book “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. It examines the philosophical origins of totalitarianism. In the book “Objective Knowledge. Evolutionary Approach” he sets out his original – however, quite in the spirit of philosophy of the late 20th century – concept of three autonomous worlds: 1). the world of physical objects; 2). the world of states of consciousness; 3). the world of ideas/theories. This concept is a logical bridge from traditional Platonism to the theory of the autonomy of discourse, fashionable in postmodernism.
Together with J. Eccles, Popper wrote the book “The Self and Its Brain”, in which he discusses the topics of interaction between the soul and the body from the position of dualism. He raises the question of free will and the compatibility of this freedom with the neural organization of the brain, denying natural determinism in the area of will.
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn’s (1922-1996) book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” was published, which became the next step in the critical attitude towards the positivist interpretation of scientific knowledge. Kuhn adheres to the historical approach, paying much attention to the real history of science. At first glance, his book is not replete with philosophical statements, but the concept of “scientific paradigm” introduced by him carries a hidden destructive force in relation to the idea of progress in scientific knowledge.
Kuhn’s idea is as follows: the development of scientific knowledge is not cumulative. It has a non-linear character and consists of stages that are characterized not only by a certain development of the scientific theory itself, but also by the organization of scientific activity specific to each stage. He identifies a “pre-paradigmatic” stage, and then a series of alternating periods of normal development and crises.
0. The “pre-paradigm” state of a certain area of knowledge is characterized by the absence of unity and the presence of many schools.
1. Then comes the paradigm. This is the word Kuhn most often uses to describe a scientific theory that is held by a majority of scientists. Two conditions are necessary for a theory to become a paradigm: it must be a) “unprecedented” so as to absorb alternatives; b) open enough so that problems can be found within it for further elaboration. Kuhn calls the period of paradigm dominance normal science. During the period of normal science, cumulative growth of knowledge is possible. The paradigm is outlined in textbooks.
The period of “normal science” is characterized above all by the fact that scientists have complete confidence in the paradigm within which they work, and if some puzzle cannot be solved, they do not question the paradigm. Most often, they assume that they do not have enough data or are not equipped to solve it. Perhaps they propose some additions to the paradigm – “ad hoc hypotheses” according to Popper.
2. Unsolved puzzles accumulate, the paradigm ceases to explain new facts satisfactorily. Scientists stop attributing their failures to their own problems and question the paradigm. A crisis occurs, then a revolution occurs; a new theory appears, gains acceptance, and becomes a paradigm. The most obvious sign of this is the writing of new textbooks.
In the second edition of his book, Kuhn goes into more detail about the philosophical essence of a paradigm. If in the first version, a paradigm is a theory, usually a classical book, the principles of which have not been disputed for a long time (for example, Aristotle’s Physics, Newton’s Principia), then in the second version, a paradigm is understood more generally. It is a set of rules that the scientific community follows to set problems. A paradigm is also an explanatory scheme, rules for interpreting results. Sometimes Kuhn replaces the concept of “paradigm” with others, for example, the concept of “disciplinary matrix”.
Thus, the philosophical content of Kuhn’s theory is that science is not considered as a process of knowledge accumulation, but rather as a set of methods for obtaining and interpreting it. Kuhn is more skeptical about progress than Popper, whose competitive struggle of theories still led to the survival of the best. The concept of a paradigm implies the idea of a complete absence of progress. However, it should be noted that Kuhn himself does not formulate this idea (Kuhn avoided radical conclusions and specifically indicated that he considered progress to be integral to science). However, he writes about the fundamental incomparability of paradigms, which makes their comparison for progressiveness meaningless. This idea will later be brought to its logical conclusion by Feyerabend. Since the paradigm becomes the basis for interpreting facts, each new paradigm considers itself better than the previous ones. It may seem that it includes them, becomes their extension, and that they are its “limiting cases” (this is how one usually speaks of the relationship between Newtonian mechanics and the theory of relativity: the first is a limiting case of the second). However, this is not necessarily so. Old paradigms could contain valuable ideas that the new one does not, imply the possibility of searching in directions that are closed in the new one. Kuhn’s theory contains the seeds of the relativistic philosophy of science that arose later.
It is curious that Kuhn’s theory became a typical paradigm for its followers, thereby partly confirming itself (even showing that paradigms exist not only in empirical science, but also in philosophy, which Kuhn did not write about), and partly refuting it, or more precisely limiting it (i.e. demonstrating that the doctrine of paradigms, being a paradigm itself, is just as limited as any paradigm, and necessarily implies alternatives to itself).
The real surname of Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) was Lipschitz. He was born in Budapest. He took the pseudonym Lakatos (in Hungarian “carpenter”), worked in the civil service, and was repressed on political charges. After leaving prison, he managed to emigrate to England in 1956, and he ended up with Popper, whose student he became.
Lakatos develops Popper’s idea of evolutionary epistemology, according to which falsified theories are replaced by others, which turn out to be unfalsified up to a certain point, and are then replaced by the next ones, etc. In this version, this scheme is progressivist, and the new trends of that time required an increased skepticism towards science. Moreover, after Kuhn, whose book was extremely richly illustrated with examples from the history of science, the philosophy of science increasingly moved from the construction of an ideal methodology to the analysis of the real practice and theory of science, and this reality does not correspond to Popper’s scheme. Therefore, Lakatos calls the first version of Popper’s theory “naive falsificationism”.
In a more sophisticated version, the same scheme (he also attributes its idea to Popper, but Popper did not develop it) looks like this. A developed scientific theory consists of a “hard core” and a “protective belt”. The hard core of the theory includes fundamental propositions for it, the falsification of which requires the rejection of the theory. The protective belt is formed from propositions and hypotheses accepted for the protection of the hard core ad hoc (Popper did not recognize such hypotheses). The protective belt, therefore, can change without changing the hard core; the hard core and the protective belt are methodologically heterogeneous.
Lakatos’ model is more complex than Popper’s. Therefore, he stops talking simply about theory and introduces the concept of a research program. Each program contains creative potential in its hard core – the prospect of setting problems and new original hypotheses (Lakatos calls it “positive heuristics”). In the process of setting and solving these new problems, some transformation of the program may be required, the need for which is assumed by the protective belt. In this way, some modification of the entire complex of the research program is carried out, moving it forward. Lakatos writes about the “positive shift of problems”, i.e. about the possibility of a research program to provide new empirical knowledge. It is precisely the possibility of a positive shift that distinguishes a well-functioning, productive research program. At the same time, the protective belt also consists of hypotheses introduced to protect the hard core from fatal falsifications; in essence, such hypotheses are not creative, they constitute a kind of ballast for the program (Lakatos calls this “negative heuristics”). When the proportion of negative heuristics exceeds the positive one, the program enters a state of stagnation and crisis. A “regressive shift of problems” occurs.
Lakatos’s next step in constructing his philosophy of science was to turn to the history of science. His theory of the history of science is formed in polemics with Kuhn, whose ideas Lakatos considers too irrationalistic. In reconstructing the history of science, he introduces two parts – internal and external, like two parts of a research program. The internal history of science consists of such a history of scientific ideas that can be rationally reconstructed on the basis of an analysis of the ideas themselves. External history includes “external” factors from the point of view of the logic of ideas – firstly, accidents, of which there are many in any history, including the history of science, and secondly, external influences on science, for example, from culture, politics, and so on.
Lakatos considers four types of philosophical platforms on the basis of which one can build both the philosophy of science and its history. At the same time, he points out that only that platform is good for constructing a philosophy of science that is effective in reconstructing its real history. These types are:
1. Inductivism (sometimes he uses the term “justificationism” in a similar meaning);
2. Conventionalism (the simplest of the suitable theories is selected);
3. Falsificationism (in a naive form);
4. His own methodology of research programs. It is easy to show, writes Lakatos, that the first three platforms are not suitable for reconstructing the real history of science, since science has never developed according to the laws of inductivism, or the laws of conventionalism, or according to the prescriptions of Popperian falsificationism. On the basis of the methodology of research programs, Lakatos believes, the history of science can be reconstructed. This methodology is more complex and therefore more flexible; it allows for numerous deviations from the path that retrospectively seems optimal, but at the same time does not declare non-optimal movement irrational. Lakatos’s historical method was made especially flexible by his distinction between the internal and external history of science; although the very concept of a research program is so realistic and flexible that it allows one to include in internal history what, under more rigid methodologies (especially inductivist), would inevitably have to be attributed to external history. For example, this is the case with the contradiction between what theory predicts and what is actually observed. From the point of view of the other three methodologies, the development by a scientist of a theory that allows for such contradictions must be declared irrational. But since the methodology of research programs distinguishes a rigid core and a protective belt in a theory, it can assign the contradiction to the area of the protective belt and quite rightly show that often a contradiction with the facts stimulates the development of a theory, promotes a “positive shift” in the program. Lakatos goes so far as to write: “Any theory is born in an ocean of contradictions,” and does not find this position to be contrary to rationality.
Lakatos wanted to create a theory of science that, on the one hand, would correspond to the canons of rationality in the broad sense of the word, i.e., would allow us to consider science as an instrument of knowledge, an approach to truth. In this he follows Popper. On the other hand, he strove to ensure that his theory of science, when applied to the reconstruction of the history of science, would not contradict reality. The reality of science is not simple. The solution proposed by Lakatos – to consider not scientific theories, but research programs – is difficult, in any case more difficult than the simplified models of many other philosophers of science. But, apparently, among all rational teachings on the essence of science, it can be considered optimal.
Although Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) was a contemporary of both Lakatos and Kuhn, his views on the theory of science are much closer to the ideology of postmodernism, with its characteristic skepticism about the knowledge of truth. They represent an attempt to bring to their logical conclusion those paths of thought that had been outlined before him. Unlike the thinkers considered earlier, Feyerabend is an antiscientist. He does not see the good in scientific and technological progress and is inclined to emphasize the evil that science and its application can bring with them, from environmental pollution to the expulsion of “prescientific” types of knowledge and the loss of those valuable ideas that they may have contained. He is a typical representative of the sixties, filled with rebellious sentiments in relation to everything that only allows a rebellious frame of mind. This position regarding the value of science enables him to criticize its weakness in the matter of knowing the truth more freely and mercilessly than his predecessors managed to do.
If Lakatos continued Popper’s line, Feyerabend continues Kuhn’s line. He takes from him the concept of paradigm – without tiring of criticizing this concept, but rejects any idea of the possibility of cognitive progress. He develops the idea of the fundamental incommensurability and incomparability of paradigms. Feyerabend gives many arguments in favor of such incomparability. For example, he points out, theories always have a reverse effect on observed facts (Popper also had this idea); in different theories even the same-looking terms receive different definitions; two theories do not have a common, so to speak, “substance” where they could meet for comparison. They can fight each other not with the help of arguments, since they are fundamentally incapable of understanding each other’s arguments. The field of their struggle is extra-scientific and extra-rational (for example, fashion). Feyerabend writes insightfully about the impossibility of creating a single and clear language for science, which was what the logical positivists were striving for. It is even possible, he notes, that an explicit definition changes the meaning of the word being defined. The meanings of words and sentences, including observation sentences, become even more different depending on different contexts, theoretical load, etc. (this idea already appeared in Popper).
As two principles by which the development of science can be described, Feyerabend proposes the principle of proliferation (multiplication) of hypotheses and the principle of persistence of theory. He agrees with Kuhn that there are periods of normal development of science and periods of revolution. Persistence of theory is characteristic of the former periods, proliferation of hypotheses – of the latter. Persistence, on the one hand, and proliferation – on the other – as a whole constitute a kind of dialectic. However, Feyerabend does not make this dialectic dependent on the agreement of theory with facts. He does not write, for example, that proliferation of hypotheses begins as a result of a crisis of theory, as a result of the fact that theory ceases to explain new observations, etc. The struggle of persistence with proliferations constitutes the inner essence of science. This is, so to speak, a game of scientific passions, which has no relation to the subject of knowledge. In this regard, Feyerabend’s appeal to the social implementation of science, to its organization from the point of view of the distribution of power, ideological influences, and so on, seems natural. Feyerabend first poses the question: what is science as a cultural, social and political phenomenon. He himself gives typically anti-scientist answers, for example, he writes: “Let us free society from the power of science, as our ancestors freed us from the power of the One True Religion.”
A large trend in empirical sociology—the sociology of science—is naturally included in this same line, which thinks of science as a social phenomenon, and not as an organ for comprehending truth, whose characteristics should be derived from its subject. The Kuhn-Feyerabend line—the sociology of science—derives the characteristics of science from the characteristics not of the subject of science, but of those who work in it and their communities.
The theories of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend were briefly reviewed above. They, of course, do not limit the list of thinkers who rethought classical philosophy of science in the middle and early second half of the 20th century.
Michael Polanyi (1981-1976) introduced the concept of “tacit knowledge,” which is always present in the work of a scientist and can significantly, but not explicitly, guide his thought.
Kurt Hübner (born 1921) focused on the issue of the closeness of scientific thinking to mythological thinking and the determinacy of science in each era by its cultural characteristics.
M. Foucault, who, admittedly, belonged to a different tradition and did not use the concepts of post-positivism, but was ideologically close to it, pointed out the close connection between knowledge and power, the dependence of science on its social organization, etc. Foucault showed this using the example of psychiatry (which is undoubtedly more advantageous than physics).
In the eighties, the critical intensity towards science diminished, and postpositivism as a whole movement faded away.
We have seen that postpositivism can be divided into two lines, one of which goes back to Popper, the other to Kuhn. Popper’s line is characterized by attention to epistemological questions, the absence of extreme skepticism, and a generally positive attitude toward such an enterprise of the human mind as scientific knowledge; an analysis of different types of rationality precisely as rationality. Therefore, the entire line can be conditionally called rationalistic. The line that Kuhn began eventually came to complete skepticism with respect to scientific knowledge. It studies science as a social or political enterprise, leaving almost no attention to the rationally reconstructed cognitive movement. From it emerged the modern sociology of science. Some of its representatives are characterized by anti-scientism. Very roughly, it can be called irrationalistic, although it must be borne in mind that in its methods this philosophy itself is in no way irrationalistic, this word here only means that it takes a more or less skeptical position with respect to scientific rationality.
Literature
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