The discussions about the relationship between the mental and the physical, discussed in the previous chapters, can be classified as a metaphysical part of the modern philosophy of consciousness. Despite the undoubted productivity of such discussions, some philosophers express doubts about the possibility of achieving positive results in this area and provide arguments in favor of their point of view. For example, K. McGinn believes that the human mind, which arose through the process of natural selection, is simply not designed to resolve questions of this kind.
McGinn’s position is supported by one of the most famous philosophers of our time, Steven Pinker (in April 2004, Time magazine included him in the list of the hundred most influential people in the world). Pinker was born in 1954 in Montreal. He received a bachelor’s degree in experimental psychology from McGill University in Montreal in 1976 and a doctorate in 1979 from Harvard University. From 1982 to 2003, Pinker worked at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and in 2003 he became a professor in the psychology department at Harvard.
At the beginning of his scientific career, Pinker worked as an experimental psychologist on problems of visual perception and form recognition. Then he switched his attention to psycholinguistics. He was influenced by the ideas of Noam Chomsky, the most influential humanist of the second half of the twentieth century, the author of the concept of “universal grammar”, which assumes the existence of innate language mechanisms common to all people. Back in the 1950s, Chomsky opposed the behaviorist B. F. Skinner, who tried to explain the human capacity for speech on the basis of an associationist model of external “reinforcement” of verbal actions without assuming specific internal dispositions. But having shown that human speech is unrealistic without such innate structures that explain the ability of children to easily learn the most complex grammatical rules and generate a potentially infinite number of new linguistic units, Chomsky did not clarify the question of their origin.
Not satisfied with this position, Pinker attempted to find an evolutionary explanation for the innate mechanisms of language. He summarized his findings in The Language Instinct (1994), in which he treats language as an important adaptive mechanism for receiving and disseminating vital information. He later tested the evolutionary approach on other components of human consciousness, such as perception and categorical thinking. The result of these efforts was the publication of How the Mind Works (1997), which quickly became a bestseller. In 2002, Pinker published an even more extensive work, Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, which provides a generalized image of human nature and analyzes its possible cultural and political implications.
Pinker conceives of human nature as a kind of precision mental aggregate, consisting of many heterogeneous mechanisms and finely tuned to the original natural and social environment of man. The price for such specialization, however, is the enigmatic nature of the foundations of consciousness and the presence of other “eternal riddles” before which our mind stops. After all, reason is one of the mental mechanisms. It also has an algorithmic, “computational” nature and is designed for the rule-based unification of semantic elements. Therefore, it is not able to grasp “holistic”, “insanely simple” questions that relate not to the summation of elements, but to the elements themselves. Traditional problems of philosophy can be classified as such questions: consciousness-body, the nature of personality, free will, reference, universals and obligation. When considering such problems, reason resembles a bird with luxurious wings helplessly spread out on the ground (see 3: 565).
Thus, the riddle of consciousness and other “eternal questions,” according to Pinker, must apparently remain unanswered. He rightly traces this approach back to Hume’s principles. But, like Hume, he does not limit himself to skeptical statements. Pinker is sure that these statements themselves today testify to “great progress in understanding the human psyche” (3: 563). After all, they presuppose an assessment of the psyche from evolutionary and “computational” positions. It is on the basis of “evolutionary psychology,” which includes a “computational theory of consciousness,” that philosophers can outline the main features of human nature.
Myths about Man. Pinker introduces his positive theory of human nature with a critical analysis of popular myths about man that are prevalent in the academic environment, but sometimes openly contradict common sense. The main target for Pinker, as well as for the founders of modern evolutionary psychology L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, who influenced him (the first attempts to build a psychology of this kind came from Darwin), is the so-called Standard Social Scientific Model (SSSM), which dominated the humanities of the twentieth century. According to this model, human behavior, unlike animals, “is determined by culture, an autonomous system of symbols and values” (1: 386). Cultures allow for the widest variations and can shape a person in the right direction. Biological limitations for such an influence, according to the standard model, are insignificant: children, “at birth, have almost nothing but a few reflexes” and an undifferentiated “ability to learn”; They “learn their culture through training, rewards and punishments, and role models” (1: 386). The core of this scheme, varieties of which are the Marxist theory of human essence as a set of social relations, gender feminism with its concept of the “role” nature of sex, and other concepts, can be expressed in the old formula: man is a “blank slate” filled with external influences. In addition to the myth of the “blank slate”, Pinker notes, two other misconceptions have also received “a sacred status in modern intellectual life”, namely the theory of the “noble savage” and the concept of the “spirit in the machine” (4: 6, 9). The first of these, going back to the ideas of Rousseau, idealizes the “natural” state of humanity, the second, associated with the name of Descartes, treats consciousness, or “spirit”, as an independent entity. Although these dogmas are logically independent of the theory of the “blank slate”, “in practice they often occur together” (4: 10). The original “purity” of man points to civilization as the source of all vices, and the lack of structure in his nature suggests that all his complex actions are performed by the spirit.
Pinker tries to falsify these theories with facts. Noble savages exist only in the imagination. Real assessments of the level of violence in various communities show a tendency for it to decrease with the development of civilization. Man is not a “blank slate” either, and not only general abilities but also a number of individual characteristics are innate, i.e. not determined by the environment, which is confirmed, in particular, by the significant mental similarity of twins who grew up separately. The complexity of human nature makes it unnecessary to assume a special spiritual essence that controls human actions.
A modular approach to human nature. Destroying myths about man allows Pinker to move on to a constructive characterization of human nature. He is primarily interested in its mental component — consciousness, or mind. But he interprets the mind not in a substantial sense, but as a result of brain activity. The human brain is an organ that has evolved as a special device for processing information. Accordingly, the mind should be considered as a “system of computing organs designed by natural selection to solve the types of problems that our ancestors encountered in their primitive lives” (3: 21). Pinker is not convinced by the criticism of computational theories of consciousness by R. Penrose and J. Searle. He believes that Penrose has made a lot of gross errors, and Searle is openly abusing common sense. But Pinker is not a supporter of identifying subjective states of consciousness with computational processes in the brain.
Each mental organ, or module, he suggests, has its own special internal architecture and purpose. The “basic logic” of any module is determined by our genetic program. The subproblems that a particular module solved in our ancestors were part of “one big problem for their genes: maximizing the number of copies passed on to the next generation” (3: 21).
Accordingly, one of the main tasks in studying mental modules, according to Pinker, should be the procedure of “reverse engineering”, allowing to answer the questions of “when and why” they arose. Such studies seem to be attempts to revive the teleological approach to studying man. But it is well known how absurd or even anecdotal the search for answers to the question: “For what purpose?” can be. In addition, teleological analysis seems to be devoid of the real predictive value that characterizes scientific research.
Pinker understands these dangers. He himself gives examples of pseudo-evolutionary reverse engineering: “What purpose does music serve? It brings a community together. Why did happiness evolve? Because happy people are nice to be around, so they attract more allies. What is the function of humor? To relieve tension,” and so on (3: 37). The weakness of these explanations is their scant factual base and the fact that they rely on premises that themselves need to be explained. Indeed, “Why do rhythmic sounds bring a community together? Why do people like to be around happy people? Why does humor relieve tension?” (3: 38). The correct approach involves implementing the following procedures. First, the goal that the organism must achieve is specified. Then it is established which mechanism would contribute most to its implementation. And only after we have established a priori what a “well-designed consciousness” should be like in a given situation, should we establish empirically whether our consciousness is one. With reliable support from facts, such hypotheses also acquire predictive value. Understanding the original functions of a particular mental module allows us to predict its possible reactions in the new environment in which humanity finds itself. Sometimes this helps solve specific problems of a practical, political or even artistic nature.
The empirical algorithm for establishing innate mental modules, according to Pinker, looks like this. For example, if we are talking about recognizing shapes, then after we have generally decided whether a system that recognizes, for example, furniture, can also recognize faces, or whether a special algorithm is needed for this, “using data from biological anthropology, we can look for evidence of whether our ancestors had to solve this problem in the conditions of existence in which they evolved” (1: 400). Next, we must turn to data from ethnography or psychology: if some module is innate, then, for example, children solving the corresponding problems “should look like geniuses, knowing things that they were not taught”. Finally, “if a module for some problem really exists, neurology should discover that in the brain tissue involved in solving this problem there are certain kinds of physiological connections, such as those that form a system or subsystem” (1: 400).
Using these criteria, Pinker allows for the existence of the following basic modules, or “instinct families,” in the human psyche: language, perception, intuitive mechanics, intuitive biology, numbers, mental maps for large areas, choice of habitat, instincts associated with danger, food, infection and disease, observation of one’s state, intuitive psychology, a database on individuals, self-knowledge, justice, kinship, sexual partnership (1: 400–401).
The given list of mental modules differs significantly from the traditional classification of mental abilities in “standard psychology,” which divides its subject into categories of perception, memory, attention, thinking, emotions, as well as development, personality, anomalies, etc. Studying consciousness by abilities is as effective, Pinker believes, as studying a machine first by its steel parts, then by its aluminum ones, etc. The real human psyche is such that its innate modules can contain components of the most diverse general abilities.
The modular approach, Pinker is convinced, is a real revolution in psychology. Unlike traditional views, it seems counterintuitive, but this is no more than an appearance, since the latest experimental data literally crushes the usual pictures of mental life. Thus, based on the standard theory of general abilities, such as reason, reproductive imagination, etc., it is difficult to admit that a person can, for example, recognize things, but not recognize people, or have high intelligence, but not master the rules for combining words in a sentence, etc. Facts, however, show the reality of such cases, which, according to Pinker, can be fully explained only in the modular theory of the psyche, although this thesis is disputed by representatives of the connectivist direction of modern philosophy of consciousness, such as P. Churchland, who are trying to prove that even if the brain has only general-purpose neural networks, they are capable of learning to solve specialized problems
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Innate mental modules, Pinker argues, can only function in interaction with the environment. For example, the language instinct becomes the ability to speak English or French. The general scheme of interaction between innate mental structures and the environment, according to Pinker, is as follows. Human biological heredity “lays down internal mental mechanisms,” including learning ones. Thanks to the latter, we can learn skills, abilities, knowledge, and values, which together constitute culture. They develop other mental modules, preparing them to process initial information from the environment. The interaction of all these factors gives rise to certain behavior (see 1: 389).
The concept of culture. To adequately understand this scheme, it is necessary to clarify the role of culture. As already noted, Pinker refuses to recognize it as an autonomous reality. At the same time, he criticizes the nominalistic concept of culture in its “memetic” version. The analogy of the change and spread of cultural units, memes, with the process of mutations and natural selection, he believes, is very conditional. After all, the modification of memes, which occurs as a result of conscious mental efforts of people, is little like biological mutations resulting from errors in copying DNA. More promising, in his opinion, is the so-called epidemic theory of culture. Culture is “a set of technological and social inventions accumulated by people to make their lives easier,” nothing more (4: 65). These inventions do not exist on their own, but in the minds of people or in coded form on material carriers. Various cultural technologies potentially, and sometimes actually, compete with each other, and the more successful ones spread quickly, like in an epidemic. Despite the “pathogenic” metaphors, Pinker is sure that this concept of culture contains many healing moments. After all, some technologies can be more effective than others and, when they collide, displace the latter. It is important to understand that there is nothing terrible about this. Cultures can change. It is a big mistake to try to absolutize cultural values, to attach excessive importance to national cultural differences, etc.
Thus, the absolutization of culture, carried out in the Standard Social Scientific Model, distorts the real role of the latter, which is reduced to creating conditions for the most effective implementation of innate mental mechanisms, and in a certain sense rebels against human nature itself. The history of the 20th century, Pinker argues, has given many examples of hushing up and ignoring human nature, including in the sphere of artistic creativity (an illustration of which he considers modernist and postmodernist art), as well as deliberate attempts to completely remake it, which could not but end in failure. Adherents of the ideology of the “blank slate” justified their position by the fact that the recognition of innate mental qualities and inclinations of people, such as selfishness or aggressive impulses, inevitably leads to the legitimization of discrimination, violence and other harmful consequences.
Pinker strongly disagrees with such statements, showing that they are based on the so-called “naturalistic fallacy.” It consists of the fact that the natural, the organic, is automatically equated with the good. This means that if a person, for example, is naturally inclined to aggression, then aggression must be justified. But this method of reasoning is erroneous. The existent cannot be confused with the proper.
However, the idea of what is due is also rooted in human nature (although ethics, like mathematics, can have its own objective logic). Pinker shows that the “moral sense”, interpreted by him as a set of altruistic emotions such as shame, compassion, justice, etc., like other components of human nature, is a product of evolution. Altruism is a beneficial adaptive tactic. But this does not mean that morality can be identified with a hidden form of egoism. Pinker agrees with R. Dawkins’ thesis about the “selfishness” of an individual’s genes, but he emphasizes that the metaphorical selfishness of these genes should not be identified with the selfishness of the individual himself. The maximum dissemination of the genes inherent in this individual can be facilitated by his truly altruistic behavior, since copies of these genes are also present in his neighbors, and their support contributes to the multiplication of such sets of DNA.
Thus, the admission of innate components of human nature does not mean the legitimization of aggression and egoism. But Pinker does not limit himself to this negative conclusion. In The Blank Slate, he consistently proves that the recognition of the inner nature of man not only does not encroach on such values as equality of opportunity, freedom and justice, but also strengthens them, allowing to soften the severity of social and other conflicts. After all, it is the existence of a single human nature that makes it possible to talk about universal values common to all of humanity. Based on this premise, it is possible to effectively combat the oppression of people in those places where they still prevail. The denial of innate human aspirations for autonomy, self-expression, justice, well-being, etc. cannot but lead to the conclusion about the relativity of all these values, which preserves discrimination and criminal political regimes.
Genetically determined similarities between people, Pinker emphasizes, significantly exceed hereditary differences between them. Nevertheless, these differences are quite real. For example, men are on average more sexually active than women, individuals have hereditary predispositions that determine the differences in their characters, levels of intelligence, etc. One cannot pretend, Pinker believes, that all this does not exist. On the contrary, it is necessary to take such facts into account and seek compromise social solutions that, on the one hand, would allow people to receive according to their abilities, and on the other, not to suffer from not always favorable hereditary qualities and inclinations. In some cases, it is necessary to prevent the manifestation of negative inclinations by toughening punishments for actions resulting from them.
In short, Pinker calls not to turn away from reality, but to look it in the eye. Such an honest policy should bear fruit. He is optimistic about the future of humanity. The integration of cultures has already led to the expansion of the sphere of applicability of the moral sense of individuals, which initially covered only their immediate environment, to all people living on Earth (the idea of the “expanding circle” of the moral, first clearly explicated by P. Singer at the end of the 20th century). Cooperation and respect for the rights of others are gradually replacing aggressive competition and hatred between peoples.
Philosophy, according to Pinker, can contribute to all these processes, but only if it does not multiply myths, but clears the field for ever larger-scale empirical studies of human nature and brings together their results. And there is no need to be afraid, he believes, that the materialistic theory of man will lead to the loss of the idea of his dignity and will make our existence meaningless. On the contrary, the rejection of the phantom of the spiritual essence that settles in the human body and survives after its disintegration teaches us to value every moment of our lives.
Literature
1. Pinker S. Language as instinct. M., 2004.
2. Pinker S. The Language Instinct. NY, 1994.
3. Pinker S. How the Mind Works. NY, 1997.
4. Pinker S. The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature. NY, 2002.
