{"id":615,"date":"2024-07-03T17:57:38","date_gmt":"2024-07-03T14:57:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/?p=615"},"modified":"2025-11-20T19:46:45","modified_gmt":"2025-11-20T16:46:45","slug":"immanuel-kant-the-spirit-of-critical-reflection-the-transcendental-turn-in-metaphysics-the-absolute-value-of-the-human-person","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/2024\/07\/03\/immanuel-kant-the-spirit-of-critical-reflection-the-transcendental-turn-in-metaphysics-the-absolute-value-of-the-human-person\/","title":{"rendered":"Immanuel Kant. The spirit of critical reflection, the transcendental turn in metaphysics, the absolute value of the human person"},"content":{"rendered":"

This chapter is dedicated to one of the most influential philosophers in the history of thought, Immanuel Kant, the man who instilled in European culture the spirit of critical reflection, carried out a transcendental turn in the metaphysics of the New Age, and proclaimed the \u201cabsolute value\u201d of the human personality. The impact of Kant\u2019s ideas is felt by anyone who has any understanding of philosophy.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Modern philosophy of mind, cognitive science, analytical philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism of the 20th century – these and other trends recognized their dependence on Kant’s ideas. And today, Kant’s influence is no longer connected with the teachings that were created under the impression of his system at the end of the 18th century. But in historical consideration, one cannot ignore the tradition formed by Kant, which is designated as “German classical idealism”. This is the accepted name for the totality of philosophical teachings of I. Kant, J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel. They are united by attention to the nature of the spirit, interpreted through the concepts of activity and freedom, including in historical terms. German classical idealism is sometimes attempted to be interpreted as an intellectual equivalent of the Great French Revolution. However, to no lesser extent, it can be considered the completion or development of the philosophy of the German Enlightenment of the 18th century.<\/span><\/p>\n

The eighteenth century was very favorable for Germany in philosophical terms, although at the beginning of the century it lagged noticeably behind England and France. There was almost no philosophical literature published in German, and there was no established terminology. A radical change in the situation was associated with the figure of\u00a0<\/span>Christian Wolff<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0(1679-1754). Wolff sensed the great speculative potential of the German language and carried out a global terminological reform. Possessing, in addition, an extraordinary systematic gift, he adapted the ideas of the great thinkers of the seventeenth century, Descartes and Leibniz, to the needs of university education. Wolff’s students – A. G. Baumgarten, F. Chr. Baumeister and others – created a number of classic textbooks, from which many generations of students learned the basics of modern European metaphysics. In the 20s – 40s of the 18th century, Wolffianism became the most influential philosophical movement in Germany. However, Wolff also had many opponents, among whom the so-called “eclectics” stood out. German philosophy of the Enlightenment developed in the clash between the Wolffians and the eclectics. The eclectics – Chr. Thomasius, J. F. Budde, J. G. Walch, Chr. A. Crusius, J. G. G. Feder, K. Meiners and others – combined theological commitment (mainly to the ideas of Pietism – a radical movement in Lutheranism) with a commitment to empirical methodology and “common sense”, from the position of which they attacked Wolff’s extravagant hypothesis of “pre-established harmony”, inherited by him from Leibniz.<\/span><\/p>\n

At first, the Wolffians fought off these attacks, but gradually the more “sound” theories of the eclectics began to prevail. From the 1850s, Wolff’s influence sharply declined. A period of uncertainty and relative balance between various schools began. At the same time, a boom in translation activity began in Germany. At the instigation of the Prussian King Friedrich II, who was carried away by the ideas of the Parisian enlighteners – Voltaire, Rousseau, La Mettrie and others, a fashion for materialism and freethinking arose. French thinkers, many of whom moved to Berlin and received posts in the Royal Academy of Sciences, propagated the theories of British philosophers – Locke, Hutcheson, Hume and others – in Germany.<\/span><\/p>\n

As a result, in the 1950s and 1960s, an environment exceptionally rich in philosophical ideas was formed in Germany, which could not help but become the basis for large-scale systemic constructions of the most diverse kinds. In the field of methodological research, J. G. Lambert, the author of the New Organon (1764), achieved particular success, and Johann Nicholas Tetens (1736-1807) created one of the most sophisticated treatises in the history of modern European metaphysics on the philosophy of consciousness and anthropology – Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its Development (1777). Trying to solve the riddle of consciousness in an analytical vein, Tetens came to the conclusion that it arises from the spontaneous activity of the soul when changing mental states. This creative activity is an exceptional feature of man. Its presence explains the emergence from feeling, in which it is also hiddenly present, of higher mental faculties, such as reason and free will. This activity is also manifested in people’s constant desire for development. Man, according to Tetens, can be defined as a being capable of perfection. The influence of Tetens’ ideas on subsequent thought was, however, not very great. The situation was different with Kant, who was influenced by Baumgarten, Crusius, Hume, Rousseau and other authors, but created an original teaching in which he was able to overcome the extremes of rationalistic and empiricist methodology and find a middle way between dogmatism and skepticism. The result of his constructive efforts was a majestic philosophical system that had a powerful impact on all of European metaphysics.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0was born in 1724 in K\u00f6nigsberg, where he lived his entire life. He was brought up in a poor family of craftsmen and received his primary education in a pietistic school with strict rules. In 1740, Kant entered the Albertina University. Here he became acquainted with the ideas of the eclectic Wolffian M. Knutzen, who instilled in him a love of science and a rejection of spiritualistic idealism. After completing his studies at the university and several years of home teaching, Kant returned to the academic path. Having defended several dissertations, he first became a privat-docent, and from 1770 – a professor of metaphysics. Although Kant did not shy away from social life and was known as a gallant man, over time he increasingly focused on purely philosophical problems. Teaching at the university also took a lot of his energy. Kant gave many lecture courses, from metaphysics and logic to physical geography and anthropology. In 1796, Kant stopped lecturing, but continued his scientific work almost until his death in 1804.<\/span>
\n[27]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Two periods are distinguished in Kant’s work: pre-critical (approximately until 1770) and critical. In the most general sense, the pre-critical period can be characterized as a time of Kant’s intensive search for promising directions in science and philosophy, and the critical period as a time of revolutionary discoveries and the creation of a holistic philosophical system.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pre-critical philosophy.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Already in his first book, Thoughts on the True Estimate of Living Forces (1749), Kant showed a desire to overcome the extremes of warring philosophical schools, as well as an interest in studying the essence of matter and space. In his early period, Kant considered space to be a dynamic environment that arises from the interaction of its constituent simple substances, provided that they have a common cause – God. This interpretation allowed for the relativization of the fundamental characteristics of space, such as the number of its dimensions. By changing the parameters of the interacting substances, Kant argued, space could have more dimensions than three.<\/span><\/p>\n

In addition to writing abstract philosophical treatises in the pre-critical (as well as in the critical) period, Kant also wrote more popular texts. Thus, he published several essays on the history of the Earth, the causes of earthquakes, etc. But the most famous work of the natural philosophy cycle was the General History and Theory of the Heavens, published in 1755. Here Kant paints a picture of the developing Universe, naturally forming from the chaos of matter under the influence of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Kant was sure that over time, order gradually displaces chaos. In the History of the Heavens, he also emphasizes that although the world is ordered only by natural laws, this does not mean that a scientist can do without the concept of God in its interpretation. After all, the natural laws themselves, which generate cosmic harmony, cannot be the result of chance and must be thought of as the creation of the Supreme Mind. Moreover, even sophisticated scientific methods, Kant believed, cannot explain the phenomenon of expediency in general and life in particular. Kant retained this conviction even during the critical period of his work, denying that the expediency of living beings can be interpreted without invoking the concept of a rational cause of nature – he was, as they say, a thinker of the pre-Darwinian era.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite Kant’s interest in natural philosophy and natural science, his focus was not on physics, but on metaphysics. Already in his early period, he deviated from the literal exposition of the Wolffian textbooks he used in his lectures and tried to find his own path in this science. More precisely, he believed that metaphysics had yet to become such. In order to give it rigor, he undertook a number of methodological studies. It is important that Kant did not share the opinion, widespread at that time, that metaphysics should become like mathematics in order to become a rigorous science. He argued that the methods of these sciences differ. Mathematics is constructive, metaphysics is analytical. The task of metaphysics is to reveal the elementary concepts of human thinking. And already in the pre-critical period, Kant repeatedly expressed the idea that a philosopher should avoid arbitrary fabrications in every possible way. In other words, an important problem of philosophy was the question of the limits of human knowledge. Kant states this in one of the central works of the pre-critical period, \u201cThe Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Explained by the Dreams of Metaphysics\u201d (1766), where he comes to the conclusion that the boundaries of knowledge generally coincide with the boundaries of experience. This thesis is the theoretical basis for his criticism of the Swedish mystic E. Swedenborg, to whom, in fact, \u201cThe Dreams of a Spirit-Seer\u201d is dedicated. Swedenborg boldly discussed the supersensible world and spoke of the existence of a special spiritual environment that ensures direct communication between souls. Kant undermined the foundations of such metaphysical fantasies.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, it would be wrong to interpret Kant\u2019s early philosophy exclusively in empiricist and skeptical tones. The \u201cskeptical method\u201d he took from Hume was only one of the research programs developed by Kant in the pre-critical period. In a number of works from this period, Kant appears before the reader in a completely different guise \u2013 as a thinker striving for supersensible heights and confident in their attainability. This refers primarily to the work of 1763, \u201cThe Only Possible Basis for Proving the Existence of God.\u201d While criticizing here the traditional arguments in favor of the existence of a supreme Being, Kant at the same time puts forward his own, \u201contological\u201d argument, based on the recognition of the necessity of some kind of existence (if nothing exists, then there is no material for things, and they are impossible; but the impossible is impossible, which means some kind of existence is necessary) and the identification of this primordial existence with God<\/span>
\n[28]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0. The \u201cdogmatic\u201d works of the pre-critical period also include \u201cAn Essay on Some Observations on Optimism\u201d (1759) and the 1770 dissertation \u201cOn the Form and Principles of the Sensually Perceived and Intelligible World.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

But if in the “Experience” Kant builds quite traditional schemes in the spirit of Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, then in the dissertation he discusses the knowability of the supersensible world from other positions, relying on the new theory of space and time that he developed in the late 60s. During this period, Kant rejected the relativistic theory of space that he had previously accepted, since he discovered that explaining space through the relationship of substances does not allow us to conceptualize such an important property of the latter as the difference between right and left (thus, right and left gloves can be completely identical in terms of the relationship of their parts, and yet differ from each other: a right glove cannot be put on a left hand). This phenomenon of \u201cincongruent similarities\u201d, recorded in his 1768 work \u201cOn the First Ground of the Distinction of Sides in Space\u201d, forced Kant to accept the concept of absolute space, although Newton\u2019s interpretation of such space as a receptacle of things, possessing an independent reality, always seemed absurd to him. And already in 1769 Kant found a way to get rid of this mysterious entity. The essence of Kant\u2019s solution, which is set out in his dissertation of 1770, is that absolute space can be interpreted in a subjective sense, i.e. as a subjective condition of human perception of external influences, independent of things, or an a priori form of sensory contemplation. By analogy with space, Kant rethought time, which also turned out to be an a priori form of sensuality, only in the case of time we are talking not about the external, but about the internal feeling. With this understanding, immediate spatio-temporal objects of the senses were deprived of an independent, i.e., independent of the perceiving subject, existence and were called “phenomena.” Things, as they exist independently of us, “in themselves,” were called “noumena” by Kant in order to emphasize their non-sensory, “intelligible” character.<\/span><\/p>\n

This concept was later designated by Kant as transcendental idealism. One of its consequences is the methodological conclusion about the inadmissibility of mixing sensory and rational concepts. After all, the very possibility of thinking about things in themselves testifies that the ability to think (reason) is not limited in its application to the world of sensory phenomena. Attempts to equalize the areas of application of sensory and rational concepts, as, for example, occurs in the statement \u201ceverything that exists, exists somewhere and sometime\u201d<\/span>
\n[29]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0, are, Kant said, the main cause of metaphysical errors. Kant defended a similar thesis during the critical period, but in a different context. In 1770, he believed that a person can not only think, but also know things in themselves, i.e., think them with the awareness of the objective truth of these thoughts. Ten years later, when he published the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, second revised edition 1787), his position changed radically. Now Kant argued that man is capable of knowing only phenomena, but not things in themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

Transition to criticism.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The transformation of Kant’s position was connected with the “awakening from dogmatic sleep” that occurred in 1771 under the influence of Gamov’s denial of the demonstrability of the law of causality – “every change has a cause”. Kant believed that from the thesis of the unprovability of this principle, Hume concluded that the latter had an illegitimate origin from experience and habit (experience, due to its incompleteness, cannot legitimately verify a position in which some necessary or universal connection is asserted). Such a decision could have sensualized the concept of cause and other rational concepts, essentially erasing the line between sensuality and thinking. In order to preserve the fundamental difference between sensual and rational ideas, Kant, who agreed with the logic of this Humeian argument, had to demonstrate that the law of causality could nevertheless be proven.<\/span><\/p>\n

Faced with the need to prove the thesis that \u201cevery change has a cause,\u201d Kant first of all expanded his task by including other similar principles, such as the law of the constancy of matter, in the circle of principles to be proven, and then defined the general strategy for his actions in such cases. He came to the conclusion that one can be convinced of the truth of such laws only by showing a priori that they act as subjective principles that actively shape things. But these things cannot be noumena, things in themselves, by their very definition independent of human cognitive abilities. If human reason can bring form to some objects, then they can only be phenomena, subjective occurrences. But does reason really bring its laws to the world of phenomena? Confirmation of this thesis required the greatest efforts from Kant during the period of preparation of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d which is called his \u201cdecade of silence.\u201d The decisive link \u2013 the doctrine of the unity of apperception \u2013 was found by Kant in 1775, which was reflected in the puzzling manuscripts of the so-called \u201cDuisburg archive\u201d (4: 36 \u2013 56). The final text of the \u201cCritique\u201d was created by Kant in \u201c4\u20135 months\u201d in 1780.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most famous works in the history of world philosophy, forms the first part of Kant’s critical system, namely the so-called “theoretical philosophy” that answers the question “what can I know?” “Practical philosophy” and the philosophy of religion that continues it, set forth by Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and other works, answer two other questions that are inevitable for any person: “what should I do?” and “what can I hope for?” The role of a connecting link between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason is played by the Critique of Judgment (1790). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant constructs a system of principles of pure reason that coincide with the laws of nature as a world of phenomena. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he discusses the foundations of morality and the noumenal freedom of the human will as a condition of moral consciousness. The Critique of Judgment builds bridges between the world of nature and the world of freedom through an analysis of the concept of purposefulness.<\/span><\/p>\n

The three fundamental questions of philosophy<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0can, Kant argues, be reduced to a single problem: “What is man?” It should not be forgotten, however, that man, according to Kant, can be studied in different ways. He can be studied by empirical methods, observing the manifestations of human nature in different eras and in different cultures and paying attention to the possibilities of improving man in general and his various abilities in particular. Such a method is characteristic of anthropology, and the results of such studies were published by Kant in “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View” (1798), the text of which is based on the notes of lectures on anthropology that Kant gave at the University of K\u00f6nigsberg from the beginning of the 70s. Another way of studying man is based not on experience, but on philosophical reflection, and it allows us to identify a priori forms of three basic human abilities, namely the ability to know, desire, and the so-called ability to enjoy-displeasure. This approach to man can also be called anthropology, but it will be a special, \u201ctranscendental\u201d<\/span>
\n[30]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0anthropology. Its theses are developed in detail in Kant\u2019s three \u201cCritiques.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

It is important, however, to note that Kant’s system of critical philosophy is in any case not limited to the “Critiques”. They are considered by Kant as a kind of preparatory works, preceding a more objectively oriented presentation of the material with an analysis of the basic human abilities. Thus, the criticism of the theoretical ability of man should be continued by the metaphysics of nature, and the practical – by the metaphysics of morals<\/span>
\n[31]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0. Kant actually created not only the “critical”, but also the “dogmatic”, applied parts of his philosophy, having published “The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science” (1786) and “The Metaphysics of Morals” (1797). However, a sharp opposition of the applied and critical parts of Kant’s philosophy is meaningless, since his three “Critiques” already contain the outlines of these applied parts. As for the Critique of Pure Reason, it contains the outlines of the entire system of criticism in general and, in particular, of the two remaining Critiques, which is explained by the fact that at first Kant planned to limit himself to this work.<\/span><\/p>\n

Theoretical philosophy.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0If we consider the Critique of Pure Reason, analyzing only the elements of theoretical philosophy, we can say that this work combines two epistemological projects: 1) a negative program of limiting human knowledge to the sphere of possible experience, objects of the senses, and 2) a positive program of substantiating the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge in this sphere. Kant was sure that these parts of his \u201ctranscendental philosophy\u201d are interconnected. It has already been shown above why he held this opinion. In general, a historical, or genetic, approach to the analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason allows us to better understand the structure of this work and solve many of its mysteries. After all, in the text of the Critique, Kant does not always put in the foreground those arguments that led to the formation of his views, and this can sometimes disorient the reader<\/span>
\n[32]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0.<\/span><\/p>\n

The focus of the negative and positive programs of the Critique of Pure Reason is its main question: \u201cHow are synthetic judgments a priori possible?\u201d (3: 64). Behind this \u201cschool\u201d formulation (Kant calls synthetic judgments judgments in which a predicate is added to the subject from the outside, as in the judgment \u201cbodies have weight\u201d; they are opposed to analytical judgments that explicate the content of the subject, as in the judgment \u201cbodies are extended\u201d) lies the following problem: how can one reliably, i.e. with due universality and necessity (criteria of the a priori), learn something about things that are not given or have not yet been given to us in sensory experience? Kant was sure that such knowledge exists. As an example, he cited the provisions of pure mathematics, to which all objects that can be encountered in the senses obviously correspond, as well as the principles of \u201cgeneral natural science\u201d, such as the law of causality – \u201call changes have a cause\u201d. But how can man anticipate what is not yet given to him? In other words, \u201chow is pure mathematics possible?\u201d, \u201chow is pure natural science possible?\u201d and, finally, \u201chow is metaphysics possible as a science?\u201d (3: 65-66).<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant argued that sciences containing a priori synthetic knowledge, and this knowledge itself, are possible only if human cognitive abilities somehow determine things. This view of the problem, which contradicts the “appearance” that our concepts of the world are, on the contrary, formed by things, Kant himself called the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy (3: 35, 38). It is clear, however, that man is not the creator of things. Therefore, if he can determine them, then only from the formal side, and only those of them that can be given to him in experience are related to his perception.<\/span><\/p>\n

Things, insofar as they relate to human experience, Kant, as already noted, calls phenomena or appearances. They are opposed to things in themselves. Since man cannot form things in themselves, their a priori knowledge is impossible. They are not given in experience either. Therefore, Kant concludes that such things are unknowable. Nevertheless, he admits their existence, since something must appear in phenomena. Things in themselves \u201caffect\u201d our sensuality (Sinnlichkeit), being the source of the \u201cmaterial\u201d side of phenomena. The forms of phenomena are introduced by us ourselves. They are a priori. Kant distinguishes two such forms – space and time. Space is the form of \u201cexternal sense\u201d, time – \u201cinternal\u201d. Inner sense is connected with the external, Kant believed, and is impossible without it. The sequence of our internal states, be they thoughts, sensations or desires, can be perceived only by relating them to some unchanging background, namely, objects in space, matter<\/span>
\n[33]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0. But the external sense cannot function without the internal one, since the constancy of spatial objects, the coexistence of their parts and the sequence of their changes are incomprehensible outside of temporal characteristics.<\/span><\/p>\n

The idea that time and, especially, space do not exist independently of the subject seems very strange. Kant, however, insists that if time and space were not a priori forms of sensibility, an apodictic exposition of their properties in geometry and arithmetic would be impossible. They would have to be empirical sciences, but such disciplines cannot contain a priori synthetic knowledge. Arithmetic and geometry, however, contain them in abundance.<\/span><\/p>\n

The sciences of the forms and laws of sensory contemplation, however, do not exhaust all aspects of human cognition. Knowledge can be not only contemplative, but also discursive. And any real perception already presupposes: 1) the givenness of the object in sensory experience, 2) awareness of this object. Consciousness has no relation to sensuality and contemplation. Feelings are passive, and consciousness is a spontaneous action. Kant showed that any act of consciousness that can be expressed by the formula \u201cI think [something]\u201d presupposes reflection, self-awareness, revealing to us a single and identical I, the only unchanging thing in the flow of ideas.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant, however, refuses to call this I a substance. Such an I would be a thing in itself, and these are incomprehensible. The I is only a form of thought, the unity of self-consciousness, or “apperception.” Nevertheless, the I turns out to be for Kant the deepest source of spontaneous activity, the basis of the “higher cognitive faculties.” The most important of these faculties is the understanding (Verstand). Its main function is judgment. Judgment is impossible without concepts. But any concept, for example, “man,” contains rules by which one can determine whether a particular object fits the given concept or not. Therefore, Kant defines the understanding as the ability to create rules. Human understanding, like sensibility with its a priori forms, contains a priori rules, “fundamentals.” Fundamentals follow from the elementary concepts of the understanding – categories, which, in turn, arise from the logical functions of judgments, such as the conjunction “if-then,” “either-or,” etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant systematizes the categories in a special table, parallel to the table of judgments, which he borrowed from logic<\/span>
\n[34]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0. He distinguishes four groups of categories – quantity, quality, relation and modality, each of which contains three categories – 1) unity, plurality, totality, 2) reality, negation, limitation, 3) substance – accident, cause – action, interaction, 4) possibility – impossibility, existence – non-existence, necessity – chance. The third category in each of the groups can be interpreted as a synthesis (but not a simple sum) of the first two. Kant, however, insisted that other categories (primarily the categories of relation) are also associated with synthetic activity. It is through categories that the manifold of the senses is brought by the “productive imagination” under the “transcendental unity of apperception”, the pure I, with which all our ideas are correlated. If phenomena were not subject to categories, these phenomena could not be consciously perceived by us. Therefore, if space and time constitute the conditions of the possibility of phenomena in general, then categories contain the conditions of the possibility of perceived phenomena – other phenomena, Kant argued, are nothing for us, and since in themselves they are devoid of reality, then \u201cunperceived phenomena\u201d are nothing more than an abstraction.<\/span><\/p>\n

Phenomena thus correspond to categories. But some kind of mediation is indispensable here. After all, categories in themselves, as a priori concepts of the understanding, are not homogeneous with phenomena as empirical objects of sensory intuition. And if they are to be applied to phenomena, they must be translated into the language of sensibility. This translation is accomplished with the help of the \u201cschematism\u201d of pure concepts of the understanding, a mechanism in which the decisive role is played by the imagination, a faculty that occupies an intermediate position between the understanding and sensibility – sensuous in form, it is active, like the understanding. Kant calls a schema \u201cthe idea of \u200b\u200ba general device of the faculty of imagination, which supplies a concept with an image\u201d (3: 177-178). Unlike an image, in which a single object is always represented, a schema contains general rules for the synthesis of the manifold in intuition. They differ from pure rational rules in their temporal character. It is through the forms of time that the sensory interpretation of categories occurs. The scheme of categories of quantity turns out to be number as the unity of a consistent \u201csynthesis of a diverse homogeneous representation in general\u201d, the scheme of categories of quality is the representation of the degree of time\u2019s fullness, the scheme of substance is \u201cthe constancy of the real in time\u201d, the scheme of cause is \u201cthe real, after which\u2026 some other real always follows\u201d, the scheme of interaction is \u201cthe coexistence of determinations of one substance with determinations of another substance according to a general rule\u201d (3: 179\u2013180). Kant declares the scheme of the category of possibility to be \u201cthe agreement of the synthesis of various representations with the conditions of time in general\u201d, reality is \u201cexistence at a certain time\u201d, necessity is \u201cexistence at all time\u201d (3: 180).<\/span><\/p>\n

The category schemes give \u201cobjective reality\u201d to these rational concepts and at the same time limit the scope of their cognitive significance to phenomena. On the basis of these schemes, Kant formulates the fundamental principles of pure understanding: \u201call intuitions are extensive quantities,\u201d \u201cin all phenomena the real \u2026 has an intensive quantity,\u201d \u201cwith every change of phenomena \u2026 the quantity of substance in nature neither increases nor decreases,\u201d \u201call changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect\u201d (3: 191, 195, 205, 210), etc. They can be considered as a priori laws of nature, which form the basis of general or pure natural science, laws which the human understanding (through the mediation of the unconscious activity of the transcendental productive imagination) brings into the world of phenomena, in order to then again, this time consciously, read them out of nature. In cognizing nature, man always presupposes these laws in it. Therefore, knowledge is impossible without the interaction of the senses and the understanding. Without reason, Kant wrote, sensory contemplations are blind, and rational concepts, deprived of sensory content, are empty. And yet, according to Kant, man is not satisfied with the world of sensory experience and wants to penetrate to the supersensory foundations of phenomena, to answer questions about free will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this direction he is drawn by reason (Vernunft). Reason grows out of the intellect and is interpreted by Kant as the \u201cfaculty of principles,\u201d the ability to think the unconditional and ultimate. In a certain sense, reason, striving to comprehend the first principles, is a philosophical faculty, since philosophy, at least \u201cfirst philosophy,\u201d or metaphysics, has always been concerned with the principles of being. And it was not by chance that Kant said that all people, as rational beings, have a natural inclination toward metaphysics.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reason has a logical and a real function. In the “logical” function it is the faculty of inference, i.e. a priori conclusions from general premises; in the real function it is used for cognition or creation of objects. In other words, reason allows for theoretical and practical application. The theoretical application of reason is, according to Kant, regulative and constitutive, and only the regulative application is legitimate, when we look at the world “as if” (als ob) it corresponded to reason. The constitutive application of reason would presuppose the possibility of demonstrative correlation of its a priori concepts with things.<\/span><\/p>\n

A priori and necessary concepts of reason, to which no object can be given in experience, Kant calls “ideas of pure reason”. From the three main types of inferences, categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive, Kant deduces three classes of ideas – soul, world and God (transcendental ideal). Kant does not deny that these ideas are a natural product of reason. But he does not believe that they can be sources of objective knowledge. They only push the mind to an ever deeper penetration into nature. The attempt to put real objects in correspondence with them fails. In the \u201cdialectical\u201d section of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d (which reveals the \u201cillusory nature of transcendental<\/span>
\n[35]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0judgments\u201d and follows \u201ctranscendental aesthetics,\u201d where the doctrine of sensibility is set forth, and \u201ctranscendental analytics\u201d \u2013 about the understanding), Kant consistently destroys the traditional metaphysical disciplines about the supersensible, which exactly correspond to the rubrication of the ideas of pure reason, namely, rational psychology, rational cosmology (the doctrine of the world as a whole) and natural theology.<\/span><\/p>\n

Critique of the Metaphysical Sciences.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0According to Kant, the main error of rational psychology, which claims to understand the essence of the soul, is the inadmissible confusion of the thinking I with the I as a thing in itself and the transfer of analytical conclusions about the former (namely, the conclusion about the substantiality, simplicity and unity of apperception) to the latter. Kant calls this confusion a paralogism of pure reason. Kant argues that efforts to demonstrate the existence of God are also devoid of any theoretical perspectives. The existence of God can be proven a priori or a posteriori. A posteriori proof can act as a cosmological and physico-theological argument. The cosmological proof of the existence of God starts from any fact of accidental existence (i.e. from the existence of a thing that may not exist) and goes back to the first cause, which is endowed with the status of necessary being. Then the conclusion is drawn that this necessary being is at the same time an all-perfect being, i.e. God. The physico-theological argument does not proceed from existence in general, but from a specific existence, which may include such a parameter as expediency. The expediency of nature forces us to admit the presence of some rational cause, which is declared by God. According to Kant, a posteriori proofs of the existence of God are obviously unacceptable, since one cannot reliably conclude from the properties of finite things found in the world about the infinite attributes of God. In particular, the physico-theological proof at best allows us to speak of the existence of an Architect, but not of an infinitely perfect Creator of the world. In reality, even this conclusion is only a subjective judgment, conditioned, according to Kant, by our inability to think differently about the causes of natural expediency. The situation is even worse with the cosmological argument. It is based on the abuse of the concept of cause, which can be correctly applied only in sensory experience. But the main thing, according to Kant, is that there are insufficient grounds for the transition from the concept of the necessary to the concept of an all-perfect being.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the a priori proof of the existence of God, the so-called “ontological argument”, cannot be successful either. It is based on an analysis of the concept of God as an all-perfect being, which, it is claimed, must contain the predicate of extra-mental existence: otherwise it will lack one of the perfections. Kant, however, declares that “being is not a real predicate” (3: 469). By saying that a thing exists, we do not add new content to its concept, but only assert that this concept corresponds to a real object. Therefore, the absence of the predicate of being in the concept of God would not be evidence of the incompleteness of the idea of \u200b\u200bthe divine essence, on the assumption of which, however, the entire ontological proof was based.<\/span><\/p>\n

No lesser problems await the human mind in attempting to understand the fundamental principles of the natural world, to understand whether it has a beginning in time and boundaries in space, whether matter consists of genuine atoms or is divisible to infinity, whether the course of nature allows for causeless events, and whether there are necessary things in the world or outside it. In considering all these questions, the mind becomes entangled in contradictions. It sees equal grounds for opposite conclusions, for the conclusions that the world is limited and that it is infinite, that matter is divisible to infinity and that there is a limit to division, etc. Kant calls such a state of internal duality of the mind “antinomy.” Antinomy threatens to destroy the mind, and it may well awaken the philosopher from his “dogmatic sleep.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant resolves the antinomy of pure reason by referring to the conclusions of transcendental aesthetics: since the natural world is only a phenomenon and not a thing in itself, it has no independent reality. Therefore, it is meaningless to say, for example, that it is infinite, as well as to look for its strictly defined boundaries. The same situation is with the divisibility of matter. Understanding the duality of being into things in themselves and phenomena in the other two cases allows us to distribute the theses and antitheses of the antinomy across different spheres of being. For example, the fact that the world of phenomena is subject to the law of natural causality does not mean that uncaused, i.e. spontaneous, or free, events are impossible. Freedom can exist in the noumenal world, the world of things in themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

Practical philosophy.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The reality of freedom, however, cannot be demonstrated by theoretical means. However, Kant shows that it is inevitable as a practical assumption. The fact is that freedom is a necessary condition of the “moral law”, the existence of which cannot be doubted. Kant examines these issues in detail in the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” (1785), “Critique of Practical Reason”, “Metaphysics of Morals” and other works.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant connects the concept of morality with unconditional duty, i.e. with situations when we are aware that we must act in such and such a way, simply because it is necessary, and not for any other reasons. As unconditional, moral requirements arise from reason, only not theoretical, but \u201cpractical\u201d, determining the will. The human will does not automatically follow moral prescriptions (it is not \u201choly\u201d), just as things follow the laws of nature. These prescriptions act for it as a \u201ccategorical imperative\u201d, i.e. an unconditional requirement<\/span>
\n[36]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0. The unconditional nature of the \u201ccategorical imperative\u201d, expressing the moral law, determines the selflessness of moral motives and their independence from egoistic aspirations, \u201csensual inclinations\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

The autonomy of good will also means that man can always act in accordance with duty. This is why Kant connects the moral law and freedom. Human will is not subject to the mechanism of sensual motivation and can act contrary to it. This conclusion forces Kant to transfer the source of moral actions, i.e. free will, to the realm of noumenal existence. Man is free not as a natural, but as a noumenal being. Many authors believe that such an interpretation, somewhat obscured by Kant’s distinction between “practical” (or psychological) and “transcendental” freedom, is highly problematic.<\/span><\/p>\n

First of all, if free actions have a basis in the noumenal world, and themselves belong to the world of phenomena, where everything is conditioned by phenomenal causes, in particular, sensory inclinations, then it is not very clear how one can talk about the reality of such actions at all. Not only can any such action be explained by sensory inclinations and other natural causes, it turns out that it will actually be committed under their influence. After all, if noumenal freedom could nevertheless break through into the world of phenomena, then the law of natural causality would be violated, but Kant proves that this law is immutable. But then he would have to admit the illusory nature of freedom and morality or assert: we are aware that we must act according to the moral law, but we cannot do this. Kant, however, is sure that if we must do something, we can do it. And we are faced with an obvious contradiction: we can and at the same time cannot behave as free beings. Of course, Kant does not avoid this difficulty. On the contrary, he emphasizes it in every possible way and tries to find a solution in distinguishing between the \u201cintelligible\u201d and \u201cempirical\u201d nature of man.<\/span><\/p>\n

Empirical character is the totality of natural causal connections that form the phenomenal life of an individual. Intelligible character expresses the noumenal side of human life, revealing him as a free being. Kant argues that noumenal freedom and phenomenal necessity can be combined under the assumption that a person\u2019s free choice, made at the noumenal level, is precisely what forms his empirical character. Although all of this person\u2019s actions are naturally determined, the laws and nature of this determination are determined by his free choice. Kant placed serious hopes on this solution, although he agreed that it cannot fully satisfy our reason. After all, the thesis about the free formation of its own phenomenal life by the noumenal I gives rise to many new difficulties. In particular, it is not entirely clear when this phenomenologization of the noumenon occurs and whether it is possible to reshape the empirical character. Apparently not \u2014 the created natural causes determine it once and for all. This means that man makes an initial choice in favor of good or evil at the moment of his appearance in the world, and does so, apparently, without yet possessing self-consciousness. Some of Kant’s statements indicate that he was inclined precisely to this interpretation (1: 3, 551). But it is obvious that free choice must be conscious. In addition, man as a phenomenal being does not live in isolation from the world and other people endowed with their own empirical characters. And if we assume that he freely forms his empirical Self, subject to natural causality and interacting with his environment, then it turns out that something like a pre-established harmony must exist between people. Kant always had an extremely negative attitude to this concept, believing that it means the end of any philosophy. And yet objective necessity pushed him to use it, although it ultimately does not help, since the pre-established harmony can only be arranged by God, who, therefore, decides questions of \u201cfree choice\u201d himself – it is clear that in this case there is no free choice left. Thus, it seems that there is simply no consistent way out of the situation under discussion. And at times Kant himself expressed himself in the spirit that the mentioned difficulties are \u201cinsoluble\u201d (4: 93). But the inconsistency of Kant’s concept in this case may rather speak in Kant’s favor. After all, a contradiction is bad because \u201canything you like\u201d follows from it. But this formula expresses the very essence of freedom. And although this does not at all mean that the concept of freedom is necessarily contradictory, at least its inconsistency does not seem unnatural. Therefore, the best theory of freedom could be considered the one in which it is most convincingly shown that this concept is fraught with contradictions. To do this, it would be necessary to demonstrate the exhaustion of all means of its consistent interpretation.And although Kant did not express this position with all directness, his desire not to hide, but, on the contrary, to maximally reveal the difficulties and problems of his own theory, meant that he was ready to recognize the illogicality of the concept of freedom.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant’s doctrine of freedom is, in a sense, the culmination of modern European philosophy of man. If he is right, then the very existence of people is equated with a miracle. Some philosophers have picked up on this intuition, calling for us to look at even our everyday life as a truly amazing phenomenon. But Kant’s doctrine can also be looked at from another angle. In the end, the contradictions found in his system of views on freedom may indicate the troubles of this system itself, and not the fundamental incomprehensibility of the concept of freedom. However, Kant’s ethics, of course, is not limited to an analysis of this concept. After all, freedom is only a prerequisite for morality.<\/span><\/p>\n

Man is always free, but he becomes moral only if he follows the categorical imperative: “Act so that the maxim of your will may at all times also have the force of a principle of universal legislation” (1:3, 349). The abstract nature of this famous formulation is due to the fact that no meaningful, sensory moments should be mixed with the moral law as a product of pure practical reason. However, it is not difficult to apply it to specific cases. To do this, it is enough to imagine whether the planned action can be a universal law of human behavior without denying itself. For example, the universal failure to repay a debt will eliminate the very concept of lending money. Such an action, therefore, is immoral. True, Kant emphasized that even if an action does not deny itself as a universal principle, this does not mean that it is moral. For example, if a person does not develop his abilities, but decides to \u201cspend his life only on amusements, idleness, and reproduction,\u201d then although such a course of action, according to Kant, is immoral, \u201cnature could still exist according to such a universal law\u201d (1:3, 149). Therefore, an additional, clarifying question is needed here: would I like the act or the maxim from which it follows to become the principle or form of universal legislation? Such clarification brings Kant\u2019s formulation of the moral law closer to the \u201cgolden rule of morality\u201d: do unto others as you would have them do unto you (or, in the negative form, \u201cwhat you do not want for yourself, do not do to others\u201d). It should be noted, however, that Kant did not identify them and said that this rule is merely a consequence of the moral law, obtained under certain restrictions. And indeed, Kant’s moral law allows for the following reformulation: act as you would have people act towards one another. This version lacks the “egoistic” nuances that are obvious in the “golden rule”<\/span>
\n[37]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0, which are unacceptable to Kant, and desire in this case follows from the nature of man as a rational being in general (see 1: 3, 151).<\/span><\/p>\n

However, it is not reason as such that gives a person immediate moral guidelines, but moral feeling, the only feeling that, as Kant says, we know completely a priori. This feeling arises when practical reason suppresses sensual inclinations and at first seems negative, but then acquires a positive character. However, pure pleasure from fulfilling a duty is not a motive for doing good deeds. If this were so, they would lose their selflessness and would be no different from outwardly similar \u201clegal\u201d actions, which do not coincide with them due to egoistic motivation.<\/span><\/p>\n

In any case, Kantian ethics is far from the abstraction for which it has sometimes been reproached. Kant is not a supporter of ascetic morality. On the contrary, he affirms the right of man to satisfy his sensual inclinations, i.e., to happiness. But man must be worthy of happiness, and dignity consists only in a moral way of thinking. The \u201chighest good\u201d thus turns out to be the unity of virtue and happiness, and moral attitude and behavior have priority over the desire for happiness, which should be a reward for virtue. However, in our world, there is no direct or natural connection between virtue and happiness. Therefore, we must admit the existence of God, who in our afterlife will reconcile one with the other.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ethicotheology.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Thus, Kant recognizes the possibility of constructing an ethicotheology that replaces traditional \u201cnatural theology.\u201d It should be borne in mind, however, that ethicotheology does not prove the existence of God, but the necessity of faith in God to support a moral way of thinking. In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Kant argued that only such \u201cmoral faith\u201d can be the basis of a \u201ctrue religion.\u201d Ideally, this religion of reason, which, according to Kant, is most closely related to Christianity, should displace all \u201cstatutory,\u201d \u201crevealed\u201d forms of religious life. However, the latter can peacefully coexist with moral faith and even strengthen it, but should not be considered the basis of worship. The latter is achieved only by good intentions. External rituals, prayer, and other similar actions have no independent meaning and can be useful only as a means of reviving a moral way of thinking.<\/span><\/p>\n

The need for external incentives to fulfill moral duty, Kant believed, is connected with the depravity of human will, the original desire to evade the good. Overcoming the latter is unthinkable without divine grace, which, however, remains an insoluble riddle for the human mind, since it contradicts the person’s awareness of the need to independently make a choice in favor of following duty.<\/span><\/p>\n

The assumption of the possibility of making an independent choice, i.e. absolute freedom of will, is, according to Kant, the first postulate of practical reason. He recognizes the other two postulates as the theses on the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (faith in which stems from the necessity of perfecting the soul, which can continue ad infinitum). The word “postulate” should emphasize that these assumptions are not equivalent to complete theoretical certainty for Kant. And Kant maintains that the absence of knowledge about the existence of God and immortality, in exchange for which man has only faith or hope, allows one to save the selflessness of duty and the freedom of the individual. Complete knowledge would force people to behave in a certain way, “their behavior would turn into a simple mechanism where, like in a puppet show, everyone gesticulates well, but there is no life in the figures.” In this case, “the moral value of actions would cease to exist, to which alone the entire value of the individual and even the value of the world in the eyes of the highest wisdom is reduced” (1:3, 693).<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, freedom can manifest itself only in a state of cognitive uncertainty, and the condition for the existence of a moral personality is the limitation of human knowledge. Kant declares the moral personality of man to be the highest value of being, since only thanks to it in this world of finite entities is something unconditional or absolute discovered, something that can no longer be a means for something else, but can only be a goal. That is why man, as an end in himself<\/span>
\n[38]<\/span><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0, is the main theme of philosophy, revealing the various types of ero spontaneous activity. In addition to the spontaneity of pure reason as the basis of cognitive activity and freedom as the basis of morality, Kant also explores creativity in the narrow sense of the word.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant examines\u00a0<\/span>artistic creativity<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0in his Critique of Judgment. However, this work has a broader meaning. It is devoted to the study of various forms of expediency, a concept that links nature and freedom. Relating to nature from the side of its object, the concept of expediency at the same time points to the rational source of this objective content, and therefore to freedom. Objective expediency is illustrated by Kant with biological organisms, while subjective expediency is manifested in the harmonious interaction of the cognitive powers of the soul that arises during the perception of beauty. Thus, Kant connects the concept of subjective expediency with the functioning of the ability to enjoy and displease, which he declares to be one of the three main powers of the soul. Aesthetic pleasures as one of the manifestations of this ability are also correlated with the action of the “reflective” ability to judge. In contrast to the “defining” faculty of judgment, which enables particular facts to be brought under general principles (it cannot be learned, and in its developed state it is called intelligence), the reflective faculty of judgment aims to find universal conceptual structures hidden behind the individual data of the sensory world. If this process is initiated by works of art, which presuppose a certain design, but of such a kind that it cannot be proven with mathematical rigor (the so-called expediency without a goal), a free play of imagination and reason begins in the soul, giving rise to the experience of beauty, and the judgments themselves become “judgments of taste.” Similar judgments can also be made regarding expedient products of nature, the purpose of which is even more hidden from us.<\/span><\/p>\n

Judgments of taste are isomorphic to moral judgments: they are just as disinterested, necessary and universal (though subjectively). Therefore, for Kant, the beautiful is a symbol of the good. The beautiful must not be confused with the pleasant, which is entirely subjective and accidental. Kant also distinguishes from the sense of the beautiful the sense of the sublime, which grows out of the awareness of the insignificance of people as physical beings in the face of the immensity of the world or the power of its elements, which, however, emphasizes the moral greatness of man, the experience of which is transferred to objects. Kant’s famous phrase about admiration for the starry sky above me and the moral law within me is nothing other than an illustration of the origin of this feeling.<\/span><\/p>\n

The concept of genius also plays an important role in Kant’s aesthetics. Its first quality, Kant asserts, “must be originality” (1: 4, 411). Genius is the ability to create new rules, which is revealed in the unity of his conscious and unconscious activity. In the creative process, the artist seems to surrender to the power of natural forces and outgrows his rational plans, which are always inevitably limited. In sensory images, he embodies “aesthetic ideas” that cannot be exhausted by any concept and which provide endless reasons for the harmonious interaction of reason and imagination.<\/span><\/p>\n

Social philosophy.<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The creative nature of man is revealed not only at the individual level, but also at the social level. Man, according to Kant, turns out to be the creator of an entire artificial world, the world of culture. In his later works, Kant often addressed the topic of social progress. He believed that society as a whole, like individuals, is aimed at improvement. However, if moral motives play a decisive role in the improvement of individuals, then society develops naturally. According to Kant, people are naturally characterized by the so-called “uncommunicative sociability” (ungesellige Geselligkeit), i.e., on the one hand, they have a tendency to communicate, and on the other, “a strong tendency to retire (isolate) … the desire to conform everything only to one’s own understanding” (1:1, 91). These qualities give rise to antagonism and competition between people, in the process of which their natural inclinations develop, the main of which is their reason and intelligence. Gradually, these abilities develop in the general mass to such an extent that people find the courage to reject external guidance from religious and other mentors and decide to use their minds independently – the Age of Enlightenment begins, the main motto of which is precisely the call for independent thinking. A necessary condition for the enlightened state of humanity is the recognition of the universal value of freedom of speech and other individual rights. These rights can be fully realized only in a “universal legal civil society”. In such a society, the most favorable conditions are created for the disclosure of the individual’s natural inclinations. The freedom of some members of society can be limited here only by the freedom of others. Wars and international conflicts prove to be an obstacle to the creation of a universal legal civil society. Kant, however, anticipates the establishment of “eternal peace”, a reliable guarantee of which can be the creation of a worldwide federal state.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant’s critical philosophy evoked many responses. At first, many complained about the obscurity of Kant’s language and the scholasticism of his terminology. Then came the time for more substantive objections. The famous Wolffian J. A. Eberhard insisted that Kant, by and large, said nothing new compared to Leibniz and Wolff, J. G. G. Feder saw a closeness between Kant and Berkeley, and A. Weishaupt generally reproached Kant for extreme subjectivism. But the most dangerous attacks against Kant were made by F. G. Jacobi. He drew attention to the ambiguity of Kant’s position in interpreting the concept of a thing in itself. On the one hand, Kant claimed that things in themselves are unknowable, on the other, he expressed himself as if he wanted to say that these things affect feelings, i.e., he still expressed some substantive judgments about the unknowable.<\/span><\/p>\n

Jacobi’s remarks in 1787 had a great influence on the further development of German philosophy. It seemed to many that Jacobi had demonstrated to philosophers the inevitability of a simple alternative: either one must acknowledge the ability of the human mind to penetrate the supersensible world by means of some kind of illumination, or one must reject the concept of the thing-in-itself and deduce everything from the concept of the subject. The first path means a decisive rejection of systematicity and rigor in thinking; the second inevitably leads to an exaggeration of the possibilities of systematic thought and the gradual replacement of the human subject by the divine Self.<\/span><\/p>\n

Both of these paths were tried by German philosophers, although the historical significance of the second turned out to be more significant. However, the influence of Jacobi was not limited here. The history of German speculative philosophy after Kant is unthinkable without mentioning another author –\u00a0<\/span>Karl Leonhard Reinhold<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0(1758 – 1823). His hour struck in the late 80s. By that time, in the few years that had passed since the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s ideas had become quite widespread. A special role in the popularization of Kantian philosophy was played by I. Schulz, L. G. Jacob, and K. Chr. E. Schmid, who published a dictionary of Kantian terms as early as 1786. All these processes received a new impetus from Reinhold. In 1786-1787 he published Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, where he emphasized the moral value of Kant’s ideas. Reinhold, however, did not stop at explaining Kant’s merits and soon began the “interpretative” stage in the development of Kantianism. He wanted to make Kant’s theories more understandable and, to this end, attempted to systematize his views on human nature, starting from self-evident premises. Reinhold considered the “fact of consciousness” to be the main one. Its expression is the so-called “law of consciousness”: “representation in consciousness differs in subject from subject and object and is related to both.” From the ability to represent, Reinhold wanted to derive all the theoretical and practical abilities of the soul, which, as he believed, were unsystematically expounded by Kant.<\/span><\/p>\n

In examining the faculty of representation, Reinhold first of all separated the \u201cexternal\u201d conditions of representation, subject and object, from the \u201cinternal\u201d ones, which include what in representation corresponds to the object and subject. The object in it corresponds to the content of the representation, the \u201cmaterial,\u201d the subject to the form brought by it itself, while the \u201cobjective material\u201d is given by things in themselves. The material side of representation corresponds to the receptivity of this faculty, the formal side to its spontaneous activity, consisting in the synthesis of the given manifold. According to Reinhold, the basis of theoretical and practical abilities is consciousness. In consciousness, the faculty of representation is actualized. For this actualization, this faculty alone is not enough; it is also necessary to admit a certain power of representation, from which, as from any power, \u201cstriving\u201d is inseparable. This striving can subsequently be emphasized on the material or formal side of representation. In the first case, we are talking about a sensual desire aimed at pleasure, in the second – about pure disinterested volition. Through the concept of secondary accentuation, Reinhold derived cognitive ability from the fact of consciousness. Consciousness itself, according to his \u201cExperience of a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation\u201d (1789), \u201cconsists in the correlation of pure representation with the object and the subject; and it is inseparable from any representation in general\u201d (21: 321). Cognition is consciousness accentuated on the object and defining it by concepts. Reinhold connects the ability to sense and contemplate with the receptivity and diversity of representation, and the ability to think with its active side. Contemplation and conceptual thinking are necessary for cognition. Thinking can be directed at the object and abstracted from it. This is reason and intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reinhold’s systematic efforts were enthusiastically received by many German thinkers of the late 18th century. However, Reinhold made a mistake by not taking into account Jacobi’s criticism of Kant. Like Kant, he considered the concept of the thing-in-itself to be legitimate. For this, he was routed by G. E. Schulze. In addition to attacks on the theory of the thing-in-itself, in 1792 Schulze showed that Reinhold’s “law of consciousness” could not be the original principle, as he wanted. After all, it presupposes a more fundamental logical law of identity. Reinhold himself was unable to respond satisfactorily to Schulze. More productive solutions were proposed by J. G. Fichte.<\/span><\/p>\n

Literature<\/span><\/strong><\/h5>\n

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25.Strawson PF<\/span><\/em>\u00a0The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. L, 1966.<\/span><\/p>\n

26. Westphal K.<\/span><\/em>\u00a0Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge, 2004.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This chapter is dedicated to one of the most influential philosophers in the history of thought, Immanuel Kant, the man who instilled in European culture the spirit of critical reflection, carried out a transcendental turn in the metaphysics of the New Age, and proclaimed the \u201cabsolute value\u201d of the human personality. The impact of Kant\u2019s ideas is felt by anyone who has any understanding of philosophy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":616,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[40,84],"tags":[148,147,145,146],"class_list":{"0":"post-615","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-philosophy","8":"category-filosofianovogovremeni","9":"tag-judgment","10":"tag-logic","11":"tag-principles","12":"tag-reason"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/615","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=615"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/615\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":618,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/615\/revisions\/618"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/616"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=615"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=615"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planeta21vek.ru\/artemiada\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=615"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}